893.00/14969
Memorandum by the Third Secretary of Embassy in China (Service), Temporarily in the United States
Kuomintang-Communist Situation
An outstanding impression gained during the past eighteen months spent in Chungking and in travel through Southwest and Northwest China is that the most careful study should be given to the internal political situation in China, particularly the growing rift between the Kuomintang and the Communists.
The “United Front” is now definitely a thing of the past and it is impossible to find any optimism regarding the possibility of its resurrection as long as present tendencies continue and the present leadership [Page 194] of the Kuomintang, both civil and military, remains in power. Far from improving, the situation is deteriorating. In Kuomintang controlled China the countering of Communism is a growing preoccupation of propaganda, of both military and civilian political indoctrination, and of secret police and gendarmerie activity. There is not only a rigorous suppression of anything coming under the ever widening definition of “Communism” but there appears to be a movement away from even the outward forms of democracy in government. It is now no longer wondered whether civil war can be avoided, but rather whether it can be delayed at least until after a victory over Japan.
The dangers and implications of this disunity are obvious and far-reaching. Militarily, the present situation is a great hindrance to any effective war effort by China. Its deterioration into civil war would be disastrous. The situation therefore has direct relationship to our own efforts to defeat Japan. At the present time a large and comparatively well trained and equipped portion of the Kuomintang Army is diverted from active combat against the Japanese to blockade the Communists. In the north (Kansu and Shensi) the lines are well established by multiple lines of block houses and these large forces remain in a condition of armed readiness. Further south (Hupeh, Anhwei, North Kiangsu) the lines are less clearly demarcated and sporadic hostilities, which have gone on for over two years and in which the Kuomintang forces appear to take the initiative, continue.
On the other side, the Communist Army is starved of all supplies and forced in turn to immobilize most of its strength to guard against what it considers the Kuomintang threat. It was admitted by both parties that there was extreme tension in Kuomintang-Communist relations in the spring of 1942. The Communists believe that it was only the Japanese invasion of Yunnan that saved them from attack at that time. The Communists and their friends claim, furthermore, that the Kuomintang is devoting its energies to the strengthening of its control over those parts of China accessible to it rather than to fighting Japan. This strengthening of the position of the Kuomintang will of course assist it in reestablishing its control over areas which will then be opened to it. A logical part of such a policy would be the taking over, as soon as an opportunity is found, of the Communist base area in Kansu-Shensi. Success in this move would weaken the Communists and make easier the eventual recapture by the Kuomintang of the Communist guerrilla zones: To support this thesis the Communists point to the campaign in the more extreme Kuomintang publications for the immediate abolition of the “Border Area”. Another factor sometimes suggested as tending to provoke an early Kuomintang attack on the Communists is the desirability, from the [Page 195] Kuomintang point of view, of disposing of them before China finds itself an active ally of Russia against Japan.
The possible positive military value of the Communist army to our war effort should not be ignored. These forces control the territory through which access may be had to Inner Mongolia, Manchuria and Japanese North China bases. The strategic importance of their position would be enhanced by the entry of Russia into the war against Japan. This importance is largely potential but fairly recent reports of continued bitter fighting in Shansi indicate that the Communists are still enough of a force to provoke periodic Japanese “mopping up” campaigns. Reflection of this is found in the intensive Japanese anti-Communist propaganda campaign in North China in the summer of 1941, although the fact must not be overlooked that Japanese propaganda has emphasized the anti-Communist angle to appeal to whatever “collaborationist” elements there may be in occupied China and to the more conservative sections of the Kuomintang. This activity in Shansi and the difficulties of the Japanese there contrast with the inactivity on most of the other Kuomintang-Japanese fronts.
Aside from the immediate war aspects, the political implications of this situation are also serious. Assuming that open hostilities are for the time being averted, the eventual defeat and withdrawal of the Japanese will leave the Kuomintang still confronted with the Communists solidly entrenched in most of North China (East Kansu, North Shensi, Shansi, South Chahar, Hopei, Shantung, North Kiangsu and North Anhwei). In addition the Communists will be in position to move into the vacuum created by the Japanese withdrawal from Suiyuan, Jehol and Manchuria, in all of which areas there is already some Communist activity. In the rest of China they will have the sympathy of elements among the liberals, intellectuals, and students. These elements are of uncertain size but of considerable influence in China, and the Kuomintang’s fear of their power, and the power of whatever underground organization the Communists have succeeded in maintaining in the Kuomintang area, is indicated by the size and activity of its various secret police organs.
But possibly the greatest potential strength of the Communists, and one reason why military action against them will not be entirely effective at the present time, is their control of the rural areas of North China in the rear of the Japanese. Here the Kuomintang cannot reach them and the Communists have apparently been able to carry out some degree of popular mobilization. I am in possession of a secret Kuomintang publication describing the “Communist Control of Hopei”. It discusses measures of combatting the Communists (by such means, for instance, as the blockade now being enforced) and concludes that if the Communists fail to “cooperate” (i. e. submit to [Page 196] complete Kuomintang domination) they must be “exterminated”. I hope to make a translation of this pamphlet which would appear to have significance as an official Kuomintang indication of the policy it will pursue in these areas. It seems reasonable to question, as some thoughtful Chinese do, whether the people of these guerrilla zones, after several years of political education and what must be assumed to be at least partial “sovietization”, will accept peacefully the imposition of Kuomintang control activated by such a spirit and implemented by military force and the political repression, and secret police and gendarmerie power, which are already important adjuncts of party control and which are being steadily strengthened and expanded.
