Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, Europe, Volume II

852.48/901: Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

Madrid, January 29, 1941—5 p.m.
[Received January 31—7:20 a.m.]

76. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. My number 239, June 24, noon, 1940.²

[Here follows an analysis of existing conditions in Spain.]

Conclusions: In a final analysis of the situation confronting our country in our relation to Spain in relation to our common humanity as well as to the general cause of British victory to which we are committed there should be kept in mind:

(1) That under existing circumstances Spain is not a free agent but is striving to preserve as much independence of action as is possible.

(2) That the food situation is serious and is becoming worse.

(3) That this hunger may sooner or later provoke an upheaval.

(4) That the result of this will be still further human suffering.

(5) That Spain might under the stress of hunger engage in a mad African adventure hoping at one and the same time to secure food from French Morocco and also to gratify a territorial ambition.

(6) That while the threat of German occupation will continue so long as large bodies of troops are held at the northern border Germany would be more greatly benefited by Spain’s voluntary adhesion to the Axis—hence German pressure is increasing. The insufficiency of aid from Britain to meet foodstuff needs and lack of aid from the United States bureaus enables the Germans to recall that their early predictions that only promises could be expected from the Federal Reserve Board are being borne out.

(7) That precious time in which to attempt to secure foodstuffs has been lost

(8) That it flows from this that it is too late (even if these leaders did not still manifest a measure of indifference to dealing with us) to undertake ordinary negotiations since if these discussions were successfully concluded it would be months before the relief might well be effective.

(9) That our policy at this time—a new policy it would be—should be a careful weighing of what Spanish neutrality is worth to us and to the common cause and that we should make a flat offer of foodstuffs with the sole condition and understanding that the spaced deliveries would cease the moment Spain entered the war or Germany occupied the peninsula.

(10) That reward for this help would be not alone that which flows from benevolence but practically of keeping the country a nonbelligerent with many if imponderable values given to the general cause. The Department may be assured that there is not the remotest possibility that such action would permit an accumulation of food stocks sufficient to be of advantage to an invading force.

(11) That we should clearly realize that the foregoing would not be appeasement but a calculated policy of supporting the Spanish Government to resist German pressure in its efforts to continue as a nonbelligerent and to create a popular attitude likely to provoke at least passive resistance should the Germans invade, equally realizing that the value of say half a million tons of wheat—the minimum need of this country until the next harvest—would be less than a fourth of the cost of a battleship (in this general connection an alternative offer might be a quantity of wheat equal in value to the amounts Spain has thus far paid to us under the cotton credits amounting to 4 million dollars).

(12) That while appreciated the maximum quantity of foodstuffs which could be supplied under the auspices of the Red Cross cannot be sufficient to relieve existing distress.

Weddell

2. Not printed.