832.248/376: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery)
820. Your No. 1025, March 25, 2 p.m. I submitted this question immediately to General Arnold. I have this morning received a reply from him which reads as follows:
“Replying to your letter of March 26th, during the stay of General Gomes in the United States discussions were held covering the Natal and Northeast Brazil situation. General Gomes agreed with me that while there is danger of an invasion of that area, the chances are that the worst that will probably happen will be a nuisance raid.
[Page 657]Everyone agrees that 30 Pursuit and 15 Medium and Light Bombardment airplanes would be very desirable as a complement for the Natal area. Unfortunately there are more insistent demands for these airplanes elsewhere in combat zones where they are employed by troops in contact with and operating against the enemy. As a compromise, I informed General Gomes that we would send to the Natal area six P–40’s and six B–25’s at once. He was very appreciative and when the difficulties covering the operation of so few planes over so many points were explained to him he was apparently quite satisfied.
In order that the maximum benefit may be obtained from these six P–40’s and six B–25’s, it was decided that American crews would man and maintain the planes pending the time when Brazilian crews could take them over, at which time the American combat and maintenance crews would be returned to the United States.
In the meantime, the question of air defense for the Natal area is still an open one and the solution of this question is subject to change, depending upon the trend of the war.”
I suggest that until General Gomes has had an opportunity of talking over with President Vargas and other officials of the Brazilian Government the results of his trip to Washington, you might well refrain from making any direct reply to the message from President Vargas. After you have, yourself, talked with General Gomes, however, and if he is apparently satisfied with the situation as indicated in General Arnold’s above-quoted communication, you may then consider it expedient to give a message along the lines of this letter to President Vargas.