762.9411/329: Telegram
The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:55 p.m.]
1009. The Foreign Minister returned to Madrid yesterday. I called on him this morning. He received me affably.
After conventional inquiries concerning his visit to Berlin I said that I had read his speech and various statements with interest and that as regards the [apparent omission] and as I had told his Senior Aide I regretted the reference to my own country as it seemed not altogether in harmony with the tenor of our conversations on October 6 with the Caudillo. I also remarked that his allusions linking communism in Russia with that [sic] communism in the United States had no basis that I could see and although there was a Communist Party in my [country?] its voting strength in recent elections was one-tenth of one percent; further that communism was as offensive to us as to Spaniards although there were probably more Communists in this country.
The Minister said that his speech was delivered just following the receipt in Berlin of news that because of “his visit to the German capital and the dismissal of Weygand there had followed Under Secretary Welles’ announcement of the cancellation of permits for exports to Spain”. I immediately countered this by saying that I thought he had been misinformed and he then admitted that communications from Cárdenas had clarified the matter. Continuing, the Minister said that he had endeavored in his speech to give it an historical setting and then added that it was unthinkable that a government should not be free on a solemn occasion such as the recent gathering to make its views and sentiments plainly known. To this I remarked that what I regretted was the utterance of statements which did not correspond to my information; that as a matter of fact the Franco movement had been favored by the passage of our Embargo Act,45 since the Republicans had the money and could have made payment had this been permitted. I added that I realized that there was a measure of sentiment in the United States favorable to the Republic due certainly in part to the [Page 933] active propaganda carried on by Republican leaders who were able to spend money freely for these purposes; that there was at least a slight analogy between this and the situation existing here where German gold seemed to exercise a powerful influence on the newspapers. (Much to my surprise he accepted this without wincing.)
The Minister then said that if the bases of our relations with the United States are [“] precarious” the fault lies with the United States. I replied that I could not accept this but that I desired to make quite clear that our general policy in the world struggle was to give every support to Great Britain as in fact to every country fighting Hitler; that our relations with Spain were primarily if not exclusively political and had their bases in the statement just made.
The Minister then returned to the subject of our relations remarking that he was, of course, aware of the negotiations which had been going on and that he was rather expecting something from Cárdenas. I replied that I too was awaiting a communication from Washington and that when received I would doubtless have occasion to again call on him.
I then recalled to the Minister his statement to Donovan in February in which he expressed conviction of German victory and asked if his recent trip had altered his views in any way. This gave him the opportunity for a monologue in which it was difficult to determine if his statements represented whistling in the dark or real conviction. In enthusiastic terms he described Germany as a solid military unit with the will to triumph. I interrupted him here to ask what had become of the 5 million Communists of 1932 who had to sacrifice some 80 delegates to the Reichstag adding that it was inconceivable that they were all converted. He answered airily that they were dead, in exile working in labor camps or lodged in concentration camps.
Continuing, the Minister said that he had extensive conversations with the various Foreign Ministers and everywhere found complete unity of purpose while from Russia came news of atrocious conditions there in which even cannibalism was practiced.
Following this I inquired of the Minister what would be the status of the various countries of Europe in the event of German victory and what would become of the sovereignty of Spain. He answered that the sovereignty of Spain would be greatly strengthened adding that Europe had always had one powerful country, that Great Britain exercised this hegemony during three centuries and was always “very hard on Spain” and now it is Germany’s turn to lead. Smaller countries, citing Holland, he said, would naturally have an “incomplete” sovereignty. In exchange for all this the menace of communism would be removed. I said here to the Minister that judging by declarations of Germany’s rulers and by their recent acts, English hegemony was a far different thing from anything that Germany would offer and [Page 934] that even small Nordic, certainly non-Nordic countries would find this out to their cost. He seemed unaffected by this.
- Approved January 8, 1937; 50 Stat. 3.↩