711.52/191: Telegram
The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 17—9:35 a.m.]
834. My No. 831, September 15, 5 p.m. Personal for the Secretary and Under Secretary. I interpret our present policy toward Spain to be to avoid taking steps whose effect might be to push Spain into the arms of the Axis, not alone because of its strategic geographical position but also having in mind the detrimental effect on our own interests in Spanish America if the impression were created there that we were attempting to throttle Spain.
However, present delays and difficulties in obtaining from United States many products urgently needed by this country make me fearful lest we provoke the belief here and perhaps elsewhere that we are acting along unnecessarily restrictive and retaliatory lines; the apparently ever-increasing restrictions against exports are seemingly only fully applied against Spain and a few other countries. The importance of Spain as a non-belligerent with its present pseudo-neutrality is recognized, I am assured, by local British diplomatic, military and naval experts as worth a serious effort to maintain. The British have therefore adopted a policy of providing such limited economic aid as will encourage existing strong non-interventionist elements to withstand the pressure of the small jingoist group who believe that Spain’s future is linked with German success. Confidence in the invincibility of Germany has been seriously shaken by developments of recent months, not alone by the Russian campaign but also by the ever-increasing aid being given by the United States together with the recognition that we are rapidly reaching a stage where our effort will even more powerfully influence the outcome.
These considerations have led to my repeated suggestions that we examine the Spanish situation in the light of its political and military [Page 916] significance, and that by following a procedure which will strengthen the conviction of those elements in the Government that more is to be gained from obtaining supplies from the democracies than by collaboration with the Axis, we have time working on our side. The friendly reception given by the Minister of Industry and Commerce to the idea of mutual sympathetic consideration of economic requirements by the two Governments, reported in my telegram No. 819, September 11, 7 p.m.,33 leads me to hope that some basis may be found for improving the commercial and ultimately the political relations between our two countries.
Unfavorable politics, economic effect here of the strict application of restrictions against exports to Spain of gasoline, cylinder oil and other petroleum products, far outweighs any disadvantages to the United States which the withdrawal of such commodities from our stocks and supply to Spain may occasion. Contrary to the fear lest small quantities of this might at some remote time benefit the Axis, I am convinced that the control we and the British can exercise can prevent any appreciable stocks from falling into the hands of the Axis even in the event of an invasion, and meanwhile they would contribute to the desirable ends indicated above.
In conclusion I give as my considered opinion that our ability to supply and to withhold such petroleum products represent the trump cards in our political and economic relations with Spain; but I do not consider this the psychological moment to play the latter.
In view of the apparent intervention of various agencies of our Government in the application of control measures I venture to suggest: “(1) That the tremendous implications of our policy toward Spain be given consideration by the economic defense board; (2) that in such a study the necessity of the coordination of export license and navicerts be equally kept in mind.”
- Not printed.↩