Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The American Republics, Volume VII

810.20 Defense/1848: Telegram

The Ambassador in Peru (Norweb) to the Secretary of State

Lima, December 31, 1941—4 p.m.
[Received January 1, 1942—4:14 a.m.]

737. For the Under Secretary. Your telegram No. 561, December 29th, 8 p.m.⁹ Following is a summary of a long conversation which I had with the President this morning:

1. I emphasized that our request for the use of an air base at Talara is due primarily to the need for adequate defense of the Canal, which is a matter of vital importance to the entire west coast; that the United States has no desire to take from the Peruvian forces any part whatever of their duty and right to defend national territory; that while the long distance patrol from Talara would afford incidental protection to this valuable Peruvian area the main objective is cooperation in hemisphere defense and that there must have been some misunderstanding about the request which we had made.

2. The President stated that there is no objection to allowing us to use Talara for long range patrols, but that for psychological reasons there must be at the same time some positive act of cooperation from us that will make available to Peruvian forces equipment that they can use in the defense of Peruvian territory.

3. The President observed that Peru is no more united and prepared for positive action against the Axis Powers than was the United States before the Japanese attack. He pointed out that if we could furnish, for example, a few planes that the Peruvian Air Force could use for coastal patrol work and if a Peruvian aviator was lost or suffered any injury while on such duty it would immediately arouse and unite the country behind an energetic program for hemisphere defense. The President emphasized this psychological factor and said that he needed at least an immediate token supply of defense equipment from the United States in order to have the support of the Peruvian people in the Talara plan.

4. When I pointed out the urgent nature of the Talara situation the President repeated that he needed at least some concrete evidence of assistance to Peruvian forces before the United States planes started to use the Talara base. He observed that Peru would be inviting attack and would be vulnerable once our planes started to use Talara.

5. The idea would be to furnish some aviation and coast defense equipment with the understanding that we would furnish personnel to train Peruvians in its use. This training could be accomplished through established missions or in any other convenient manner.

6. The Peruvians would handle only coast defense and short range patrols but would want to include Callao in their defense measures.

7. The President asked if the Peruvian Commanding General in the North could exercise some supervision over United States forces at the proposed Talara base and I replied that I was sure that a satisfactory arrangement would be made in this respect working through officers of present United States military missions.

8. The President’s attitude was one of solid support but he depends upon us to help him translate that paragraph into effective action.

9. For recommendations regarding military equipment to be made available to Peru reference is made to telegram No. 53, December 31 from the Military Attaché to the War Department and to telegram No. 312000 from the Naval Attaché to the Navy Department.

[10.] With respect to the conference at Rio de Janeiro the President said that the Peruvian delegation would have positive orders to collaborate with the United States in political, military and economic defense measures and that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructions not to commit Peru in the slightest degree before the opening of the conference.

11. The President stated that the Peruvian delegation will have instructions to recommend and support a resolution for all of the American Republics to sever diplomatic relations with Japan. I inferred from this part of the conversation that the Peruvian Government will take no action with respect to the two recently arrived Japanese Military Attachés, since this case would automatically be taken care of by the breaking off of diplomatic relations.

12. The Peruvian delegation also will have instructions regarding the operation of our Proclaimed List¹¹ and will seek to obtain action to protect dishonest economy in the operation of the list. The President was very pleased over the information that the Ravndal¹² group now is in Lima to study these matters and that something may be accomplished so that this problem can be eliminated from the instructions of the Peruvian delegation.

13. The appointment of the Peruvian delegation is proving to be a serious political problem for the President because of pressure from [apparent omission] to be leader of the opposition.

14. The President told me that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructions to take up urgently with you the question of the relations between [apparent omission] requisitioned by the United States. He wants to have this matter settled so that we can let bygones be bygones. It will be most helpful if immediate payment can be made to Peru of the amount actually paid by the latter to the Norwegian Government.¹³ Any other amounts claimed by [apparent omission] could be the subject of the usual legal procedure.

15. The President also expressed the earnest hope that you could return from the Rio de Janeiro conference by way of Lima since there are many pressing questions that could be handled most effectively through direct conversations with you here.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Paragraphs 1 to 9 inclusive have been repeated to Embassy at Panama for the information of General Andrews.¹⁴

Norweb

9. Not printed.
11. Proclamation Authorizing a Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals and Controlling Certain Exports, July 17, 1941; 6 Federal Register 3555.
12. Christian M. Ravndal, Assistant Chief of the Division of the American Republics, was sent by the Department on November 19, 1941, to the American Missions in South America to discuss export controls, the freezing of foreign funds, and the Proclaimed List.
13. See pp. 508 ff.
14. Presumably Gen. Frank M. Andrews, Commanding General, U. S. Caribbean Air Force.