Office of the Historian

893.00/15144

The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State

No. 1591
Chungking, September 18, 1943.
[Received October 14.]

Sir: Referring to the Embassy’s despatch No. 1564 of September 10, 1943, in regard to the situation in China, I have the honor to enclose a copy of despatch No. 38 of August 24, 1943,52 from the Consul at Kweilin53 on the subject of general conditions in this country.

Mr. Ringwalt indicates in his despatch, which contains a brief summary, his opinion that the situation in China is steadily growing worse and that the deterioration will, if unchecked, make impossible any material contribution from China to the war effort.

The Embassy is inclined to agree in general outline with Mr. Ringwalt’s dark picture of conditions in China but feels that he is perhaps unduly pessimistic with regard to the implicit possibility of a serious crisis in the near future. In any case, as it appears unlikely that the Government will take effective action to ameliorate the political, [Page 126] economic and military deterioration described in both Mr. Ringwalt’s despatch and in the Embassy’s despatch under reference, China’s contribution to the war effort can be expected to remain merely a passive rather than an active one.

We would reaffirm our opinion that the maintenance of the situation in China will continue to depend greatly both on the food supply and on military considerations, especially military considerations in the Far Eastern theater, and that accelerated Allied successes in the Southwest Pacific and successful direct action in China and adjacent areas should best serve to keep the deterioration from progressing to the point of disaster.54

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
  1. Not printed.↩
  2. Arthur R. Ringwalt.↩
  3. In a memorandum dated November 9, Troy L. Perkins of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs made the following comment on one aspect of the military situation in China, as described by the Consul at Kweilin: “One item, if true, is startling: ‘It is reliably stated that at the time of the invasion of Chekiang and Kiangsi in 1942 [Japanese destruction of possible air bases], the troops under General Ku Chu-t’ung numbered only 25 percent of their nominal strength, and they were only coolies engaged in transportation of contraband’.”↩