859A.20/201/12
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State
Lord Halifax called to see me this morning at his request.
The Ambassador brought up the question of Iceland. He informed me that the British Foreign Office and the British Minister to Iceland saw serious dangers involved in the procedure determined upon by the President. The British Minister in Iceland believed that it was doubtful whether Iceland would ask the United States Government to assist in its defense, and both he and the Foreign Office feared that there would be danger of leakage since there was no censorship of the press in Iceland and likewise no control over wireless installations on Icelandic fishing vessels. The British Government stated, however, that it would be prepared to acquiesce in any plan of procedure upon which the President was fully determined.
I replied to the Ambassador that the President had requested me to say to him that the plan of procedure which the President had outlined was the only plan of procedure which he desired to follow. I emphasized the fact that the President believed that in as much as the whole basis of our relations with the other American Republics was based upon our policy of non-aggression and non-intervention, the occupation by the United States of Iceland without having received from the Icelandic Government a request to do so, would destroy in great measure the confidence which the other American Republics possessed in this Government and would be utilized by axis propagandists throughout the Western Hemisphere. The President felt, I said, that exactly the same strong argument presented itself in so far as any action which we might later take with regard to the Azores was concerned. It must be clear to the British Government that if the United States occupied through force the territory of Iceland without receiving any request from the Icelandic authorities to take such action, the fears of Portugal with regard to our possible action in the Azores would be materially stimulated and would be exploited to our disadvantage and that of the British by German propaganda in Portugal.
The Ambassador then propounded the following questions:
1. Is it correct that United States forces would move upon Iceland in two movements, from Newfoundland and Bermuda, the first movement starting June 22?
I said to Lord Halifax that as I had previously explained to Mr. Butler, the President had asked me to make it clear that all that he envisaged was the concentration of the American forces required for the occupation in either Newfoundland or Bermuda, or both, and that no movement towards occupation would be undertaken until these [Page 780] concentrations had been completed. (The President subsequently asked me to confirm this statement in his name to Lord Halifax and to add that Ambassador Winant would make this completely clear through a personal message which the President had instructed him to deliver to Mr. Churchill.35a)
2. Does the United States agree that during the interim period while American and British troops are both in Iceland that the total of such troops should not be less than the present total of the British garrison? (The President subsequently asked me to state to Lord Halifax that he confirmed this understanding with the proviso that, of course, in certain eventualities the total number might be very considerably greater than the present total of the British garrison.)
3. The British Government desired to know, since they themselves preferred to make no statement upon their departure from Iceland, whether the United States Government was agreeable to their refraining from making any statement. (The President asked me to let Lord Halifax know that this would be entirely agreeable to him.)
With regard to the statement which the United States would make after the procedure insisted upon by the President had been completed, the British Government was quite willing that the United States should omit any reference in such statement to any action taken by the United States “in concert with Great Britain”. It was further suggested by the British Government that there be omitted from any American statement the first two sentences in the original draft presented to us for our consideration because of the British feeling that the two sentences which they had previously suggested would injure Portuguese susceptibilities.
Finally, the British Government asked whether they might be given the opportunity to see the draft of the proposed American statement before it was issued in order that they might be afforded the opportunity of making any suggestions they thought would be useful.
I told Lord Halifax that I would be very glad to see that that was done.
- Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.↩