893.00/14927: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received 1:25 p.m.]
176. Replying to your 137, January 25, midnight. Please refer to Embassy’s telegrams 1005, September 5, 9 a.m.; 1070, September 21, noon; and 1486, December 12, 10 a.m., 7th and 10th paragraphs, and to its despatches 408, May 14;15 468, June 18;16 501, July 7; 515, July 14; 613, September 20 [10]; and 800, December 16, 117 all 1942.
With regard to points numbered 1 and 2, there has been a clear and disturbing deterioration, as the Embassy had repeatedly reported, in the general economic situation in unoccupied China and in the condition of the Chinese armies due to undernourishment, disease and [Page 204] inaction but it is unlikely and unreasonable that the Chinese Government under present circumstances would find in this state of affairs a pretext for initiating repressive measures that might lead to civil war.
With regard to point 3, the Embassy’s information does not indicate that there has been any appreciable growth in the strength of the Communist army. There have been no large defections of national troops and individual defections have not materially affected the situation. It is understood that Communists now have more men than they can adequately arm and are encouraging soldiers to return to farms because of labour shortage. Embassy is informed that in order to avoid irritating the Kuomintang the Communists discourage defection of national troops or purchase of arms from them.
Although relations between the Communists and the Kuomintang are far from satisfactory, it is believed that the conclusion drawn is [in] the report that has reached the Department is not warranted.
In this connection particular attention is invited to my recent despatch number 800. Anti-communism continues to be cornerstone of Kuomintang policy but the leaders, notably the Generalissimo, consider it politic and practical to refrain from repressive action at this time. Liquidation of the Communists by the present Kuomintang leadership is a question of “when” rather than “whether”. The time has not arrived. It may never arrive. Russian entrance into the war against Japan would make such a move inadvisable. Liberalization of Kuomintang leadership after peace under pressure from dissatisfied popular and official elements would render conflict improbable. While the war against Japan continues, civil war is not likely to occur. Conversations with informed Kuomintang and Communist leaders here, including Chou En-lai who is mentioned in the Department’s telegram, confirm this opinion.
Hall of the National City Bank who recently travelled through Communist territory and stayed some time in Yenan reports that morale there is good, that Communist forces have fair equipment of small arms but need mountain guns and that they are carrying on guerrilla warfare but are impatient of situation which prevents them from collaborating with national armies in attacking Japanese in force. He says that whereas commodities are limited, people seem to have a fair quantity of necessities including medicines. He observes that morale of national troops he saw in south Shensi was not so good, that economic conditions were disturbing, and that corruption among military and civil officials was relatively common compared with apparent absence thereof in Yenan. Incidentally he states that he was well and courteously treated by Chinese throughout his long journey.
[Page 205]In conclusion probably the most encouraging comment that can be made regarding Kuomintang-Communist relations is that they are now much the same as they were when the Embassy described them at some length in its dispatch number 95 of August 20, 1941.19
- Foreign Relations. 1942, China, pp. 232, 241, 260, and 197, respectively.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1942, China, pp. 98, 206, 235, and 264, respectively.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. v, p. 533.↩