851.48/324
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
The Ambassador34 called at his request. He said that a trade and shipping agreement had been made between Great Britain and Sweden and agreed to by Germany. He inquired why some such arrangement could not be made between France and Great Britain. I replied that that was the unfortunate thing about the present relations between Great Britain and France. I said that they could work out many existing questions to their mutual advantage if they would only meet and proceed in a spirit of mutual concession and cooperation. He stated that the Turks were furnishing Germany food and yet Great Britain complained about food being furnished to the French. I replied that I did not know the true facts, but that that was a very different situation in any event.
I stated that it is all-important to the French and the British alike that each country should approach the other in a spirit of moderation and mutual concession to the end that they may be able to work out reasonable and fair adjustments of conflicting acts and interests in their respective shipping situations; that to this end they could well afford to select one outstanding man in each country who has the confidence of both countries and who could function together from day to day for the purpose of promoting understanding and facilitating the solution of many or most questions that may arise from time to time between the two countries. Each would, of course, represent his respective Government and would cooperate with his Government whenever occasion arose for other officials of the Government to participate in the discussion and settlement of questions which might come up.
The Ambassador said he would like to know if the British had agreed to the memorandum35 of Mr. Murphy and General Weygand in regard to the shipment of goods to French Africa. I replied that the matter was progressing and that I would request my associates to keep him advised as to developments.
[Page 122]The Ambassador spoke of the food situation in unoccupied France. He was rather mild in broaching this subject and did so in a sort of apologetic tone. I said that the position of this Government, as the Ambassador I thought knew, is that it continues to cherish the ancient friendship it has always entertained for the French people and their welfare; it is most desirous of serving them in every way at all feasible or practical, especially in this time of their great misfortune; that we have been doing this to the very best of our ability thus far; that we intend to continue to do so even should the circumstances become more averse and the difficulties more numerous. We are likewise friendly toward the British, and in addition we are aiding them as best we can in their efforts to defeat the aggressive movements of Hitler and his associates. In doing this, we profoundly believe that we are serving the cause of liberty of all of the conquered countries of Europe, as well as ourselves; that, therefore, our friendship and our aid to Great Britain are in complete harmony with our every desire to cooperate with the French to the fullest practical extent. I said that on the other hand, it is not known here as to just how far certain members of the French Government desire to go beyond the requirements of the armistice terms and the limitations of a country that has been captured for the time being; that this Government, of course, expects the French Government to exercise every relation with Germany within these two limitations just set forth; that the serious question that has arisen is whether certain members of the French Government with great influence are undertaking to go over and above and beyond the functions of a conquered country and the limitations of the armistice upon the theory that they may appease or propitiate Hitler. I said that they can, of course, do this arbitrarily if they see fit; that I desired to repeat what I had said to the Ambassador heretofore, that it is as impossible to appease Hitler as it would be for a squirrel to appease a boa constrictor, and hence this country is striving all the more to aid Great Britain and safeguard the liberties of Great Britain and the Western Hemisphere, and at the same time to win back the liberties of Europe. I said, of course, I feel very deeply that Great Britain will succeed notwithstanding some views of French statesmen to the contrary, and that despite their efforts to cooperate with Hitler, if they are doing so, Great Britain, aided by this country, will restore French liberties along with the preservation of our own and those of Great Britain.
I continued by saying that just before Admiral Darlan made the loud threat against Great Britain some days ago, which was published in every newspaper, and has not been corrected if it were not true, I had made real progress in my discussions with the British in regard to further relief for unoccupied France, but that I had [Page 123] been seriously handicapped since then. I said the crucial question with my Government just now was whether and how far some of the important members of the French Government have in mind to go in their efforts to appease Hitler by favors such as aid in the war in one way or another; that they can, if that is their idea, move in this direction in the future, but, of course, the French Government will understand that we will be correspondingly handicapped in our efforts to cooperate with France in many vitally important ways, including the matter of food relief, and that we could only do the best we might be able in these very restricting circumstances. We feel very profoundly that the British cause should be supported and that it will succeed; that we shall continue to contribute every possible aid to that end. We are deeply of the opinion that the liberties of Great Britain and this Hemisphere will be preserved and the liberties of France and conquered countries in Europe will be restored contrary to the reported views and attitudes of numerous prominent Frenchmen, who seemed to prefer the kind of rule that Hitler is dispensing to conquered countries rather than to return to the cherished liberties, freedom and popular institutions which France until recently possessed. I said that, unfortunately, many people in this country interpret the Darlan statement to have in mind aid to Hitler primarily rather than aid in the form of relief to the people of France; that I myself am not giving it any particular interpretation, but that, unfortunately, widespread interpretation is being given it.
The Ambassador proceeded to deny that Darlan had made the threat published in the press. I remarked that it was unfortunate that a denial was not made public, if it had in fact been made, for the reason that the threat, which was very ugly in its damaging effects, was published in every paper and broadcast by radio. I continued by saying that it meant everything that the denial be made public. The Ambassador showed no interest in this suggestion.
The Ambassador then recited quite a number of occurrences relating to the course of the French Government where it had not taken exception to objectionable acts by the British when it had ground to do so. These citations were unimportant and unimpressive. He closed by saying that his country was desirous of restoring normal relations with Great Britain. I expressed my gratification and inquired specifically if this was the attitude of his Government, as well as himself, to which he answered in the affirmative.
I remarked that this Government has been striving earnestly to carry forward anew its discussions with the British in regard to food relief for unoccupied France, and that I felt that we again are making progress. I added that it was important in my opinion for the French to indicate a spirit of cooperation in case Great Britain should permit the proposed two boatloads of wheat to go to unoccupied [Page 124] France, such as assurances of non-infiltration by the Germans into French Africa, the working out by all countries concerned of a rigid supervision of the distribution of the wheat, any reasonable courtesies that could possibly be extended to the British regarding shipments in French boats, and the moving of French naval vessels from continental France to French African ports. The foregoing could well be given consideration as evidence of a new purpose to cooperate more closely with the British in solving all problems and questions at all possible of solution in this friendly and mutually desirable manner.
Two or three other phases came up near the conclusion. One was my statement to him, which was called forth by a remark of his, to the effect that the enemy status of Germany and France toward each other was not changed by the armistice; that France is under no obligation to furnish Germany with supplies, or otherwise to facilitate her operations against Great Britain because it is inconsistent with enemy status; that Germany can only make requisitions for use of her occupying forces to an extent consistent with the needs of the population of occupied France; that this provision of the Hague Convention36 was intended to prevent a conquering country to make requisitions on the conquered country to the point of depriving the local population of the necessities of existence. The Ambassador proceeded very earnestly to deny that his Government intends to take any steps to assist Germany beyond the limits of the armistice and the functions of a conquered nation.
The Ambassador was less vehement and pugnacious than usual, as though the Lease-Lend Bill had made some impression on him and possibly some of the members of his Government.
- Gaston Henry-Haye, the French Ambassador.↩
- For text of memorandum of February 26, see telegram No. 249, February 28, 10 a.m., from the Ambassador in France, p. 226.↩
- Convention on Laws and Customs of War on Land, article LII, Foreign Relations, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1204.↩