740.0011 European War 1939/10340: Telegram
The Ambassador in Spain ( Weddell ) to the Secretary of State
Madrid
, April 25,
1941—6 p.m.
[Received 11:50 p.m.]
[Received 11:50 p.m.]
353. Barcelona’s 37, April 24, 6 p.m.16 In the last 36 hours I have made a rather careful canvass of colleagues, Spanish officials and others in a position to correctly gauge the course of events here; a synthesis of this would indicate the following:
- 1.
- German preparation—pressure looking to a linking of Spain’s fortune to the Axis—is strong at the present time.
- 2.
- Military opinion, including Franco, if strongly affected by recent German successes, is still of opinion that Spain should remain aloof;
- 3.
- The Foreign Minister in his strong conviction of entire German success favors closer ties;
- 4.
- However, no specific act looking to a closer alliance is anticipated until victory is achieved in the Balkans, even including an extension of this success to the Suez Canal;
- 5.
- While signature of the 3-party pact may precede direct action by Germany here, this may well include clauses permitting entry into and through Spain by German forces.
A large majority opinion indicates a crisis arriving before the end of June which would coincide with completion of military works of importance in the neighborhood of the Straits.
Weddell
- Not printed.↩