Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China

893.00/14924

Memorandum by the Third Secretary of Embassy in China (Service), Temporarily in the United States

[Washington,] January 26, 1943.

Reference Chungking’s despatch No. 800, December 16, 1942,⁹ enclosing copies in translation¹⁰ of: the Resolution concerning Kuomintang-Communist relations passed by the recent plenary session of the Kuomintang’s Central Executive Committee; a reply of the Communist Party; and an editorial from the Communist daily at Chungking.

[Here follows summary of a portion of the despatch.]

The Communists (Chou En-lai and General Lin Piao are referred to) were not particularly apprehensive of an immediate conflict. They were, however, pessimistic regarding any improvement in relations. Lin was concerned over present small scale clashes between Central Government troops and the “New Fourth Army”, and the Government’s insistence on that Army’s actual as well as theoretical elimination. Chou was reported to “continue to believe” that “it is a case of when rather than whether the Kuomintang takes forceful action to liquidate the Communists.” His hope for the avoidance of present trouble is that Chiang Kai-shek’s political wisdom will “steer away from trouble for the time being even though less wise party and military men might wish to have a showdown now.” (I was present at this interview with Chou and Lin which is here only partially reported. Lin was obviously very gloomy and discouraged. He said that he had come to Chungking in regard to the recent clashes between the Central Government and the New Fourth Army, rather than to discuss over-all Kuomintang-Communist relations. Negotiations had proved impossible because of the uncompromising attitude of Chungking military leaders.)

[Here follows summary of remainder of the despatch.]

Comment: This description of the present Kuomintang leadership, with which I am in entire agreement, was fully developed in a memorandum by John Carter Vincent, entitled: “The Chinese National Government; Its Leadership and Influential Elements”, forwarded by Chungking under cover of despatch No. 553, July 30, 1942.¹¹ That memorandum is background for many of the unsupported statements made in this despatch.

In that memorandum, there were also made several points which have direct relationship to the question of Kuomintang-Communist relations and the likelihood of civil war: the conservative character of the Party follows through to the Army, some parts of which desire to conserve their strength for eventual internal “adjustments”; if Chiang Kai-shek is removed the principal preoccupation will be internal unity; effective measures for financial, economic and social reform cannot be expected from the present leadership either now or in the post-war period; if Russia assists in the defeat of Japan, the liberals and Communists will be greatly strengthened; rather than meet the situation by long overdue reforms, it is likely that the present Kuomintang leadership will go to the extremes of reaction, adopting suppressive measures to kill all opposition.

9. Foreign Relations, 1942, China, p. 264.
10. Enclosures not printed.
11. Foreign Relations, 1942, China, p. 211.