Office of the Historian

856A.20/52: Telegram

The Minister to the Netherlands Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

London, October 17, 1941—8 p.m.
[Received October 18—12:35 a.m.]

Netherlands Series 30.

1.
I conveyed contents of your 31, October 13, 9 p.m. to Foreign Minister Van Kleffens on October 14.
2.
In conversation today Van Kleffens gave me the Netherlands Government’s reply. On second thought, he said, the Queen and her Government, prompted by security considerations, had become “extremely reluctant” to invite a Brazilian mission to Surinam, They were deeply concerned over (a) the character of the personnel of such a mission and (b) the possibility of its reports on Surinam reaching Axis hands through someone in the Brazilian War Office. They were more worried about the latter than the former possibility and a realistic attitude prompted their guarding against both.
3.
Van Kleffens thereupon handed me the following draft of an alternative wording of the proposed joint communiqué which he hoped might meet with our approval:

[Here follows text of revised draft and some comment on it.]

5.
To safeguard the feelings of the people of Surinam, Holland and the East Indies, the Netherlands Government would like the joint communiqué to state that the United States troops would be under Netherlands command and that the Netherlands would see to their maintenance. On the question of command, I recalled to his mind the President’s earlier suggestion that since the United States was not a belligerent, the American forces cooperate in the defense of [Page 822] the mines under the general direction of the Netherlands authorities. I also referred to his past assurance that this would present no practical difficulties. He replied that while the Netherlands Government preferred its own suggestion, it would consent to exclude this statement if we so desired. However, since it was important from the Dutch point of view, his Government would have to bring these points out in the Dutch language reports to its people through their radio and press service.
6.
He added that instructions to the Netherlands Minister in Rio de Janeiro were being prepared and he would let me have a copy informally before their despatch.
7.
He was unable to specify the date when the Governor of Surinam would be notified but would advise me as soon as his Government had completed arrangements with Brazil.
8.
He said that a further message from the Governor of Surinam indicated that there were insufficient accommodations for 1,000 men. Hence he believed that if United States forces were restricted to air and anti-aircraft elements this would be sufficient.
9.
In the foregoing conversation Van Kleffens gave the impression of being both embarrassed [and] harassed. I did not conceal my surprise at the reversal of the earlier formula and said I feared it would be most upsetting to the scheme itself and to the President’s general hemispheric policy. I again stressed my past statements regarding the vital importance to the President’s policy of Brazil’s inclusion in the arrangements in an acceptable form. I said the Netherlands authorities had put forward the idea of a military mission as an acceptable compromise; I feared the present proposal annulled the compromise and boiled down to a suggestion that the Brazilians guard their own frontier. He expressed the opinion that the Brazilian Government could present the proposal favorably to Brazilian opinion.
10.
I inquired whether the Netherlands Government’s “extreme reluctance” to invite a Brazilian military mission into Surinam represented a definite decision or a preference which was open to revision. Van Kleffens replied that it was a definite decision and expressed the hope that since it was a matter of major consideration for the Netherlands Government the United States Government would understand.
11.
I may add that Prime Minister Gerbrandy recently remarked to me that he was confronted with a most serious crisis in his Cabinet, certain members of which were seeking to make an issue of the charge that he was taking too much power into his hands and that he was not consulting sufficiently fully with his colleagues. While he did not directly relate this remark to any negotiations with us, the inference may not be unjustified that considerations of secrecy in [Page 823] Dutch strategic arrangements have had an influence on the situation and that he has been unable to carry with him his Cabinet in this instance.
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Biddle
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