711.93/538½
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
Dr. Soong called on me at my request, for the purpose of an informal exchange of information and comment in anticipation of his early departure for Chungking.
Dr. Soong had informed me a few days ago that he expected to leave for Chungking on September 30. I took occasion to inform him that I myself am leaving within a few days for a short trip to London for purposes of informal exploratory exchange of information and comment with personnel of the B. F. O. regarding subjects in the Far Eastern field. Dr. Soong asked at once: Why shouldn’t you also make a trip to China. I replied that I had for a long time, in fact for several years, had in mind a trip to Chungking; that I cannot at this moment be long away from the Department; but that I have hope of being able sometime after coming back from this trip to make a more or less similar visit to Chungking. Dr. Soong said that he and many of his colleagues would welcome such a development.
I said that I had been turning over in my mind various matters which had come up in discussion between Dr. Soong and me since his last return from Chungking—especially matters which he had mentioned to me immediately after his conversation of a few days ago with the Secretary on the subject of more extensive representation for China in connection with agencies of war planning. Dr. Soong had asked me on the telephone whether the Secretary had, before leaving, given me any message for him, Soong, regarding his latest representations. I had replied, and I now repeated it, that I had reason to believe that the Secretary had spoken to the President regarding those matters but that the Secretary had been extraordinarily hard pressed during the two days preceding his departure for Hot Springs and had given me nothing further on those subjects. I then took occasion to make a person to person statement outlining some of the difficulties in fact which stand in the way of its being possible for American officials in general to see certain problems in quite the same light in which Chinese officialdom at Chungking views them. I also took occasion to point out some of the facts in the record of the contribution which the United States is making to the war effort in its global terms and aspects, and of the assistance which the United States has rendered to China, in a variety of forms, during the period from 1937 to the present. Dr. Soong said that most of these facts were familiar to him and that he was able, generally speaking, to understand their significance and their effect as regarded the perspective [Page 134] in which American officials view the war problems, but that he finds it very difficult to make these things understood to his Government in Chungking: in fact, he said, it could not be expected that people there would see these things as people here see them. He said that he himself was in a difficult position. I said that I was constantly aware of some of the difficulties which attach to performance of his duties by one in his position. I went on to say that it is, it seems to me, one of the outstanding tasks of a Minister for Foreign Affairs, especially one who is able to be a part of the time in his own country and a part of the time abroad, to interpret his own country in the countries to which he goes and to interpret to his own country the countries in which he has special opportunity for first hand contacts.
Dr. Soong then said that he wanted to talk to me about the matter of Tibet. He said that, during his recent visit in London he had talked with the B. F. O. about Tibet and had explained that the Chinese regard Tibet as an integral part of China. A few days ago, he said, Sir George Sansom had come to him under instructions and had informed him of anxiety on the part of the B. F. O. regarding reports to the effect that Chinese troops are being massed on the Tibetan border. He had, he said, stated to Sir George that Tibet is an integral part of China and the Chinese Government regards relations between Chinese authorities and Tibetan authorities as a Chinese internal problem; and he had suggested that the British Government not make representations at Chungking regarding this matter. He said that he, Soong, was not informed regarding the alleged massing of Chinese troops; that he doubted whether it was a fact; but that if there was or should be such a development he did not believe that it would warrant apprehensions. There do not exist, he said, any serious tensions between the Chinese and the Tibetans. If there should arise difficulties, the Government at Chungking would have to meet the problems just as it would have to meet similar problems if they arose in any other part of China.
I took occasion to ask what proportion of the people of China proper are aware of the existence of Tibet or take any interest in that area or what occurs there. Dr. Soong replied that all Chinese who have had any schooling have learned in their study of geography that Tibet is a part of China; that it has never occurred to them that there is any question about this as a matter of simple fact; and that these are, politically speaking, the Chinese people. I then asked whether the same was true with regard to Mongolia. Dr. Soong replied in the affirmative. He went on to say, however, that, Tibet being something of a land of mystery, Chinese students and scholars gain more vivid impressions regarding that area, as they study geography and history, than regarding the more prosaic of the outlying areas. He said, [Page 135] further, that he had suggested to the British that the question of Tibet was relatively of so much less importance than a number of other immediate and more significant problems of concern both to the British Empire and to China that the British ought not make or let it become an issue. I made the remark that that expression of opinion was one susceptible of being turned by the British against the Chinese. Dr. Soong replied: Yes, it might be, for purposes of argument, but, China’s interest and China’s claim regarding Tibet are far better founded in history and in law than are those of India and Great Britain. I made the remark that on the basis of geography Tibet abuts upon China proper on the east and upon India to the south. Dr. Soong replied: Of course, but Tibet is a part of China.
