740.00112A European War, 1939/19800: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)
5871. Reference your telegram no. 6128 of November 2, 1942 and Department’s airgram no. A–138 of October 10, 1942 regarding continuance of War Trade Lists after the war. We have reviewed this question with the British here but we can not see any satisfactory reason for presently changing our position.
We continue to believe that any such public announcement at this time would be most unwise, particularly in view of the current military operations in the Mediterranean area and the efforts of both governments to reassure Portugal and Spain.23 Furthermore, in line with the considerations already stated by us, we believe any such announcement would be utilized by the Axis propaganda agencies not only to discredit our post-war aims, but also to create in the minds of their peoples both at home and abroad the impression that they, the people, had no alternative but to fight and resist us to the bitter end. This would be, we believe, contrary to the current propaganda policies of our two governments and not in our best interests at the present juncture. In this connection please emphasize with MEW that the announcement of a post-war policy now regarding continuation of the War Trade Lists with respect to Axis firms abroad inevitably involves implications that Axis firms within the Axis countries will also be subjected to retaliatory international trade restrictions. Manifestly, we cannot risk backing into even an implied suggestion of post-war policies on such a basic question through a statement of policy on the War Trade Lists.
In addition to the foregoing basic considerations and the points made in our previous airgram, we find it difficult to reconcile such a proposed announcement with the current European listing policies which are not themselves as rigorous as they could be made.
If a listed firm is vulnerable to our controls, no further deterrent pressure is needed against it unless we ourselves are dealing with [Page 300] the firm for supply or pre-emptive reasons or have been compelled to permit our firms to deal with it for similar reasons. If a firm would be vulnerable to our controls but is not presently listed, the answer would seem to be to list it. Such a firm would certainly not be deterred greatly by the announcement of such a policy if it had reason to believe, as it has had up to now, that the list would not be applied to it. In this connection we are aware that there are many circumstances, including the purchasing and pre-emptive buying programs and political problems, which make a more rigorous listing and licensing policy difficult. If a firm is not presently vulnerable because not dependent upon international commerce, we see no reason to believe it would be greatly deterred by a loose threat of continuing a control against it which, even under war conditions, was admittedly ineffective. Under post-war circumstances the control would probably be even less effective.
With respect to the observation in your no. 6128 of November 2, paragraph no. 2, that an increased effectiveness of the threat of listing would be of great value in Switzerland during the next few months, we believe that this purpose can best be achieved by both applying our listing and licensing policies more vigorously in Switzerland and perhaps by letting it be known locally, either informally or by public announcement, that this was being done. We consider such steps, wherever necessary and advisable, much more likely to be effective and less dangerous than any present public announcement with respect to a general post-war policy concerning the War Trade Lists.
The Canadian Legation here has informed us that the Canadian Government is not presently sympathetic to the MEW proposed announcement.
Please keep us fully informed on this matter.
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The Allied invasion of northwest Africa (Torch), begun on November 8, 1942, was under way. For the official narrative on the military operations, see George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, in the series United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 97–344.
In connection with the military operations, President Roosevelt sent messages to Gen. Antonio Oscar de Fragoso Garmona, President of Portugal, and to Gen. Francisco Franco y Bahamonde, head of the Spanish State. For texts of the messages, see Department of State Bulletin, November 14, 1942, pp. 905–907.
For diplomatic correspondence on the invasion and occupation of French North Africa, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. ii, pp. 429 ff.
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