740.00112 European War 1939/2269: Telegram
The Ambassador in France ( Leahy ) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 27—10:30 a.m.]
240. Embassy’s telegram 222, February 24, 1 p.m.26 I have just received a Foreign Office note signed personally by Admiral Darlan26a which reads as follows in translation:
“The Government of the United States is not incognizant of the very great difficulties in the matter of supplies which the French Government must face.
[Page 117]France, not prepared to live on her own resources, has need, in order to exist, of her Empire.
Therefore, immediately after the armistice she requested and obtained from the Germans the authorization to resume maritime traffic on a reduced scale with her principal colonies. In spite of extreme difficulties this traffic at present exceeds 100,000 tons of imports into France per week, which is of capital importance.
But this traffic is in danger of being suspended as a result of the hostile attitude of Great Britain with respect to France’s merchant vessels. On the pretext that anything which may enter France may contribute to supplying the enemy, and utilizing this pretext to seize our unarmed vessels without risk, the British Government exercises an increasingly severe restriction on the maritime trade of France. The following figures, held secret until the present, are proof thereof:
Without speaking of the 81 French merchant ships (totalling 400,000 tons) which confidently took refuge in England in June 1940 and which Great Britain has seized, the British Navy has captured the following number of ships: 3 in September 1940, 4 in October 1940, 3 in December 1940, 6 in January 1941, and 7 in February 1941.
Thus, since the Armistice, Great Britain has taken from France without any valid reason more than 100 merchant ships, of which a number, furthermore, were empty or carried only inoffensive demobilized men.
If the English Admiralty continues to capture French merchant vessels, the loss of tonnage which would result therefrom for France will cause grave consequences of a political and economic nature. On the other hand, the naval authorities will be constrained considerably to reduce the traffic between the Empire and metropolitan France to the detriment of their supply. On the other hand these restrictions could not fail to produce in France and in North Africa on public opinion as yet ill-informed of this situation, a feeling which could lead to serious political consequences.
Anxious, however, to avoid the consequences on this opinion and loath to undertake measures of reprisal, the French Government would like to see these difficulties settled by conciliatory means. In this spirit it ventures again to have recourse to the good offices of the American Government to ask it to consider whether it can intervene with the British Government in order that this series of seizures, which the French Government considers illegal and unjustified, may not be brought to an end.
The last seizures of which French ships have been the object reveal, in effect, procedure contrary to international custom. Thus the Sontay and the P. L. Dreyfus, captured near Capetown, had received from the British cruiser which forced them to stop written assurance that they would be released after search. But in spite of this written assurance, the two ships were seized, General Smuts27 having refused to ratify the decision of the captain of the cruiser. It should be noted that the two ships in question were going to Dakar and that consequently their capture could not be justified by the pretext that they could serve to supply Germany.
[Page 118]It is evident that such incidents if they are repeated can only compel the French Admiralty to resort to extreme measures which the French Government is most anxious to avoid.”