821.24/183

The Ambassador in Colombia (Braden) to the Secretary of State

No. 3375

Sir: I have the honor to refer to my telegram no. 662 of December 15, 7 p.m., and to report that this morning the Minister of Foreign Relations emphasized to me the well-nigh unrestricted nature of the commitment undertaken by President Santos in his December 13 telegram to President Roosevelt.61 So strongly did the Minister stress the obligations thus assumed by the Colombian people and Government [Page 36] and himself as Foreign Minister that I felt he was leading up to telling me that he could not go along with the President in this stand. My reaction in this particular was also induced by my having been reliably informed from three separate sources that the Minister was the only Cabinet member to vote against breaking relations with Japan and because of his having wished to defer the break with Germany and Italy until after the consultative conference. However, the Minister finally switched into a long exposition, the essentials of which were as follows:

This country, by President Santos’ telegram, is committed to do everything within its power for the democracies. Because of continental solidarity and defense, she is particularly committed to the United States and the Panama Canal defense. She will take every possible step; but, as I well knew, the Foreign Minister said, Colombian inefficiency would hamper these activities all along the way (he cited as an example the impossibility of obtaining competent intelligence officers). The Army would have been in condition to do its part, but the outbreak of the war in 1939 had prevented the shipment of munitions and armament from Belgium. Hence, the Colombian Army and Navy presently were practically impotent; the former even to maintain internal order required ammunition for Mauser rifles, but this could not be obtained in the United States, accordingly 50,000 rifles with an appropriate amount of ammunition are needed. Similarly other equipment should be acquired.

He appreciated the high motives of inter-Americanism which led us to offer such a substantial discount under the Lend-Lease program; but this was tantamount to a gift, which Colombia could not accept with dignity. Therefore, in order for this country to do her full part, he suggested that under a Lend-Lease agreement we make delivery of $16,200,000 worth of equipment (he later admitted that a smaller amount would suffice), billing this country therefor at the aggregate of the annual installments contemplated in the Department’s proposal, i. e., $9,750,000. He suggested that the balance ($6,450,000) be lent in free funds for expenditures on strategic roads, barracks, uniforms, et cetera. (It will be observed that the total of the obligation is hereby raised to $22,650,000, i. e., $16,200,000 for equipment plus $6,450,000 in free funds.) The total obligation to be repaid would, on this basis, be $16,200,000. He feared that Colombia under war conditions could not safely undertake to meet the heavy annual amortizations provided under our plan and, therefore, requested that these payments should begin after the war. There were three other minor points in connection with the Lend-Lease program which he would like to discuss later, but was sure they could be easily adjusted. Turbay had been instructed to take this matter up along the aforegiven lines.

I replied that I was sure my Government had understood the full portent of President Santos’ telegram of December 13 to President Roosevelt. I reviewed our discussions with respect to the acquisition of armament and munitions, beginning with the time when legislation was still pending in the Colombian Congress, when I had observed to him and to the Minister of War that they were thinking in terms [Page 37] of millions when, in fact, perhaps it should be hundreds of thousands of dollars. As for instance, I said, 20,000 rifles would amply cover the Army’s needs in that item, and, as so often discussed with President Santos, Colombia’s other requirements were relatively modest: some aviation, some patrol boats, the repair of the destroyers and perhaps some other equipment. In short, I had felt a year and a half ago that Colombia should concentrate largely upon aviation and a few other essentials rather than on so vast a program as was then contemplated.

I summarized the conversations which I had had with President Santos, beginning in January 1941, and made the situation clear with respect to Lend-Lease and free funds, as described in my despatch no. 3237 of November 5, 1941.62 I called attention to the fact that at no time had we wished to press a Lend-Lease agreement on this country. For the same reason, while I had called unofficially by telephone to the new Minister of War immediately after he took office, I had subsequently awaited a call from him, realizing that he was tremendously occupied with the reorganization of his Ministry.

I said that the foregoing was the situation which prevailed up to December 7. Thereafter, I had had no word from my Government, but my purely personal opinion was that the acquisition of equipment under Lend-Lease had probably become much more difficult than before. I had seen a press statement from England to the effect that even Great Britain expected to get much less. Therefore, while we deeply appreciated Colombia’s desire to assist in every way, by force of circumstances she might be compelled to concentrate her cooperation largely on such matters as the control of enemy aliens, communications, et cetera. Moreover, I said I could visualize, under the changed conditions of war, our making certain requests which previously we had not and would not even have mentioned, but which from now on might enable Colombia to assist very effectively.

The Minister reiterated that, quite irrespective of whether or not the United States could make a Lend-Lease and free fund agreement such as he outlined, Colombia would give her every assistance without restraint, but that naturally this cooperation could not be very effective unless she were able to obtain equipment and funds as described in his aforementioned proposal. I promised to communicate his thoughts to the Department.

It seems reasonable to anticipate that, as the war develops, we will have numerous facilities to request of Colombia, as, for instance, those covered in the Department’s telegram no. 500 of December 13, 7 p.m.62 I am sanguine that many, if not all, of these requests will be granted readily. Hence, the Department may prefer to keep such matters entirely apart from the assistance and facilities of a military or economic [Page 38] nature we may grant to Colombia. On the other hand, were it possible to work out some such Lend-Lease and free fund arrangement as the Minister requests, it might form a part of a broad program of collaboration between the United States and Colombia for Canal and hemisphere defense, and it might include an obligation by Colombia to grant us, for the strictly limited period of the war, every reasonable facility we might request. Self-evidently such an agreement would be practically tantamount to an alliance.

Respectfully yours,

Spruille Braden
  1. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, December 20, 1941, p. 546.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Not printed.