893.00/14989
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Davies)36
In a conversation with Chou En-lai, Communist representative in Chungking, I cautiously explored the possibility of our drawing on Communist intelligence regarding enemy activities. He responded in a seemingly cooperative spirit, but pointed out that for really effective liaison we should have a small group of officers stationed in their territory. Chou’s supply of incoming information from North China is obviously limited. But they had at their command at Yenan and in northern Shansi a steady flow of intelligence regarding the Japanese, particularly with regard to their operations in North China, Manchuria, the Yangtze valley and, until recently, Hainan.
Chou reiterated his invitation of last summer for a small group of American officers to set up observers’ posts in Shensi and Shansi. He pointed out that if we plan to assist in driving the Japanese from North China, it is now not too early to begin investigating sites for possible airfields in Shensi, Shansi, Hopei and Shantung and to begin studying at first hand conditions in that area. He seemed to be particularly anxious that an air officer investigate airfield possibilities in Shensi-Shansi. It would be advisable, according to Chou, to indicate to the Central Government at the outset that the observer stations are considered permanent stations for the duration. The personnel could then be rotated without misunderstanding over the principle of American officers proceeding to that area for air and ground intelligence work in cooperation with the Chinese authorities in North China.
His organization, Chou said, has received radio reports from its agents on Hainan Island. But the last remaining radio in possession of the Communists on Hainan had apparently ceased to function, for they receive no more direct messages. He stated that the Communists are the strongest force on the island resisting the Japanese.
[Page 215]I then asked him a blunt question, one completely out of my professional character. I said that if we wished to extend lend-lease aid impartially to the Chinese Army, irrespective of political complexion and including those who seemed to be the most anxious to fight the common enemy, would we be able to do so. He shook his head, replying that the prejudice against and suspicion of the Eighteenth Group Army was too strong. He then added that after the American Navy has further whittled down Japanese naval strength and the Chinese Army settles down to the truly formidable task of trying to drive the Japanese Army from China, the Generalissimo’s attitude toward the Communists may undergo a change because General Chiang will discover that the Japanese are much stronger than he now realizes. It is bad to over-estimate the Japanese, Chou commented, it is quite as bad to under-estimate them. The Generalissimo is guilty of the latter error, he said. And when General Chiang discovers that the Japanese are not going to be easily rolled back into the sea, then he may feel that he will have to give more consideration to the Communists.
Chou exhibited anxiety over what the Japanese might do in the face of the movement of Chinese troops to Yunnan, the inflow of lend-lease arms by air and the Yunnan training project. He suggested that the Japanese must be suffering from a very strong temptation to attack Yunnan before Chinese-American strength in that area grows much further. If the Japanese occupy Yunnan, he observed, they have gone a long way toward strangulating Free China. And a Japanese invasion of that province poses no great difficulties for the enemy.
He corroborated the reports of bad feeling between Chen Cheng37 and Ho Ying-chin.38 He also stated that Chen Cheng was loath to assume the Yunnan command. He had accepted the command only after considerable pressure from the Generalissimo and had reportedly said just before his departure that he was going to stay only a few days at Kunming after which he intended to return.
In discussing General Sun of the 38th Division he remarked that it was a pity that Sun would probably not be eligible to become an Army commander. Explanation: Sun is not one of the Whampoa clique.
I asked him if he had seen T. V. Soong during the Foreign Minister’s visit to Chungking. He had. Soong had displayed to him a fair attitude toward the Communists. But Chou had heard that to others, Soong had been critical of the Communists. Chou was not sure whom the Foreign Minister was trying to deceive. He is not sure of Soong’s position beyond recognizing that Soong is personally exceedingly ambitious. …
[Page 216]Chou feels that the Foreign Minister is now biding his time. He remained in his home most of the time in Chungking. He did not interfere in economic matters. The Generalissimo would not permit him to do so because, as Chou remarked, General Chiang knows that H. H. Kung will do as he is told whereas Soong will not, he is too independent. As for foreign affairs, Soong realizes that the formulation of policy rests solely with the Generalissimo, the Foreign Minister’s function being simply to report. That Soong did, following which he retired to his residence where he spent most of his time attending to his own private affairs, including the Bank of China. He made new investments, conspicuously in Kweichow Province.
The Foreign Minister’s only major political accomplishment, according to Chou, was to institute a temporary housecleaning in the Chinese Red Cross. And this was achieved only after two strained sessions with the Generalissimo and a rather dramatic visit to a meeting of the Executive Yuan. C. T. Wang, who has apparently been mishandling the Red Cross, was removed on the grounds that he was “too elderly and needed a rest” and was replaced by Dr. Chiang Monlin, President of Peking National University.
I asked how Soong’s relations with the Kwangsi clique were. Chou said that they were good but that on this last visit the Foreign Minister had apparently studiously avoided having much contact with Pai Chung-hsi.
Finally, I asked Chou if he regarded Soong as a progressive force in Chinese politics. He hesitated and then said that there were two sides to Soong’s nature. He intimated that Soong might be considered modern in his outlook and methods, but not because of that necessarily progressive.
Premier Tojo’s visit to Nanking was viewed by Chou as a demonstration designed to give the Wang Ching-wei regime face and bolster its morale. He suggested that the visit may also have encompassed negotiations for the further use of Chinese manpower, both industrially (as in the reported transfer of Shanghai skilled labor to Manchuria) and militarily through increased conscription of puppet troops.