Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, The American Republics, Volume V

740.0011 European War 1939/18611: Telegram

The Under Secretary of State (Welles), Temporarily at Rio de Janeiro, to the Secretary of State

Rio de Janeiro, January 18, 1942—6 p.m.
[Received January 19—6:17 a.m.]

21. For the President. The highlights of the situation are approximately as follows: Two days before my arrival in Rio de Janeiro President Vargas called together his Cabinet and his highest military and naval authorities and told them that he had reached the decision that, both from the standpoint of the highest interests of Brazil as well as from the standpoint of the commitments which Brazil had previously made, Brazil must stand or fall with the United States. He stated that any member of the Government who was in disagreement with this policy was at liberty to resign his position. He received a unanimous vote of approval though the Chief of the General Staff⁴ and the Minister of War⁵ both of whom had during the earlier months of the war been unquestionably under the belief that Germany would triumph stated that Brazil’s ability to defend herself was very limited and one of the chief reasons for this was the fact that notwithstanding the repeated efforts which the Brazilian Army had made to obtain armaments and munitions from the United States and notwithstanding the repeated assurances which had been given by the United States Government that such help would be forthcoming, up to the present time nothing but token shipments from the United States had been made. They stressed particularly the point that even the few small tanks which had been sent [were] without armament and were consequently practically useless. Both the Minister for War and General Góes Monteiro, however, stated that in their considered opinion the policy announced by President Vargas was the only correct policy for Brazil to follow. (I know from outside sources that both Generals have made statements to exactly the same effect to representatives of the Axis Powers and to representatives of the Argentine and Chilean Governments.)

In the course of his statement of policy to his Cabinet, President Vargas emphasized significantly that his Government did not have to depend upon the Armed Forces of the Republic for the control of subversive activities, even including any attempt at a local uprising by German or Italian sympathizers. He told his Cabinet that the Brazilian people were 100% in agreement with the policy upon which he had decided and that the people themselves would be able to take care of any attempts at Axis-inspired uprisings.

Since that moment the attitude of the Brazilian Government could not have been finer nor more firm from our point of view. The Brazilian press has cooperated completely in everything we have wanted and the atmosphere consequently created both by the press and by open public sympathy with the United States has needless to say been enormously helpful at this time.

President Vargas has stated to the Argentine Foreign Minister⁶ that the Brazilian Government supports the United States completely and that the Brazilian Government considers it indispensable that a joint declaration by all the American Republics for an immediate severance of relations with the Axis Powers be adopted at the Conference. He has sent a personal message to that effect by courier to the Acting President of Argentina⁷ and he is presently using all of Brazil’s very great influence in Chile in order to bring the Chilean Government in line. It is not too much to say that had it not been for the strong and helpful position taken by President Vargas and by Aranha⁸ four of the other South American Republics would probably have drifted in the direction of Argentina.

Last night President Vargas sent for me and after I had expressed my deep appreciation of all that he had been doing to cooperate with us he said that as I knew the decisions of his Government had been taken and that the decisions were final. He continued that as Aranha had told me earlier in the evening the latter had received during the day letters addressed to him on [from] the German, Italian, and Japanese Ambassadors. These letters, whose texts I had seen stated, bluntly, in the case of the German Ambassador and in a more veiled fashion in the case of the Japanese and Italian Ambassadors that if Brazil undertook to break diplomatic relations she could anticipate a state of war with the Axis Powers. (The letters were regarded as personal by the Brazilian Government and they are therefore anxious that no publicity should be given to their contents as yet.)

President Vargas then went on to say that the decision reached by the Brazilian Government implied inevitably that she would soon be actually at war. He said that the responsibility which he had assumed on behalf of the Brazilian people was very great. He said that it was peculiarly great because of the fact that notwithstanding all his efforts during the past 18 months to obtain at least a minimum of war supplies from the United States I myself knew what the result of his effort had been. He said that he felt that in view of the present circumstances he could depend upon you better than anyone else to understand his crucial difficulties. He went on to say that obviously Brazil could not be treated as a small Central American power which would be satisfied with the stationing of American troops upon its territory, but that Brazil rather has a right to be regarded by the United States as a friend and ally and as entitled to be furnished under the Lend-Lease Act⁹ with planes, tanks, and coast artillery sufficient to enable the Brazilian Army to defend at least in part those regions of northeastern Brazil whose defense is as vitally necessary for the United States as for Brazil herself.

In view of the nature of the conversation I regarded it as inexpedient to take up with the President the issue of the stationing of United States forces in northeastern Brazil in line with the understanding which I reached with General Marshall before I left Washington. Personally I have no doubt that this issue can be met successfully and that the Brazilian Government will agree thereto provided the Brazilian Army is given at least a minimum of matériel requested by President Vargas.

The conversation I had with the President was at a large gathering and I could only speak with him for a few moments. He has asked me to come to see him alone tomorrow, Monday, evening at 6 o’clock. I should like to be specifically authorized by you to state in the course of that conversation that I have communicated directly with you and that you have authorized me to say to him as Chief Executive of one great American nation to the Chief Executive of another great American nation and also as a personal friend that if the President will give me a list of the minimum requirements needed urgently by the Brazilian Army for the proper protection of northeastern Brazil you will give orders that the items contained in that list will be made available to the Brazilian Government at the first possible moment subject only to the exigencies of the present defense requirements of the United States of America and to any subsequent modifications that may later be agreed upon by the United States and Brazilian General Staffs.

As I know you will appreciate the issue involved is one of the highest national importance.… Like all armies, the Brazilian High Command is not inclined to be enthusiastic about getting into war if they have none of the basic elements for defense. If they are not promptly given the necessary assurances and if they are not able to see with their own eyes before long some concrete evidences of help coming, exactly that kind of a situation which the Nazis could use to their best advantage will be created.

The problem is one of such critical importance that I have felt it necessary to bring it to your attention immediately. I shall deeply appreciate it if you can let me have a favorable reply before my interview with President Vargas tomorrow evening.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Welles

4. Gen. Pedro Góes Monteiro.
5. Gen. Eurico Gaspar Dutra.
6. Enrique Ruiz-Guiñazú.
7. Ramón Castillo.
8. Oswaldo Aranha, Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
9. Act of March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31. For correspondence on the negotiation of the Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and Brazil, signed October 1, 1941, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. vi; for text of further agreement, signed March 3, 1942, see post, p. 815.