740.0011 Pacific War/3529
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
No. 1693
Chungking, October 18,
1943.
[Received November 6.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s
telegraphic instruction no. 1302, September 17, 10 p.m. suggesting that,
when calling upon General Chiang Kai-shek upon my return to Chungking I
mention the great importance attached by the American Government to vigorous
prosecution by China of the war against Japan, and requesting that Mr.
Atcheson report the reactions of Chinese officials to his earlier approaches
in regard to China’s war effort and that I also report on any approaches I
might make. Reference is also made to related correspondence including the
Embassy’s telegrams nos. 1674, September 11 and 1711, September 15 and the
Embassy’s despatch no. 1589, September 17, 1943 (enclosing copies of
memoranda67 of Mr. Atcheson’s
conversations); also to my telegrams nos. 1807, September 26 and 1871,
October 6, 11 a.m.68 and my despatch no. 1626,
September 27, 1943.69
[Page 140]
I reported in my 1807, September 26 that General Stilwell had informed me
that as a result of Mr. Atcheson’s conversations the Chinese Government had
restored one-third of the appropriations for airfields and roads which had
been cut but that he was not satisfied with the general picture. A
memorandum of my conversation of September 25 with General Stilwell was
enclosed with my despatch no. 1626, September 27.
In my 1871, October 6, I reported briefly in regard to my call on General
Chiang Kai-shek on October 4 during which suitable opportunity was found to
emphasize the determination with which the Government and people of the
United States are devoting themselves to winning the war and to say that the
United States looked to its Allies, including China, to put forth all
effort, with the resources at their command, in cooperation with us to that
end. I reported also that General Chiang said that China could be counted
upon to do her share. A memorandum of my conversation with General Chiang is
enclosed. (The question of Russian relations with the other United Nations
as discussed with the Generalissimo was reported in my 1914, October 11,
noon.)70
Prior to my conversation with the Generalissimo (earlier opportunity to see
him did not arise because of his occupation with the Plenary Session of the
C. E. C. and the subsequent meeting of the People’s Political Council), I
had a long conversation on October [September] 24
with Dr. K. C. Wu, Acting Foreign Minister. A memorandum of this
conversation is enclosed. As regards the question of the war effort I
indicated that my personal opinion was similar to that recently expressed to
Dr. Wu by Mr. Atcheson (Embassy’s 1711, September 15 and despatch no. 1589,
September 17) and I said that it seemed to me that as the United Nations war
effort became intensified in this area there was strong likelihood that the
Japanese—pressed in the South Pacific, the Indian Ocean and Burma—might
undertake an all-out effort against China; hence it would be necessary for
all of us, including China, to exert the heaviest possible military effort
to prevent Japanese success. Dr. Wu replied that he fully appreciated the
situation; that as he had mentioned to Mr. Atcheson following their
conversation he had gone at once to the Generalissimo and he could say now
that the Generalissimo had issued appropriate instructions. During the
course of my conversation with Dr. Wu, the latter brought up the question of
the Kuomintang-Communist situation and also the subject of articles recently
published in the United States which were critical of China. These aspects
of the conversation are described in some detail in the enclosed
memorandum.
[Page 141]
In addition to talking with President Chiang and Dr. Wu, I have had
conversations with a number of high Chinese officials during which
opportunity occurred for me to make remarks along the lines of those
suggested by the Department in its 1302, September 17. Among these officials
have been Dr. H. H. Kung, Vice President of the Executive Yuan and
concurrently Minister of Finance; Dr. Wang Chung-hui, Secretary General of
the National Defense Council and former Foreign Minister; General Ho
Ying-chin, Chief of Staff and Minister of War; Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, former
Minister of Education and recently Secretary General of the Central Planning
Board, who has considerable influence with the Generalissimo and who is
probably shortly proceeding to England as the head of a good will mission;
General Wu Teh-chen, Secretary General of the Kuomintang Headquarters; Dr.
Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan; Dr. Wong Wen-hao, Minister of
Economic Affairs; Dr. Tseng Yang-fu, Minister of Communications; Dr. Quo
Tai-chi, former Ambassador to Great Britain and also former Foreign
Minister; and Dr. T. V. Soong, Foreign Minister, who has just returned to
Chungking. My conversations with these officials were along lines similar to
those taken in my conversations with General Chiang and Dr. Wu and their
responses and attitudes were in general similar to those of the
Generalissimo and the Acting Foreign Minister. Looking back over those
conversations it seems to me that of the officials other than the
Generalissimo, the most satisfactory interest in the problem presented was
exhibited by Dr. K. C. Wu and General Wu Teh-chen; the latter on his own
initiative took occasion on October 14 to inquire of Mr. Atcheson if any
improvement had occurred in the situation and he indicated that he had made
endeavor to cause improvement.
