Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China

740.0011 Pacific War/3451

The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State ⁴⁵

No. 1589

Chungking, September 17, 1943.
[Received October 14.]

Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s telegrams nos. 1674, September 11, and 1711, September 15, in regard to the concern of Generals Stilwell and Hearn over certain aspects of the present and pending military situation in this area.

There are now enclosed, for purposes of record, memoranda of conversations⁴⁶ on this subject which I have had with Dr. K. C. Wu, Acting Foreign Minister; General Wu Teh-chen, Secretary General of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang; Dr. Wang Chung-hui, Secretary General of the Supreme National Defense Council; Dr. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan; and Dr. H. H. Kung, Vice President of the Executive Yuan and concurrently Minister of Finance. The general substance and tenor of these conversations were reported and commented on in our telegram no. 1711, September 15 referred to above.

It is too early to say whether the conversations have been definitively productive to any degree as regards the particular problems to which they were addressed. As mentioned in our 1711, September 15, the Chinese officials with whom I talked received my remarks in most friendly fashion, some showed interest and concern and some said that they would endeavor to have appropriate action taken. But Dr. Kung, who holds the second highest place in the Government, indicated that in his view the surrender of Italy had relegated the problems presented to a comparatively minor place because he believed that Allied naval forces in strength could now speedily be sent to the Indian Ocean for recapture of Singapore and occupation of Haiphong as preliminary steps toward direct attack upon Japan.

Prior to Italy’s surrender it was apparent that most leaders of the Chinese Government were pinning their principal hopes for the immediate future upon an early campaign to retake Burma. We feel that now Dr. Kung’s attitude reflects that of President Chiang Kaishek and others who, in a manner not uncharacteristic of a people as volatile as the Chinese, have been seeking escape from their present seemingly insurmountable economic problems by indulgence in an unjustifiable optimism for the future. We have reported the surprising optimism as to an early termination of the war expressed by the Generalissimo in his “instructions” to the recent plenary session of the Central Executive Committee and the even more astonishing optimism he expressed in regard to the unabated spiraling of inflation and the pressing economic situation in general. We reported previously our considered opinion, gained from observation and conversation with numbers of Government officials, that the Chinese, weary from the heavy burdens and trials of the past six years, have persuaded themselves that China has done its share and psychologically have withdrawn into roseate dreams of a prosperous post-war China while waiting for us and the British to accomplish the task of defeating Japan and of bringing their post-war dreams into being.

In the final manifesto of the CEC session⁴⁷ issued on September 13, some emphasis was laid on the war of resistance against Japan. In the light of the further evidence we have recently had of the power of American criticism upon Chinese leaders, this last moment lip service to a subject which had been almost completely ignored throughout the session, is probably not unrelated to the conversations described in the enclosed memoranda. But emphasis in the manifesto, such as it is, was only on “resistance”; there was not even a platitudinous appeal for forthright or offensive action.

We may, however, take encouragement from the very fact that American criticism or fear of criticism exerts a far-reaching influence in Chinese official circles and that we undoubtedly possess a powerful lever which can sometimes be used to advantage. There is little question in our minds and in the minds of other foreign observers here that, as we have indicated in our reports, the recent changes in the organic law relating to the office of President (although the apparent endeavor to set up the semblance of the chief executive office of a Western democracy has merely confirmed Chiang Kai-shek’s personal dictatorship), the CEC session’s apologetic announcement for post-war constitutional government and the mildness of the session’s pronouncement in regard to Kuomintang-Communist difficulties were all in considerable part the result of efforts by China’s leaders to improve the appearance to the United States of things as they were and to avoid ill opinion in the United States.

We accordingly feel that the conversations have been in the right direction and that as regards the Kuomintang-Communist difficulties they have been definitely helpful especially as the CEC session opened with an influential “war party” of die-hards crying for punitive action against the Communists. But the conversations have not succeeded and probably will not succeed, without substantial support from home, in influencing the Chinese Government to set itself to work to increase by military action or other forthright affirmative means China’s participation in the war against Japan.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Chargé in China (Atcheson) of a Conversation With the Secretary General of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang (Wu)

[Chungking,] September 11, 1943.

I called on General Wu this afternoon by appointment, and went over the situation with him closely along the lines of my remarks to Dr. Wang Chung-hui (memorandum of September 11⁴⁸).

General Wu said that he was very glad indeed that I had come to him and he was sure that if the Generalissimo and General Ho Yingchin were completely aware of the situation that effective orders to rectify it would be issued at once. I said again that General Stilwell had of course been in frequent conference with the Generalissimo and General Ho and fully realized that both were very anxious to see that everything possible was done to get matters forward but that our military had a feeling that there were some strata of military officials and others below the Generalissimo and General Ho who were not taking sufficiently effective action pursuant to their orders from above.

General Wu said that he would see what could be done and that he realized fully that the matter was one of great importance to both China and the United States. He said that as regards the apparent lack of interest of the CEC in the war against Japan, the meetings here included the calling together of the General Staff and the military situation in China was of course a subject of discussion. As regards the Communist situation he said that this was only one of a number of problems; that the Chinese Government realized it was most unfortunate that it had to immobilize “twenty divisions” including some of China’s best troops to guard its rear against the Communists while at the same time facing the Japanese and that, as I had mentioned, one result of this situation was that neither those twenty divisions nor the Communists were actively fighting the Japanese. He said that the CEC was, he thought, going to appeal to the Communists to fulfil their promises of 1937 in the hope that this situation could be improved; that no Government of course could permit the existence within its borders of another and independent government with an army such as the Communists maintained.⁴⁹ I made it clear that our military had no complaint against Dr. Tseng Yang-fu and fully appreciated Dr. Tseng’s energetic efforts.

After discussing various other phases of the situation in China and some aspects of Sino-American relations, General Wu thanked me again and said that we should talk together oftener, and I departed.

George Atcheson, Jr.

45. Upon receipt of this despatch, Troy L. Perkins of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs addressed a memorandum, dated October 20, 1943, to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) and the Assistant Secretary of State (Long) in which he reviewed the correspondence, concluded that these conversations had not materially altered the situation, and recommended that “You may wish, therefore, to give consideration to the advisability of bringing this situation, which is of concern to our military commanders in China, our Embassy, and to this Division, to the attention of the President.”
46. Four enclosures not printed.
47. See telegram No. 1706, September 14, from the Chargé in China, p. 335, and subsequent telegrams.
48. Not printed.
49. In his memorandum of conversation with Dr. Kung, Mr. Atcheson stated that the latter also took “almost the same line as that taken by General Wu Teh-chen” on this subject.