711.52/183
Memorandum by Mr. Perry George of the Division of European Affairs 28a
Despatch no. 1099 of August 6, 1941 from Madrid encloses a memorandum29 of an extremely interesting conversation between Mr. Beaulac30 and the Spanish Minister of Industry and Commerce. Mr. Beaulac called informally on Carceller, solely to establish contact. He mentioned that when recently in Washington he was hopeful that some arrangement could be arrived at to promote a greater interchange of products between Spain and this country, but that his hopes had waned owing to Franco’s public attitude and continued unfriendliness toward our Ambassador. The United States is a democracy and Spain’s attitude has had publicity here, tending to create an impression that Spain is determinedly unfriendly to us while cooperating with the Axis. The United States has made the irrevocable decision that Hitler will not be permitted to control the Atlantic, and our military and naval authorities are convinced that without such [Page 912] control Hitler will lose the war. The American people are behind our Government in this determination.
Carceller asked America to be practical and examine the acts of the Spanish Government rather than the words of its leaders. Practical cooperation with the Axis was insignificant, German forces were on the Spanish frontier, Spain was impoverished—lacking airplanes and artillery, and in no position to resist the Germans. The Spanish policy was to prevent the contingency from arising. This policy, of giving Germany an impression of cooperation while denying effective cooperation, should be supported by the democracies.
Had Franco shown himself less friendly to Germany and more friendly to the democracies he would have done us the greatest possible dis-service.
He suggested the wisdom of a policy on the part of the democracies of cooperating with Spain in organizing a system of smuggling imported commodities into Germany, to strengthen the impression of sincere cooperation with Germany. He said there was not an intelligent man in the German Embassy and that he was fooling the Embassy, for example, in agreeing to make 12,000 tons of olive oil available to Germany at the rate of a thousand tons monthly. In a year many things might happen. Similarly the matter of Spanish volunteers against Russia was a cheap gesture.
Mr. Beaulac did not minimize the influence of German troops on the frontier but felt that an unnecessary feature in the picture was Franco’s refusal to see our Ambassador. Carceller regretted this situation and said that he was endeavoring to arrange matters. He was optimistic. Serrano Suñer was solely responsible. Serrano hated the United States and the Ambassador. He was an evil man with unbounded ambition, using the Axis for increasing his own power. Serrano Suñer believed that if Franco delayed long enough, our Ambassador would be replaced. The Cabinet was against Serrano in this and felt that a better idea would be to replace Serrano.
Much as Franco’s speech of July 17 was displeasing to Americans, it displeased Serrano more, as an apparent effort to transfer the Axis banner from the Foreign Minister.
Asked why Serrano Suñer was less offensive to the British than to us, Carceller said that the Foreign Minister basically admired the type of “English Lord.” He would like to be one himself. He detested the type of American businessman. Mr. Beaulac thought Spain had gone too far in permitting certain things to happen and to be said. There was a close relationship between national dignity and national security, and when a country went out of its way to offend the dignity of a friendly country it imperiled its own people. Spanish interests would be better protected by an attitude of greater dignity.
[Page 913]Carceller said that Franco had strong democratic instincts and was not sold on totalitarianism. He was not dictator in Spain, but the “presiding officer of the Council of Ministers.”
Carceller himself had the friendliest feeling toward the United States and hoped he could contribute something to keeping Spain and the United States friendly and furthering common interests.
Mr. Beaulac asked if he did not think that the Germans had stayed out of Spain because this seemed desirable from a military viewpoint. Carceller replied affirmatively but said a different attitude on Spain’s part might have made invasion appear desirable. He added that an American attempt at military measures in North Africa or the Islands off the Peninsula might precipitate German action in Spain, and that the Spanish Government was fearful of this.