As regards the general question of Sino-American relations, my impression
from my conversations with Chinese officials since my return to Chungking
has been that they are almost universally and sincerely friendly to the
United States; that they look upon the United States as China’s best friend;
and that they are anxious that China maintain the good opinion as well as
the good will of the United States. While their continuing interest in the
Hanson Baldwin article in the August Reader’s Digest
and in other published articles critical of China on the one hand gave some
definite indication that the criticism was resented, I could not escape the
impression also that the criticism had struck home sufficiently to influence
Chinese leaders to endeavor to take steps which might put the Chinese
Government and its activities in a better light to American observers,
especially observers in the United States. (Various aspects of this
consideration have been discussed in the Embassy’s recent despatches in
regard to the Central
[Page 142]
Executive
Committee meeting in Chungking early in September and in regard to the
subsequent meeting of the People’s Political Council.) For example, Dr. Quo
Tai-chi, who is an intelligent and enlightened official of considerable
experience and who will probably again in the future assume some important
Government post, stated his opinion that the criticism had already had good
effect in China and that from the long range point of view it was preferable
that it had occurred now rather than later as there would probably result
the striking of a balance in regard to China in the American mind which
would preclude at some later time a sudden reaction from the current
“idealization” of China which might be most adverse. Dr. Quo also stated
that he felt that China had been vastly overpraised in the United States
since the United States became involved in the war and he seemed to feel
that the recent criticism constituted a beneficial leaven in connection with
this aspect of the situation. Dr. Quo’s remarks on this and related
questions are being made the subject of a separate despatch.71
In conclusion, I would say that while we have perhaps succeeded in impressing
upon some officials the need for increased and more effective war effort on
the part of China and while also there may be resulting some minor
improvement in some aspects of the situation, we cannot safely count under
present conditions (which involve of course the question of equipment for
the Chinese forces) on effecting any significant psychological change in the
Chinese attitude which will impel China’s leaders and soldiers to put forth
materially greater effort in the war against Japan. The Chinese have
persuaded themselves that the war in Europe will shortly end and that the
United States, possibly with help from Great Britain, will defeat Japan;
that the Chinese are too tired and too worn and too ill-equipped to make
greater effort, especially when such effort may not be necessary; and that
the Chinese can sit back, holding what they have against the Japanese, and
concentrate their planning upon China’s post-war political and economic
problems.72
Respectfully yours,
[Page 143]
[Enclosure 1]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of
Embassy in China (Atcheson)
[Chungking,] October 4, 1943.
| Participants: |
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek |
|
Ambassador Gauss |
|
Mr. Li Wei-kuo, Secretary to the
Generalissimo |
|
Lieutenant Colonel Chen Ping-chai, Aide
(Interpreter) |
|
Mr. Atcheson |
The Ambassador, accompanied by Mr. Atcheson, called on the Generalissimo
by appointment at five o’clock this afternoon. The conversation opened
with the usual exchange of amenities and further exchanges occurred
during its course. The Generalissimo said he was very glad to see the
Ambassador back and inquired after his health and the health of the
President and of Secretary Hull. The Ambassador said that he brought to
the Generalissimo cordial greetings and best wishes from the President
and the Secretary of State; he said that on his return journey he had
learned that the Generalissimo had been elected President of the
National Government of China and he wished to offer his most cordial
congratulations. The Generalissimo showed pleasure and a very friendly
appreciation of the message of greetings and of the congratulations.