Non-Communist Chinese of my acquaintance (as, for instance, the nephew of the well known late editor of the Ta Kung Pao) consider the likelihood of civil war the greatest problem facing China. They point out that the Communists are far stronger now than they were when they stood off Kuomintang armies for ten years in Central China and that they will be much stronger yet if it proves that they have succeeded in winning the support of the population in the guerrilla zone. They point to numerous recent instances of successful Communist infiltration into and indoctrination of opposing Chinese armies (such as those of Yen Hsi-shan) and wonder whether this will not cause a prolongation of the struggle and perhaps make a victory for the Kuomintang, or for either side, impossible. There is undoubtedly a strong revulsion in the mind of the average, non-party Chinese to the idea of renewed civil war and the Kuomintang may indeed have difficulty with the loyalty and effectiveness of its conscript troops.
Belief in the certainty of eventual civil war leads these same Chinese to question whether the United States has given sufficient realistic consideration to the future in China of democracy. The question is raised whether it is to China’s advantage, or to America’s own interests, for the United States to give the Kuomintang Government large quantities of military supplies which, judging from past experience, are not likely to be used effectively against Japan but will be available for civil war to enforce “unity” in the country by military force. These Chinese also speculate on the position of American troops which may be in China (in support of the Kuomintang Army) if there should be civil war; and wonder what will be the attitude of Russia, especially if it has become by that time a partner in the victory over Japan.
But ignoring these problematical implications, there can be no denial that civil war in China, or even the continuation after the defeat of Japan of the present deadlock, will greatly impede the return of peaceful conditions. This blocking of the orderly large scale [Page 197] rehabilitation of China will in itself seriously and adversely affect American interests. Even if a conflict is averted, the continuance or, as is probable in such an event, the worsening of the already serious economic strains within the country may result in economic collapse. If there is civil war the likelihood of such an economic collapse is of course greater.
There is also the possibility that economic difficulties may make the war-weary, over-conscripted and over-taxed farmers fertile ground for Communist propaganda and thus bring about a revolution going beyond the moderate democracy which the Chinese Communists now claim to be seeking. Such a Communist government would probably not be democratic in the American sense. And it is probable, even if the United States did not incur the enmity of the Communists for alleged material or diplomatic support of the Kuomintang, that this Communist government would be more inclined toward friendship and cooperation with Russia than with Great Britain and America.
For these reasons it would therefore appear to be in the interest of the United States to make efforts to prevent a deterioration of the internal political situation in China and, if possible, to bring about an improvement.
The Communists themselves (Chou En-lai and Lin Piao in a conversation with John Carter Vincent and the undersigned about November 20, 1942) consider that foreign influence (obviously American) with the Kuomintang is the only force that may be able to improve the situation. They admit the difficulty of successful foreign suggestions regarding China’s internal affairs, no matter how tactfully made. But they believe that the reflection of a better informed foreign opinion, official and public, would have some effect on the more far sighted elements of leadership in the Kuomintang, such as the Generalissimo.
The Communists suggest several approaches to the problem. One would be the emphasizing in our dealings with the Chinese Government, and in our propaganda to China, of the political nature of the, world conflict; democracy against fascism. This would include constant reiteration of the American hope of seeing the development of genuine democracy in China. It should imply to the Kuomintang our knowledge of and concern over the situation in China.
Another suggestion is some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist army as a participant in the war against fascism. The United States might intervene to the end that the Kuomintang blockade be discontinued and support be given by the Central Government to the Eighteenth Group Army. The Communists hope this might include a specification that the Communist armies receive a proportionate share of American supplies sent to China.
[Page 198]Another way of making our interest in the situation known to the Kuomintang would be to send American representatives to visit the Communist area. I have not heard this proposed by the Communists themselves. But there is no doubt that they would welcome such action.
This visit would have the great additional advantage of providing us with comprehensive and reliable information regarding the Communist side of the situation. For instance we might be able to have better answers to some of the following pertinent questions: How faithfully have the Communists carried out their United Front promises? What is the form of their local government? How “Communistic” is it? Does it show any democratic character or possibilities? Has it won any support of the people? How does it compare with conditions of government in Kuomintang China? How does the Communist treatment of the people in such matters as taxation, grain requisition, military service and forced labor compare with that in the Kuomintang territory? What is the military and economic strength of the Communists and what is their probable value to the Allied cause? How have they dealt with problems such as inflation, price control, development of economic resources for carrying on the war, and trading with the enemy? Have the people in the guerrilla area been mobilized and aroused to the degree necessary to support real guerrilla warfare?
Without such knowledge, it is difficult to appraise conflicting reports and reach a considered judgment. Due to the Kuomintang blockade, information regarding conditions in the Communist area is at present not available. Such information as we do have is several years out of date, and has limitations as to scope and probable reliability. Carlson4 was primarily a military man and had a limited knowledge of the Chinese language. Most of the journalists who have been able to visit the Communist area appear to have a bias favorable to the Communists. They also suffered from language limitations and were unable to remain in the area for an extended period.
I suggest that the American representatives best suited to visit the Communist area are Foreign Service Officers of the China language service. One or two men might be sent. They should combine moderately long term residence at Yenan or its vicinity with fairly extensive travel in the guerrilla area. It is important that they not be required to base a report on a brief visit during which they would be under the influence of official guides, but that they should have a sufficient time to become familiar with conditions and make personal day to day observations.
There is mail and telegraphic communication between Yenan and Chungking, and similar communication between various parts of the [Page 199] Communist area. The officers would therefore not be out of touch with the Embassy and could, if it is thought desirable, make periodic reports.5