740.00112 European War 1939/4010: Telegram
The Chargé at Tangier ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 2—5:36 p.m.]
375. Following is a summary of my conversation with General Noguès on November 30.
He first inquired about the status of the economic accord and I said that I had no instructions but that Murphy whom he was going to see in a few moments was better qualified to speak with him on that subject. He emphasized that Weygand’s departure had not changed anything so far as Morocco’s position toward the economic accord was concerned.
I said that while I had no instructions whatsoever from the Department I thought that an unfortunate impression may well have [Page 489] been created in Washington by the appearance of members of the German Armistice Commission.
Noguès said that the Germans had insisted on wearing their uniforms as a reprisal against the severe restrictions with which he had surrounded them. The other reports were entirely false and had probably been spread by British intelligence agents. The Protectorate authorities had expelled any French person having any relation whatsoever with the Commission outside the strict scope of its activities. Even women in bordels frequented by them had been expelled from Morocco for this association. He added that in addition to exercising their right to wear uniforms the Germans had threatened also to increase the Armistice Commission. He stated that they were already tired of wearing their uniforms as it was a source of embarrassment to them and he had pointed out to the Commission that it greatly increased the possibility of incidents which he wished to avoid at all costs. A Nantes or Bordeaux affair might well result in unforeseeable consequences. He thought the Germans would gradually abandon their intention to wear uniforms at all times but he could say nothing regarding a probable increase in the Commission.
Noguès said a great fault committed in connection with the economic accord had been the loose talk concerning it. Reports had reached him of widespread statements as far afield as Madrid that Weygand was the man of the United States. This talk had done great damage to Weygand and the announcement of the suspension of the accord following the departure of Weygand played directly into the hands of the Germans as it tended to justify the German contention that the accord had a political basis.
He hoped the accord would continue on a purely economic basis. He thought it in our interest, as well as in that of France, to maintain North Africa and especially Morocco outside the war area. The advent of the War to Morocco would be disastrous. Morocco, he insisted, would defend itself against any [attack]. He wished to emphasize that any menace by us against North Africa was only playing into the hands of Germany. I repeated that I had no official information but mentioned our apprehension that German bases might be established. He did not see how submarine bases on the Moroccan coast would give the Germans any advantages they did not already possess at Brest for example.
He did not believe that a German demand for transport of troops via Bizerte was likely. He thought Germany had too little at stake in Libya to risk an attempt to salvage that operation if it went sour.
He thought the Spanish work on airdromes in Spanish Morocco was defensive in character and that it was in the nature of defensive measures against the possibility of a British landing.
[Page 490]In Russia he thought the defense of Moscow more important than the retaking of Rostov just announced. The great thing for the Russians was for them to prevent the Germans from establishing themselves in control of the Volga which seemed to be their ultimate aim.
At one point in the conversation he referred to the tendency of some Spanish authorities to undermine his position in view of his refusal to consider any discussions regarding the extension of Spanish Morocco to the Sebou line. He said that nothing was known as to how far the Laval conversations had gone on this subject (see my despatch 271 [217] June 14, 194145) and that he had taken the position that there could be no adjustment of this subject with Spain until a final general treaty of peace.
Noguès said the native population of Morocco was absolutely dependent on our aid. It was now anti-British but pro-American. If we withdrew our aid the feeling would shift against us also. In the absence of our aid Morocco would be forced to look elsewhere. Noguès had gotten out of a sick bed to see me and he was tired and worn from malaria. It was difficult to determine whether his illness or his anxiety regarding the situation in Morocco and his own personal position was responsible for the nervousness and lack of customary ease with which he spoke.
Repeated to Vichy; by courier to Casablanca and Algiers.
- Not printed.↩