740.0011 Pacific War/3555½
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)80
I refer to a memorandum addressed to Mr. Long and Mr. Stettinius by FE under date October 2081 covering a Memorandum82 on the subject of recent conversations between the American Chargé d’Affaires and leading Chinese officials at Chungking in regard to the military situation in the China theater, and to the memorandum addressed by Mr. Long to Mr. Stettinius on October 20 covering same.83
By way of comment on various and sundry reports from Chungking dealing with the subject of apparent Chinese official apathy or indifference in relation to the problem of effort on the part of the Chinese to prepare for and/or to engage in offensive military operations,—I feel that we should take especially into consideration one factor which is of substantial importance and which does not gain mention in reports made by American agencies: namely, that various Chinese in high political and military circles are deeply resentful of the attitudes and methods of some American (and some British) authorities—a fact which may well contribute substantially toward the adoption by such Chinese of the attitudes and positions to which the reporting officers call attention. It is noteworthy also that the Chinese make against their American and their British allies charges not dissimilar to those which various representatives of the said allies, especially some American and some British representatives, make against the Chinese: namely, the charge of uncooperativeness on the part of [Page 153] various officers and a general tendency to pay too little attention to the China theater and its potentialities. Illustrative in that connection is the mention which Mr. Atcheson made in a conversation, as recorded, with Chinese officials of “the delay in construction of needed airfields and roads and the failure of the Chinese authorities to provide sufficient labor or funds for this work”. True, that delinquency on the part of the Chinese is a fact. However, an identical delinquency on the part of the British in Assam, also a fact, has been complained of both by Chinese and by American authorities.
It is quite true that the Chinese are apathetic as regards engaging in or preparing for offensive operations on a substantial scale. Toward overcoming this situation, it is imperative that we and the British give appropriate and adequate attention to the psychological and the material factors which underlie and in large part account for that unsatisfactory phenomenon. So long as the Chinese are doubtful of our intention to treat China as a real partner in a common effort on a fully cooperative basis, and until the Chinese have in their hands weapons in amounts and qualities warranting embarkation by them upon offensive operations, a standstill or sit-down attitude on their part is likely to continue to prevail and complaints about it on our part are likely to have little effect other than that of adversely prejudicing both Chinese opinion and our own opinions. Toward improving this situation, we need especially to make sure of the rightness of our own attitude, intentions and actions in regard to the Far Eastern theater and to our relations with and contacts with China and the Chinese.
In the light of these points, consideration of which will, I think, contribute somewhat toward putting the situation under reference in perspective, and in the light of the fact that Lord Mountbatten has been and is—in conference with Chinese and British and American authorities at Chungking and at New Delhi—looking into the situation under reference and its problems, I would recommend that we not for the present take this matter up with the War Department or any other agency of this Government; or, that if we do take it up with anybody and in any context we make effort to call attention not only to the unsatisfactory features of the Chinese attitude but also and at the same time to factors such as I have mentioned above which play a part in the determining of that attitude and to indicated ways and means resort to which might be expected to contribute toward an advantageous altering of that attitude.84
- Addressed to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine), the Assistant Secretary of State (Long), and the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius).↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 45, p. 121.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed; Mr. Long recommended that Mr. Stettinius might care to discuss the matter with the Secretary of War with the idea that it might be laid before the Chiefs of Staff and brought to the attention of the President. “In case they agree as to the seriousness of the situation it might be wise to have the President communicate directly with Marshal Chiang Kai Shek. An appropriate telegram could be drafted for his consideration after it has been passed by the Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of War.”↩
- Notation by Mr. Ballantine: “Concur J. W. B.”↩