The Department will find the enclosure, I am sure, an interesting
resume of the current views of General Weygand which are shared by
some of his associates.
[Enclosure—Translation]
Memorandum by General Weygand
When I undertook the functions of Delegate General of the
Government in French Africa, the international situation was
dominated by a fact, the importance of which would of necessity
be capital in the conduct of French policy. I speak of the
failure of the German air offensive against the British Isles
which presaged a prolongation of the war and, without doubt, the
incapacity of the German Reich to bring the Anglo-Saxon powers
to their knees.
Under those circumstances, the position of vanquished France
suddenly took on a new value by reason of the fact that the
Armistice concluded on my request permitted to France the
control of its Empire. With one stroke France again became
master of an important factor in the outcome of the war, and the
strategic positions in its control became a trump essential ill
the general diplomatic situation. The importance thereof was
emphasized by the general interest which was shown therein by
foreign propaganda.
I fought this propaganda to the best of my ability.
[Page 462]
In my opinion, the role of the Empire should be the protection of
metropolitan France against abuses which the Reich imposes upon
all European peoples. This protection cannot be exercised if
France does not retain its territories intact. France must guard
its territories against dissident movements or foreign attack.
That was my role and I do not fear to say that the loyalty of
French Africa today is stronger than ever.
It was necessary also that France guard its territories against
German infiltration. That was the duty of the Government.
Control by the Reich of affairs in our Empire deprives France of
the trump which the Armistice left it. Such control places
France at the mercy of the conqueror just as in the case of
Poland and Greece.
At the beginning of the present year, the United States offered
us an economic accord which has not given all the economic
results for which we could have hoped because of British
opposition (seizure of the Schéhérazade,
reduction of our requests for petroleum products), and that of
Germany (opposition to the departure of our ships, refusal to
accept propositions permitting an increase in the number of
merchant ships engaged in this traffic, opposition to the
control by American consular officers of the exportation of
petroleum products, etc.).
But, from the political point of view, this accord offered an
important advantage. France, thanks to its Empire, remained the
only European power retaining its economic relations with the
United States. As long as French control of its territories was
not threatened, the Anglo-Saxons respected it.
Thus, in addition to the duty, as I understood it, of protecting
the Empire against the conqueror, there was added a further
possibility, that of maintaining cordial economic and political
contact with a power which, in any event, will be one of the
arbiters of the situation at the end of the war.
The evolution of the situation in 1941 only confirms the growing
importance of French Africa. The battle of the Atlantic does not
develop into a German success. American intervention is growing
more defined, and today the amendment of the Neutrality Act is
an accomplished fact. Germany, on the other hand, marks time in
Russia. Everything indicates that the battle this winter will be
that of the Mediterranean, as the possession of that waterway
will be indispensable to Germany for the transport of raw
products from East to West. The organization of Germanized
Europe is impossible without control of this important maritime
highway, the Mediterranean.
To open French Africa to Germany is to assure to the latter the
possibility of organizing the continent of Europe. It would also
mean that France would be deprived of a strategic position—the
key
[Page 463]
for the final
issue of the war. It would cause the Empire to run the risk of
becoming a battlefield between the two opponents. By resisting
Germany we might aggravate the conditions of a severe Armistice,
but we would leave ourselves the possibilities of action which
can only improve with time. Opening Africa to Germany means in
the last analysis giving to Germany a unique opportunity to be
able to continue the war during 10 years and to impose without
the possibility of any reaction its will upon France.
[Algiers, 15 November
1941.]
