811.20 Defense (M)/1084: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery)
2396. For McAshan. Your letter 341, August 10,77 and telegrams 3069, August 15, 3166, August 20. Following are conclusions after further discussions by Department, Board of Economic Warfare, Rubber Reserve and Donnelly, for which please try to secure Brazilian acceptance.
- 1st. If Brazilian tires are to be distributed equitably and on basis of indispensable needs, agreement on all transactions should be obtained from Washington. It is suggested that applications and orders be presented by the Commission for the control of the Washington Agreements to Rubber Reserve, Rio de Janeiro. The latter can then informally advise Rubber Reserve, Washington, by telegraph or otherwise, of facts necessary for passing judgment. The agreement between the two Governments need not, of course, refer to anything except approval by Rubber Reserve, Rio de Janeiro. It is believed here that, through special arrangements with Board of Economic Warfare, each transaction could be processed here within 48 hours after receipt. The reason for this procedure is that there is believed to be only insufficient information in Rio de Janeiro for adequate consideration of the applications to be expected. It does not have the names of people on the Proclaimed List in the other countries; this list changes from day to day. It is not in a position to pass on the importance of particular projects for which tires may be needed; Washington has detailed information as to the purpose and status of these projects.
- 2d. Washington should have the right to approve and if need be to direct allocations. It has made commitments to the other American Republics. A general commitment was made in the Department’s circular telegram of May 18,78 and in all agreements with the rubber producing countries this Government has agreed to use its best efforts to supply specified tonnages of rubber products. In addition this Government has agreed with certain of the countries to furnish specific numbers of tires. In the agreement with Colombia, for instance, this Government undertook to supply 20,000 tires immediately and 30,000 tires within a year. Emergency allocations were made to Peru, Chile and the Dominican Republic in specific amounts. In making these allocations this Government relied on the availability of Brazilian tires. What happens if the disposition of Brazilian tires is not in accord with our commitments?
Further we do not know whether Brazil could withstand the anticipated diplomatic and domestic pressure, and believe that it may find it advantageous to be relieved from it.
We regret that it therefore seems impossible to concur in the proposed procedure. It is suggested that, if possible, you delay any final action until Donnelly’s return; he is fully informed as to our position and concurs in it.