859A.20/208/12

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

The British Ambassador called me on the telephone this morning to say that he had information for me with regard to the Iceland question. I consequently arranged to see the Ambassador at eleven o’clock.

The Ambassador came in with two messages for me which are attached herewith. He read to me likewise additional telegrams he had received from his Government which made it entirely clear that the Icelandic Government and the British Government approved entirely of the texts of the messages proposed by the President to be exchanged between the Prime Minister of Iceland and himself and likewise with regard to all of the other steps, including the timing of publicity to be given to these messages as specified in the last conversation I had with the Ambassador on this subject. The sole reservation [Page 791] made was that the Icelandic Government, for the reasons expressed in the memorandum handed to me by the Ambassador, hoped that the President would agree to use the phrase “to replace” instead of the phrase suggested by the President “to supplement and perhaps eventually to replace” in the penultimate sentence of the first paragraph of the message to be sent by the Prime Minister of Iceland to the President. I said that this suggestion had been made by the President himself and that I doubted very much that the President would feel able to modify his decision in that regard, but that I would submit the matter to the President and let the Ambassador have the President’s decision in the matter.

It was further clearly stated by the Ambassador that the Prime Minister of Iceland agreed that the agreement now reached between him and the President as to the texts of the two messages to be exchanged should be regarded as sufficient and that no texts need actually be telegraphed.

I subsequently spoke with the President on the telephone and he authorized me to state to the Ambassador that he was willing to omit the word “perhaps” from the suggested message but that he would have to insist upon the retention of the phrase “to supplement and eventually to replace” in lieu of the mere phrase “to replace”.

I then called Lord Halifax on the telephone and communicated to him the President’s decision. Lord Halifax said that I was to understand that this was entirely satisfactory to the Prime Minister of Iceland and that the two texts of the messages were now to be regarded as finally approved.

S[umner] W[elles]
[Annex 1]

The penultimate sentence of the first paragraph of the text of the message which the Iceland Prime Minister originally suggested that he should send to the President ran as follows:

“He also called my attention to the declaration of the President of the United States to the effect that he must take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of the Western Hemisphere—one of President’s measures is to assist in the defence of Iceland—and that the President is therefore prepared to send here immediately United States troops to replace the British force here.”

This paragraph was redrafted by the President to run as follows:—

“He also called my attention to the declaration of the President of the United States to the effect that he must take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of the Western Hemisphere—one of the President’s measures is to assist in the defense of Iceland—and that the President is therefore prepared to send here immediately United States troops to supplement and perhaps eventually to replace the British force here.”

[Page 792]

The Iceland Prime Minister has now replied through the British Minister in Reykjavik that the Iceland Government would greatly prefer the original wording which they themselves suggested.

This is important from the point of view of their own internal political position. They had counted on being able to defend their action in the Icelandic Parliament by saying that Iceland would now be accepting the protection of a non-belligerent power instead of that of a belligerent. The wording desired by the President suggests, however, that in theory, at all events, Iceland may be under a joint occupation for an indefinite period. The Iceland Government do not understand the necessity for the President’s amendment since they feel that it is already provided that it should be left to the judgment of the United States and British Governments to decide when the British forces should leave.

One of the “reservations” or “conditions” asked by the Iceland Government from His Majesty’s Government, and accepted by the latter, ran as follows:—

“Great Britain promises to withdraw all her armed forces as soon as the transport of the United States forces is so far advanced that their military strength is sufficient for the defence of the country. The defence of the country while the change is to be effected never to be less than they are now.”

The Iceland Government hope that if the President feels unable to withdraw his proposed amendment and return to the text originally suggested by the Iceland Prime Minister, he will be prepared to have the word “perhaps” in his draft omitted.

The Iceland Government agree to the President’s proposal that once the texts of the two messages have been finally agreed upon46 this agreement shall be regarded as being equivalent to the two notes having been exchanged and it will not be necessary for them actually to be telegraphed. The Iceland Government also agree that as soon as the draft messages have been finally settled the United States forces should start.47

July 1, 1941.

[Annex 2]

The Foreign Office are anxious to be informed as long as possible in advance of the date and hour of publication in Washington of the exchange of messages between the President and the Iceland Prime Minister. They are also anxious to know whether the President proposes to publish any other material at the same time. In that event they would like if possible to be informed of the text of this additional material in advance.

  1. The final texts of the two messages, dated July 1, are printed as Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 232.
  2. United States Forces arrived in Iceland on July 7, 1941.