I said that I wondered what is the popular concept, from point of view geographically, historically and politically, regarding Korea.62 Dr. Soong replied that the Chinese in no sense think of Korea as a part, or a lost part, of an existing or a once having existed Chinese Empire. Nor, he added, do they so think of Indo-China.63 In their current thinking regarding postwar settlements, the prevalent Chinese opinion runs, he said, to the idea that Korea should be put under an international trusteeship. Indo-China also, he said, the Chinese today regard as an area the disposal of which would best be made in terms of a trusteeship. There followed some discussion of difficulties which conceivably might be encountered should effort be made to apply that principle in each and/or in both of these cases.
Dr. Soong then said that he wanted to bring to my attention a situation which exists at Chungking. He said that, speaking frankly and with regret, he must tell me that relations between Chinese authorities and the American military authorities are “sour”. He said that this was one among many reasons why the Chinese felt insistently that they ought to be given more extensive representation in military councils in Washington. I said that I was sorry to hear what he said regarding the situation in Chungking but that I wondered how and to what degree the question of representation in Washington could be tied up with or would bring about amelioration of an unsatisfactory relationship, as described by him, in Chungking. Dr. Soong replied that, if China were represented in combined staffs meetings here, her representative would be able frankly to report upon and to discuss such matters and there would be likelihood of their being remedied. I inquired whether, with or without such representation, China’s Military Attaché or Dr. Soong himself could not present China’s views—either formally or informally. Dr. Soong replied that in time of war military attachés have limited entree and little [Page 136] weight; and that such matters can be dealt with effectively only between and among military men functioning in constituted and authorized groups on a common high level. Dr. Soong went on to say that the Chinese find it very difficult to work with General Stilwell; Stilwell’s ideas and those of the Chinese High Command do not, he said, harmonize; the Chinese feel, he said, that Stilwell is uncooperative; he, Soong, while in Chungking last spring, worked hard as a go-between and he found, he said, that practically all of the Chinese, both military and civilian, who had occasion to have contact with Stilwell found Stilwell’s attitude, etc. unsatisfactory and his approach to common problems such as to constitute an obstacle to effective cooperation. He went on to say that, although Stilwell may be highly qualified as a military man and a commander of his own forces, the Chinese feel that, to qualify for high command in a position which involves widespread contact with and cooperation with personnel equal or superior in rank and not under his command, an officer needs to have personal, political and diplomatic assets in addition to his qualifications as a soldier. I called attention to various of General Stilwell’s special qualifications for performance in China, such as his previous experience in that country, his knowledge of the language, his long acquaintance with and friendly feelings toward many of China’s leaders, and the energy and the devotion with which he has thrown himself into the task of training and equipping Chinese soldiers and officers. Dr. Soong replied that, notwithstanding these qualifications, there were other qualifications, especially those which have to do with attitude in personal relationships, which are needed for effective performance in the task of cooperative effort which appertains to the position which General Stilwell holds—and he implied that General Stilwell is deficient as regards those other qualifications. By way, apparently, of illustrating and underscoring, Dr. Soong said that General Chennault has proven himself to be an outstanding military man and at the same time has effectively cooperated with and has become and is persona grata with and among all of his Chinese contacts. I remarked that it is gratifying to us to hear this regarding General Chennault, but I could not but wonder whether, as between General Stilwell and his Chinese contacts, there is not some fault on the Chinese side. We have in fact, I said, heard made in criticism of the Chinese not a few statements similar to those which Dr. Soong had just made to me regarding Stilwell. Dr. Soong replied that probably there was some fault on the Chinese side, but that, fault or no fault, and regardless on which side the greater fault lies, the simple fact is that in the relations between his Chinese contacts and Stilwell there is not mutually and reciprocally the harmony, the cooperativeness and the effectiveness which should exist in such a relationship. [Page 137] Under those circumstances, he said, no matter what may be the “oughts” of the situation, there cannot be achieved the unity of purpose and of effort which, for the good of China, of the United States, and of the allied cause, should prevail. Dr. Soong added that he greatly regretted having to mention and to dwell upon this point, but that, confronted with military and political problems of utmost importance, it is right and necessary that governments be frank with one another in matters of common concern, that this is an important matter of common concern, and that he hoped that we would accept in the spirit in which it was given the exposition which he had made of the Chinese view in and regarding this situation. I replied that it is well for us to know the Chinese view, that it seemed to me utterly right that he should inform us regarding it, but that I was sure that he would realize that it would be difficult for us to see a question of this sort in quite the light in which the Chinese see it. Dr. Soong remarked: Naturally, I understand that, but please keep in mind that this is a situation which exists in China, at our capital, and which therefore interests and affects us Chinese more intimately than would be the case if, in reverse, it were a situation which existed in Washington.
Dr. Soong then rose to leave. He expressed gratification that we had been able to have this lengthy and frank conversation, and mutual expressions of bon voyage were exchanged.