General Chiang exhibited an almost immediate interest in the question of
Soviet Russian relations. He asked whether Mr. Hull would personally
attend the tripartite Foreign Minister’s conference. The Ambassador
replied he had no official information but assumed from recent press
reports that he would attend in person. He then asked where conference
would be held. Mr. Gauss stated that when he left Washington there had
been no announcement on the subject. General Chiang then asked what was
the opinion in Washington when Mr. Gauss left as to Soviet continuance
in the war and collaboration with partners of the United Nations. The
Ambassador replied that he had not discussed this subject with higher
authorities in Washington but that from his conversations in official
circles generally he had the definite impression that there was full
American confidence that Soviet Russia would continue in the war and in
collaboration with partners of the United Nations. The Generalissimo
commented that there had always been deep suspicion of Soviet intentions
and subject was one of great importance. Mr. Gauss replied that he had
of course noted press speculation regarding intentions of Soviet Russia;
that while there had been mutual suspicion between Soviet Russia and
other Powers for many years and it might take some time fully to
[Page 144]
break down any such suspicion
still lingering in the minds of unofficial observers, there seemed in
official circles at home to be every indication of confidence that
relations with the Soviet would continue on a satisfactory basis and
that the meeting of the Foreign Ministers would be successful in
clarifying objectives and policies in matters of mutual concern and
interest with reference to the European theatre of the war.
The Generalissimo inquired as to American post-war problems. The
Ambassador replied that, while there were groups in the Government and
out of the Government—some consisting of the best brains of the
country—which were giving intensive study to post-war problems, the main
energies of the American Government and of the American people were now
concentrated whole-heartedly in making an all-out effort to accomplish
the immediate task of achieving victory over the common enemy. Mr. Gauss
said that he had found a tremendous war effort during his visit to the
United States and described for the Generalissimo various aspects of the
general picture of the determined and increasing war effort of the
United States which was absorbing the mental and physical efforts of all
Americans. He said that there was not the slightest question that the
American Government and the American people were completely determined
to win the war and to fight on with ever increasing vigor and weight in
battle and in production until victory should be achieved; that victory
to us meant only one thing—unconditional surrender by Japan as well as
by Italy and Germany. The Ambassador said that in the tremendous and
relentless effort which the American Government, the expanding American
armed forces and the single-minded American people were putting forth
the United States looked to its Allies such as Britain and Russia and
China to make a similarly whole-hearted effort toward victory; that the
victory could not be the victory of any one country alone but must be a
victory of the United Nations; that the only way to win the peace was
first to win a complete victory in the war and whole-hearted effort by
all partners or allies was required to achieve that end.
Mr. Gauss went on to say that he realized—and he had made it clear at
home in conversations with American officials—that all the Allies could
not be expected to contribute an equal share to the war effort because
some were limited by their capacities or resources. He said that it was
obvious that China’s effort was limited in some directions by lack of
military equipment and that not only recently but throughout his tour of
duty as American Ambassador to China he had consistently put forward the
thesis that it would be a mistake to expect, or to count on, a
contribution to the war from China that was physically greater than
China’s capacities; but that he hoped, and he had
[Page 145]
every confidence, that the Chinese
Government would put forth every effort of which China was capable
within the limits of its resources, and this was most important to the
success of the United Nations in defeating Japan. The Generalissimo said
that China may be counted upon to do her full share. He added that when
the Burma Road is opened China can receive necessary arms and equipment
and do more.
The Generalissimo entered into a lengthy dissertation on the question of
American-Chinese cooperation which was the only portion of his remarks
which appeared to fall into the usual and traditional formula of
official conversations. His comments nevertheless seemed to reflect
appreciation of American friendship for China and he said that it was
his observation that of all the peoples of the world Americans and
Chinese found it easiest and most natural to get along with each other.
In his reply the Ambassador expressed hearty agreement and described in
some detail how impressed he was with the proof of the Generalissimo’s
statement to be found in the Chinese air training station at Karachi
where Chinese and American officers and Chinese and American mechanics
and other enlisted men not only worked together in understanding and
friendship but lived together, ate together and had their recreation
together. Mr. Gauss spoke also of the productive results of the air
training program, including the training of Chinese air cadets in the
United States, and mentioned how successful it was proving with Chinese
pilots incorporated into units of our Air Force in China and flying and
fighting side by side with American airmen.
At the close of the conversation the Generalissimo inquired whether the
Ambassador was taking up residence on the North Bank or the South Bank.
The Ambassador stated that he was now living in the city not far from
the Generalissimo’s residence, that he was available at any time the
Generalissimo wished to see him as he was always at the Generalissimo’s
command and that he would be glad to be of any possible service at any
time. The Generalissimo replied with repeated thanks.
The conversation lasted some fifty minutes. The Generalissimo was most
pleasant and friendly throughout and both in his greetings and goodbyes
showed more than ordinary cordiality both to the Ambassador and to Mr.
Atcheson.
