Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China

740.0011 Pacific War/3144½

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)²⁰

[Washington,] March 5, 1943.

China is now represented on only two important United Nations organizations—(1) Pacific War Council, (2) United Nations Information Board. China also has limited liaison with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Chinese Military Attaché maintains an office in the Combined Chiefs of Staff Building and participates in some meetings of a general character.

The Pacific War Council is devoted almost entirely to an informal exchange of views and information among the persons participating in the meetings. The President usually reports on events of interest to those present. The United Nations Information Board is not an organization concerned with the day-by-day conduct of psychological warfare and is of relatively small importance in the general picture.

Among the more important organizations established by the United Nations to deal with various phases of the war there may be listed the following:

[Here follows list of 26 United Nations organizations, together with “purpose” and “nations represented.” For a similar list, see Department of State Bulletin, January 16, 1943, pages 66–78.]

From a study of the foregoing organizations there emerges plainly the fact that in all of the more important organizations the United States and Great Britain have almost exclusive representation, with the exception of those organizations primarily devoted to problems involving this hemisphere. At the same time, a study of the purposes of these organizations makes clear that such membership is founded on good reasons. The United States and Great Britain have the most to give and are giving the most in regard to the supplies dealt with in most of the committees or organizations. Nevertheless, it remains obvious that China is not represented on joint organizations to handle problems in connection with the war in the Far East.

There is considerable evidence to indicate that important sections of Chinese opinion both official and private regard the strategic planning and conduct of the war of the United Nations against the Axis countries as an American-British operation. This feeling is detrimental to the cooperative efforts of the United States and China against Japan. If allowed to continue it may become dangerous. Persons in China holding the conviction that war strategy is now purely Anglo-American feel strongly that China should be accepted as an “equal partner”. In support of this contention they cite China’s past contributions and China’s future potentialities. Such persons argue that strategy against the enemy Japan cannot be plotted and be executed to maximum advantage unless full use is made of the resources and experience of each country at war with Japan. In the light of China’s geographical position, vast manpower and what they regard as China’s war potential, they feel that China deserves to be represented on and heard in the highest councils.

There is growing evidence that the views outlined in the foregoing paragraph are coming to be accepted by an increasing number of members of Congress and private persons in this country.

The role which China and Chinese manpower and resources is to play in the crushing of Japan is primarily a military problem to be decided by competent military authorities. The time at which comprehensive staff discussions and planning between the highest military authorities of all forces which are to participate in the offensive drive against Japan should occur is also a matter to be decided by the competent military authorities. There are, however, important political considerations affecting not only present relations between the United States and China but also the long future of American relations with and American interests in countries of the Pacific area which make it important that prompt consideration be given to the question of bringing about on the part of China a feeling of partnership in the war of the United Nations against the Axis countries. One method might be to take the necessary steps to bring about more active participation by China in United Nations organizations at the earliest possible date.

It is suggested, therefore, that our thought should be directed constantly and intensively toward establishing at the earliest practicable time such organizations as may be desirable and feasible (1) to convince the Chinese of their increasing participation in war planning and execution of operations and (2) to contribute to the achievement of United States policy in the Pacific designed, first, totally to defeat the enemy in the shortest possible time and, second, to create conditions of long-range stability and orderly evolution in the Pacific area. Membership in such organizations, some of which might sit in Chungking and some in Washington, might include representatives of the United States and China and such others of the United Nations as might be desired both by the United States and China.

Chinese membership on many existing organizations might not be desirable or feasible. It is felt, however, that much good might be accomplished by the creation of new organizations in some instances similar in scope and purpose to existing organizations devoted to like problems in areas other than China and the Far East. In this connection, reference is made to the existing organizations listed above.

