893.00/14970

Memorandum Prepared in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs 21

Kuomintang-Communist Situation

The Embassy at Chungking in its recent analysis of Kuomintang-Communist relations (telegram 176, February 1, 11 a.m.) stated that the most encouraging comment that can be made is that Kuomintang-Communist relations are now much the same as when the Embassy described them in its despatch no. 95, August 20, 1941.19 In that despatch the Embassy said, inter alia:

“… it becomes reasonably clear that there can be little hope of a real united front, that is, a united front grounded upon sincere political and military cooperation. Even though divergent social conceptions were insufficient to keep the parties apart, strong personal prejudice on the part of many of the Kuomintang leaders would effectively prevent real cooperation. Endeavors to bridge the gap between [Page 206] the older and controlling elements in the Kuomintang and the communist leaders would, it is felt, prove as ineffectual as they were unwelcome. On the other hand, prevention of an open rupture is considered to be quite feasible so long as the common front against Japan is viewed as a necessity and outside assistance in maintaining that front is desired.

“Once that necessity ceased to exist, the Kuomintang-Communist feud may be expected to flare up again, probably in the form of hostilities. The foregoing statement assumes a continuation of the present Kuomintang leadership. There is a possibility that the more liberal younger element in the Kuomintang may become sufficiently influential to effect a bridging of the gap—might even through the adoption of needed social and agrarian reforms cut the ground from under the communists and effect a relative degree of political unity in the country. This is in no wise an early prospect but it is worth bearing in mind when taking a long view of the situation.”

In its despatch no. 800 of December 16, 1942,23 which dealt with Kuomintang-Communist relations, the Embassy made the following comments:

“… Whatever strength the Communist party has derives more from the failures of the Kuomintang than in any positive accomplishment on its own part. Had the Kuomintang had the foresight to adopt simple effective measures for agrarian reform, equitable taxation, and for promotion of home industries along the lines of the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, for example, it could have cut the ground from under opposition such as the Communists represent. This could still be done but it is feared that the present Kuomintang leadership, sterile in so far as social reform is concerned, is incapable of altering its conservative course.”

The Embassy expressed the opinion in its recent analysis of Kuomintang-Communist relations (Chungking’s telegram no. 176 of February 1, 1943) that the elimination of the Communists by the present leadership of the Kuomintang is a question of “when” rather than “whether”. The Embassy adds, however, that the time has not arrived and may never arrive because Russian entrance into the war against Japan would make such a move inadvisable and because pressure from dissatisfied popular and official elements may enforce a liberalization of Kuomintang leadership after the peace.

The chief hope for the delay or avoidance of this conflict is the personal leadership of the Generalissimo, who, as the Ambassador has stated, foresees the harmful effect on foreign opinion which civil war would have and who is still able to restrain the military and more conservative party elements. This view is also held by the Communists who do not expect an immediate worsening of the present condition of armed truce in north and sporadic small-scale encounters in central China.

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The opinion that civil war is likely to be delayed would appear to be justified. There are, however, several factors which might possibly bring about Kuomintang-Communist hostilities before the end of the war with Japan. One of these would be the removal of the Generalissimo, which might permit extremist elements to gain control. Another might be Kuomintang fear of growing Communist power, especially among the people of the guerrilla zones in north China. A third might be a fear of possible Russian support of the Communists after the war. It is probably true that Russia does not desire a civil war in China at this time and has therefore given its support only to the Central Government. The Kuomintang may fear that this will not be the case after the war, especially if Russia has had a part in defeating Japan, and the liberal elements in China are strengthened thereby.

The present lack of unity in China and immobilization of substantial Kuomintang and Communist forces to offset each other is of importance during the present period because it hinders China’s war effort.

Assuming that the present armed truce will continue until the end of the war, there will still remain to be solved the fundamental question of internal peace and unity. It is to be hoped that the Generalissimo, Dr. T. V. Soong24 and other liberal elements may be in a position strong enough to bring about the reforms which can be the basis for lasting peace. However, there is still little evidence of a young, more liberal leadership rising in the Kuomintang itself. It is also possible that the Communists will be in a stronger position than ever before by reason of their probable control of most of north China. There will no longer be the common fear of an external attack. And the economic exhaustion of China and the deterioration of Chinese armies mentioned by Ambassador Gauss in his telegram referred to above will be factors which may contribute to civil war and which may make a Central Government victory in any such civil war difficult.

The foregoing is a brief summary of a situation which has serious implications affecting American interests both in the present war effort and in future efforts to assist post-war rehabilitation. It is a situation which merits careful study and the consideration of any action which might appropriately be taken to encourage and further Chinese unity. One possible course of action might be the sending of American officials to visit the Communist areas. This would have the double advantage of informing the Chinese of our interest in the whole question and of providing us with additional information regarding various phases of the problem. However, it is believed that [Page 208] the Chinese Government authorities would resent our sending representatives to Communist areas, without obtaining prior approval of the Government. And under present circumstances, it is to be doubted whether the Chinese Government would welcome a request for such approval.

  1. Drafted by the Third Secretary of Embassy in China (Service), temporarily in the United States, and the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Smyth); initialed by the Chief of the Division (Hamilton).
  2. Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. v, p. 533.
  3. Foreign Relations, 1942, China, p. 264.
  4. Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs.