740.0011 Pacific War/3487
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in China (Gauss)58
| Present: | Lieutenant General Stilwell |
| Major General Hearn, Chief of Staff | |
| Mr. Gauss |
General Stilwell came in to see me at noon today, following my return to Chungking. Major General Hearn was with him.
I commented that I had been going over with Mr. Atcheson the complaint regarding the complacent attitude of the Chinese toward the war, the representations made informally by Atcheson in influential quarters, and the possibility of further effort on our part in this matter. I asked Stilwell whether there had been any improvement in the situation.
He said “No” but later qualified that statement by saying that the Chinese have restored the one-third of the appropriations for roads and air fields which they had previously cut, but they still were not making the proposed road a main highway; and he emphasized that there will be no real improvement in the situation until the present Minister of War59 is gotten out of office. He mentioned as an example that while 90,000 troops are required for replacements in Yunnan only about 60,000 have been ordered there and of that 60,000 probably only about 40,000 will arrive; then perhaps another 20,000 will be ordered in and only a percentage of them will arrive, and so on.
I told Stilwell that when I see the Generalissimo I intend if possible to mention—in connection with our own increasing offensive efforts in the Pacific—the great importance attached by us to vigorous prosecution by China of the war against Japan by all means at China’s disposal. I commented that I felt that with increased activity by the United Nations in other theaters in the Pacific and as the Japanese are compelled to withdraw, their withdrawal in my opinion might be into China and before the war is won we may expect considerably increased military activity in the China theater requiring an all-out effort of preparation in this theater. Stilwell agreed with this, saying that he has been preaching the same thing for some time.
I mentioned in confidence that consideration is being given, at the suggestion of the Embassy, to a recommendation that the President include in his congratulatory telegram to Chiang at the time of the latter’s inauguration as President of the National Government—in the first half of October, likely—an expression of his hope for or confidence [Page 131] in China’s vigorous prosecution of the war along with the increasing United Nations effort in other Pacific theaters. I said that I favored such action. This congratulatory telegram might be a suitable and convenient vehicle for a carefully phrased message, the intent of which would not miscarry.
Stilwell said he favored such a message. He has been urging constantly that China be prodded into increasing activity.
During the course of our conversation I took occasion to say to Stilwell that it had occurred to me in going over the files on the subject of China’s slackening war effort and the delay in providing air fields, roads, etc., that Stilwell has an “ace in the hole” which it seemed to me he might consider playing, however unorthodox from a military point of view such action might seem; that is, he might consider having General Chennault visit Chungking and, after briefing him, let him have one of his intimate talks with the Generalissimo and urge the necessity of getting these things done which he needs in the military effort. I said that Chennault’s position with the Generalissimo is unique and I believe he could add a considerable weight in the general picture.
Stilwell apparently did not take to my suggestion. He commented that Chennault of course is being used; he (Chennault) needs these air fields and roads and so on, but “we all need them”; and he intimated that Chennault is one of those who think we should use American money and go ahead and build them—not look to the Chinese to provide them.
I dropped the matter there, feeling that I had gone as far as I could in intimating to Stilwell that Chennault probably has more effective influence with the Chinese Government in military matters than has Stilwell or any of the rest of us, and that, having in mind always the end in view—which is what counts—it might be desirable to bring Chennault more effectively into the picture. I feel that if more cordial relations existed between Stilwell and Chennault and they could act in harmony more could be gotten from the Chinese.
[The memorandum printed supra was forwarded to the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck), the Assistant Secretary of State (Long), and the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) in a memorandum dated November 3 by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine). In his memorandum Mr. Ballantine explained that “with reference to the Ambassador’s suggestion … that the President include in his congratulatory telegram to Generalissimo Chiang upon the latter’s inauguration as President of China an expression [Page 132] of hope for or confidence in China’s vigorous prosecution of the war, this matter was given careful consideration in the Department and it was decided that it would not be appropriate to include such a statement in the President’s congratulatory telegram but that this disposition was without prejudice to further consideration of the question of appropriate action designed to accomplish the purpose which had inspired the Embassy’s recommendations, namely, of encouraging the Chinese to increase their war effort.” (740.0011 Pacific War/3487)]