For example, there might now be established to advantage a Pacific Intelligence Board which would (1) take over the functions of the United Nations Information Board as they may pertain to the Pacific, (2) establish close cooperation between the United States and China in the gathering, exchange and dissemination of all forms of military, economic and political intelligence with respect to the Pacific area, and (3) develop and put into operation a well-coordinated program of psychological warfare against Some may argue that establishment of an of organization of this nature would be undesirable for the reasons that such a board might tend to color intelligence information, that Chinese information services are biased and not objective, and that in psychological warfare China might press strongly for overemphasis on freedom and independence for non-self-governing peoples in the Pacific area, including areas under the sovereignty of other United Nations. It is submitted, nevertheless, that in addition to the psychological advantages—such as stimulation of China’s sense of participation and responsibility and enhancement of the United Nations’ cause in the eyes of the peoples of the Pacific area—the establishment of an organization of this sort could produce practical results of material benefit to the war effort. The Chinese will continue their intelligence and psychological activities. These activities could be more readily tempered, coordinated and integrated with our own similar efforts through a board of this sort than could be accomplished through the present somewhat uncoordinated and individual programs. Establishment of such a board would not, meanwhile, interfere in any way with our present avenues of intelligence both in China and in nearby areas. Membership on a board of this sort would include representatives from the United States and China and such others of the United Nations as might be desirable. The activities of a board of this sort would coordinate and possibly merge many of the activities of such organizations as BEW, OSS and OWI²¹ now being carried on in connection with the war against Japan.

Among other organizations which suggest themselves there may be noted the following:

(1) Combined Chiefs of Staff for the Pacific. Subject, of course, to final decision by the highest military authorities, there may well be established Combined Chiefs of Staff for military operations in the theaters of, first, China, Indochina and Thailand; second, India, Burma and Malaya; and possibly third, Australia, the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines. At the present time Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is the United Nations’ Commander-in-Chief in the first theater, General Wavell is the United Nations’ Commander-in-Chief in the second theater, and General MacArthur is the United Nations’ Commander-in-Chief in the third theater. General Stilwell, who is Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo in the latter’s United Nations command, is also the Commanding General of all United States forces in India, Burma and China and the Commanding General of all United States forces in the “Asiatic theater”. The creation of a Combined Chiefs of Staff for the Pacific would be designed to facilitate full coordination of all efforts in three adjacent theaters of war, in all of which operations against Japan are being conducted.

(2) United States–China Supply Council. There might be established an organization with representation from at least the United States and China similar in scope and purpose to the already established Allied Supply Council. The Allied Supply Council has United States and Australian membership and has the purpose “to coordinate plans and advise on supplies available from Australian sources”. A council of the sort envisaged might well contribute to the solution of the difficult problem of supplies within China necessary for military operations. For example, something might be worked out to our mutual advantage in regard to transportation facilities, petroleum development, food stores, et cetera. At present these problems are dealt with separately by various Chinese organizations and by United States Army and other United States officials concerned.

(3) Combined Production and Resources Board. While at the moment the need for a board of this sort may not appear to be great, it is submitted that such an organization with possibly representatives from India sitting with United States and China representatives could go far to “complete the organizations needed for the most effective use of the combined resources” available from the United States, India and China in the prosecution of the war.

The creation of a board of this sort would have important psychological advantages in that it would include membership of both Indians and Chinese.

Such a board might also make significant practical contribution. The press has recently attributed to Mr. Stettinius, Lend-Lease Administrator, the prediction that Lend-Lease assistance to India would be “much more extended” for the reason that United States experts believe that India, if properly developed, could supply the entire Burma–China–India front. In this connection, there was attributed to Dr. Henry F. Grady²² the statement that if India had the tools and its labor were trained, India could supply Burma and China as well as itself. India is now the second largest producer of iron ore in the British Empire. At the present time important numbers of military vehicles are being assembled in India, gliders are being manufactured and military airplanes are being repaired. Large-scale production of military uniforms will soon supply United States forces there and other production of important military supplies is being prepared.

(4) Combined Raw Materials Board. At the present time the United Nations, especially the United States, are receiving limited amounts of important raw materials from China. Information with regard to the availability of such materials and ways and means for their procurement, shipment and utilization are at present handled by several organizations both in this country and in China. On the part of the United States there are (1) Metals Reserve Company, handling all metals, (2) Defense Supplies Corporation, handling bristles, silk, et cetera, and (3) BEW, which has sent “shipping expediters”, mining experts, et cetera, to China. In China there are (1) National Resources Commission, handling all minerals, (2) semiofficial Foo Shing Company, handling bristles, silk, et cetera, and (3) the China National Tea Company. The foregoing is not exhaustive of the list of governmental agencies and organizations involved. It is believed that creation of a China–United States Board to handle these problems would have beneficial psychological effect and might contribute to increased effectiveness in operations.