Following the conversation Mr. Li stated to Mr. Atcheson that it had been
one of the “happiest” conversations with the Generalissimo that he had
witnessed.
[Page 146]
[Enclosure 2]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of
Embassy in China (Atcheson)
[Chungking,] September 24, 1943.
| Participants: |
Dr. K. C. Wu, Acting Foreign
Minister |
|
Ambassador Gauss |
|
Mr. Atcheson |
The Ambassador called on Dr. Wu by appointment this afternoon to pay his
respects upon his return to China. A long and very friendly and informal
conversation ensued in regard to various questions affecting
Sino-American relations and the war effort, most of which arose out of
inquiries made by Dr. Wu as to the Ambassador’s opinion and as to the
opinion of the American Government and people in respect to these
matters.
Dr. Wu said that there had recently been articles published in the United
States which were quite critical of China and which indicated that some
Americans did not think that China was proceeding along democratic lines
and that the Chinese armed forces were not doing their utmost to defeat
the enemy. He asked what the Ambassador’s impression of this development
was. Mr. Gauss said that he had been aware that there had been such
criticism of China in various press and magazine articles; that we at
home are of course used to having our own government criticized; that
American writers and critics were accustomed not only to criticize
vigorously and with full freedom their own government but any aspect of
American life with which they were in disagreement; that they were also
accustomed to criticizing foreign governments and foreign countries;
that China was by no means the only country which came in for such
criticism; and that on the other hand there had probably been less
American criticism of China than of, say, Great Britain and Russia in
regard to various questions which arose from time to time. Dr. Wu said
that the Chinese did not really mind criticism from Americans, as the
United States was China’s best friend, and that China really welcomed
honest criticism and hoped to take advantage therefrom. Mr. Gauss
mentioned that writers in the United States were not always fully
cognizant of the facts in connection with developments and conditions in
China and Mr. Atcheson remarked that in these days it was difficult for
such writers to obtain accurate and comprehensive information on these
subjects. Mr. Atcheson added that, with respect to Hanson Baldwin’s
article in the August Reader’s Digest, it was of
course absurd for Mr. Baldwin to voice the traditional Japanese
propaganda line that China was not a nation but a geographic area and
that the
[Page 147]
American people and
American Government naturally did not have—and had never exhibited—any
such attitude toward the Chinese nation.
As regards the question of the war effort the Ambassador indicated that
his personal opinion was similar to that recently expressed to Dr. Wu by
Mr. Atcheson and he said that it seemed to him that as the United
Nations war effort became intensified in this area—as it certainly would
be greatly intensified and the intensification had already begun—there
was the strong likelihood that the Japanese, pressed in the south
Pacific, the Indian Ocean and Burma, might make something like an
all-out effort against China. The Ambassador said that in the light of
this likelihood it would be necessary for all of us, including China, to
exert the heaviest possible military effort to prevent Japanese success.
Dr. Wu replied that he concurred and the Japanese would certainly like
to knock China completely out of the picture. He went on to speak of
China’s six-year-long struggle and great difficulties and he said in a
humorous vein that the Chinese could not merely with spears do very much
against the Japanese. Mr. Gauss replied in the same vein that spears had
proven excellent weapons in the past in case of necessity and could be
used again and he mentioned that military equipment including air
matériel was increasingly coming into China. Dr. Wu said that, quite
seriously, he fully appreciated the situation; that as he had mentioned
to Mr. Atcheson following their conversation in regard to the war effort
he had gone at once to the Generalissimo, and he could say now that the
Generalissimo had issued appropriate instructions.
Dr. Wu turned the conversation on the Kuomintang-Communist situation and
suggested that the Ambassador offer an opinion in this matter. Mr. Gauss
said that this was, of course, an internal domestic problem and then
went on to make remarks indicative of, from our point of view, the need
of maintaining unity in China and of avoiding any dissension which might
adversely affect the war effort.
The Ambassador took occasion to mention that our people at home were very
pleased with the successful showing in battle made by the Chinese air
cadets trained in the United States, the effective way in which they had
been incorporated into units of the 14th Air Force and their general
spirit of cooperation and fighting ability when put to the test.
Before our departure Dr. Wu made a number of extremely friendly remarks
in regard to the Ambassador’s return to China, said that he and other
officials of the Chinese Government were aware that Mr. Gauss had made
consistent efforts while in Chungking to obtain more aid for China and
that the Chinese were very glad to welcome him back as an old and valued
friend.
