868.248/101

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

The Greek Minister came in to see me, at his request.

He said that he did not wish to be monotonous but the question of the proposed planes for Greece was on his mind and his Government had wired him requesting a further report, stressing the urgent need for these planes. He added that they had likewise made representations to our Minister in Athens (which I presume are the representations appearing in Athens’ no. 71, February 12, noon82).

I said that I had hoped to be able to call him a little later in the week when I had hoped to be in a position to give him a definite statement. As yet, I was not prepared to do so.

Personally and unofficially, however, I said, I would like to give him a review of the situation. I asked him to be guarded in his reporting because I did not wish him to raise hopes in his Government which might not be fulfilled, despite the fact that I was optimistic.

I then said that, following the failure of our earlier attempt, we had instituted a review of all of the available resources which might be detached for Greece. I believed that we had found thirty modern fighting planes which would satisfy the situation, which were either manufactured or in process of manufacture and which might be expected to be available within perhaps the next four weeks. I said that the arrangements were not yet complete and it had not been my intention to make any statement about them until this had been done, and that the Minister would recognize that nothing could be considered as certain until it was finally finished. I was myself optimistic, and hoped that a definite answer could be had perhaps by the end of this week.

The Minister said he was very glad. He agreed entirely that in view of the unfinished state of the arrangements, it would be desirable to be appropriately guarded in his report to Athens.

He then said that since the Greeks were to furnish the ships, he thought it would be both useful and encouraging if, as soon as possible, we could make it possible for him to send a cable to Athens requesting [Page 692] that a ship be fitted out and made thus available. This would both avoid loss of time, and be tangible evidence that something was going to happen—and evidence which he thought the Greek Government would much appreciate.

I said that we would certainly endeavor to expedite the completion of the arrangements as soon as it was appropriate; and I thought that even now he might appropriately inquire to find out how long it would take to secure the necessary transport.

The Minister then, somewhat to my surprise, asked whether the African route had proved feasible. (It happened that the Secretary of the Treasury at lunch had told me of the African route, and the method of flying planes across Africa; but he had given me to understand that this was wholly unknown.) I therefore said that I understood that the British had been making very full studies on this point; and I was of the impression that they thought that this is a practicable route. I ventured to tell him in determining the route and method of transport of these planes, to consult his British colleague, who could advise him fully in the premises.

The Minister then raised the question of the Chinese planes. Insisting that he fully appreciated the importance of China to the United States, he felt that it would create a difficult situation were the Greek planes to be postponed; China has known that her planes were coming along regularly each month; he hoped that the Greek planes could be echeloned with the Chinese so that it should not appear that the importance of China was considered greater than the importance of Greece and the Middle East. I made a few remarks about the vital importance of the Chinese situation but added that the program on which I was working would chiefly meet any of his requests in this regard.

The Minister concluded by referring to a cabled report sent by Colonel Donovan83 to the Secretary of the Navy. This report set out a list of materials, chiefly trucks and tractors, needed by Greece for agricultural purposes to replace pack animals and manpower detached for use at the front. He said that he would obtain for me a copy of this cablegram. His inquiry was whether the material requested in this report could be considered as coming within the terms of the Lend-Lease Bill.84

I said that obviously I was not prepared to answer that question. In a general way, I understood that the Lend-Lease Bill permitted a rather broad construction; but that after receiving the document [Page 693] in question I would have the matter studied and attempt to give him an answer.

The Minister then discussed briefly the Bulgarian situation. He added little to our information, save in respect of his comments on the position of the King. He was convinced, he said, that the King did not wish to let the Germans in; but that he was helpless in the face of a pro-Nazi General Staff and intelligentsia. The peasants have no public opinion, save a vague pro-Russian sentiment. The King was thus “disarmed” and could do nothing save accept a solution analogous to that of Denmark. He added that it remained to be seen whether the Germans would not attempt to order the Bulgarian Army to fight. If so, he thought the Army would fight, though without great enthusiasm.

I confined myself to comments that it would seem to me that Bulgaria had had a great opportunity to learn what was really meant by watching the fate of their brethren in Rumania. That, it would seem to me, would convince any thinking man that they have little to gain by playing the German game. The Minister said, sadly, that all Bulgarian politics really extend from the Second Bulgarian War (1913) and that they had virtually never recovered from the illusions and attachments and orientation which that had imposed upon them.

  1. Ante, p. 644.
  2. William J. Donovan, unofficial observer for the Secretary of the Navy in Southeast Europe and the Near East, December 1940–March 1941.
  3. Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.