It has been suggested in various quarters that China be given a place on a supreme strategy board either to plot all United Nations strategy or at least that part of strategy determining operations against Japan.

There are arguments pro:

(1) Important political advantages might accrue from giving China such a position—the placing of China on such a board might go far to advance the United Nations’ cause in the eyes of all Oriental and colored peoples and might placate China’s feeling that she is being “left out of” decisions affecting prosecution of the war.

(2) Partly as a result of the foregoing and partly as a result of closer liaison with China such a step might make possible more use of China’s experience and knowledge of Japan’s war machine.

(3) The taking of this step might cause the Chinese more actively to engage the enemy in China and might assure the maximum use of China’s geographic position, manpower and total war potential.

There are arguments contra:

(1) China is not participating and cannot be expected to participate in the war against Germany. Even against Japan present operations of the United Nations are for the most part in areas removed from China.

(2) The creation of such a board with Chinese participation unless followed by development of strategic plans and reasonably early operations of a nature favored by China might serve only to heighten Chinese bitterness and resentment.

(3) Increasing the number of voices to be heard in plotting strategy for the war might result in delays, injudicious compromises and undesirable division of responsibility as well as in injurious recriminations.

To evaluate the arguments both pro and contra it is probably necessary to know whether operations against Japan are to be accelerated and expanded on a considerable scale in the relatively near future. If United States forces, with such assistance as might be available from other United Nations, are to undertake soon extensive operations against Japan, it would seem that the arguments pro are stronger than the arguments contra. If on the other hand the time is not yet ripe for operations of this sort, the arguments contra would seem to be stronger than the arguments pro. In this latter event the Chinese are bound to be disappointed whether or not they have membership on a board plotting grand strategy. The question resolves itself, therefore, primarily into a psychological one: whether the degree of disappointment on the part of the Chinese will be greater if they are present and must be told that operations of the nature which they desire are not feasible or if they are not present and subsequently observe that operations which they desire are not carried out. It is to be pointed out at the same time that highest decisions of grand strategy are for the most part made at personal meetings between such high leaders as President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, President Roosevelt and Mr. Molotov,²³ Mr. Churchill and Mr. Stalin,²⁴ and are not often made at meetings of persons of lesser rank.

Quite apart from the question of a new strategy board, it is believed that the political desiderata involved—including (1) China’s present and post-war attitude, (2) the offsetting of racial animosities in the Far East and especially in India, and (3) the development of conditions conducive to stability and orderly evolution in the Pacific area—make it a matter of importance that steps be taken directed toward giving China a greater feeling of joint participation in the war against the Axis countries.

Summary and Recommendation

If the foregoing suggestions meet with approval, it is suggested that Mr. Welles at one of his regular liaison meetings with General Marshall²⁵ and Admiral King²⁶ discuss with them the question of creating a Pacific Intelligence Board (see page 6 supra). Should General Marshall and Admiral King approve, this question might then be taken up with officials of BEW, OWI and OSS, and the project coordinated and put into shape for presentation to the Chinese Government.

It is suggested that Mr. Welles might also discuss with General Marshall and Admiral King the question of the possible creation of a Combined Chiefs of Staff for the Pacific (see page 7 supra).

If Mr. Welles approves, it is suggested that he ask Mr. Acheson to discuss with officials of BEW, Metals Reserve Company, Defense Supplies Corporation, and other interested agencies of this Government the question of the establishment of a United States–China Supply Council, a Combined Production and Resources Board, and a Combined Raw Materials Board (see pages 7–8 supra).

We believe that the steps which have been suggested would be helpful in achieving the broad-gauge political objectives of associating China more closely with our own war and post-war efforts, of offsetting racial animosities in the Far East and especially in India, and of developing conditions conducive to stability and orderly evolution in the Pacific area. We believe also that such steps would contribute measurably to the war effort.

M[axwell] M. H[amilton]

20. Submitted on March 6 to the Under Secretary of State (Welles) and Assistant Secretaries (Berle and Acheson).
21. Board of Economic Warfare, Office of Strategic Services, and Office of War Information, respectively.
22. Former Assistant Secretary of State; president of American President Lines Ltd.; head of American Technical Mission to India, March–May 1942.
23. V. M. Molotov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
24. Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Commissars (Premier) of the Soviet Union.
25. Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army.
26. Adm. Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations.