740.00112 European War 1939/3713
Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)87
Mr. Welles: We have been informed that an official of the British Embassy will shortly proceed to London for consultation purposes and that before his departure it is likely that an interview will be requested of you. If such an interview takes place it would seem to afford a good opportunity to convey to the British authorities in London the position of this Government in regard to the plan of economic assistance for North Africa. There are a number of factors which would seem to make it desirable to impress the British Government with our views in this regard.
Although the British Embassy officials here have reluctantly come to agree that the plan of economic assistance is producing good results, it is evident that the London authorities are far from enthusiastic about the scheme. The reason for this no doubt is that the plan is not fully understood by the people of Great Britain and as a consequence there has been severe criticism in Parliament. This criticism seems to be reflected in the slowness of the British Government to approve each step in the development of the plan, particularly with respect to the items submitted for approval under the quota and with respect to the shipment of petroleum products.
The type and quantity of the commodities listed under the quota are generally subjected to numerous conditions and provisions which are difficult for the French to accept and which are then referred back to London for final decision. The delays in reaching agreement on these many small points naturally slow up the whole plan enormously and have been in large part responsible for the fact that only four cargo vessels have actually left the United States for North Africa since the plan was first discussed last November. One of the principal [Page 447] troubles seems to be that the British are endeavoring to utilize the economic plan to implement their war policy, and as a price for their consent to the shipment of many items they demand concessions from the French which bear no direct relation to the internal economic problems of North Africa.
The question of oil shipments presents a more difficult problem, since it is likely to arouse even more criticism in the future. The British desire us to issue a statement to the press regarding the forthcoming arrival in Casablanca of the tanker Lorraine, which sailed from the United States on September 26 with fuel oil and other petroleum products. The object of such a statement would of course be to have us assume a share of the responsibility. The preliminary conditions attached to a future program of oil shipments have been so discouraging that Mr. Robert Murphy has asked permission to postpone discussion of this subject with General Weygand and to set forth in any case that they are British conditions and not ours.
I believe that if advantage could be taken of the opportunity to impress upon the British once again our desire to proceed rapidly with the North African plan, we might obtain a greater measure of cooperation. It would seem that what really counts in North Africa is the broad gesture of American aid, rather than long drawn out bargaining over details. Even if an entire shipment of American goods fell into the hands of the Axis it would have no real effect on the course of the war and might actually call favorable attention to the efforts of the United States. Yet in this connection the British constantly seem to lose sight of the fact that our control officers in North Africa are supervising the distribution of goods and it is highly unlikely that any portion thereof would find its way to an unauthorized destination.
The British Embassy in Washington seems to be little more than an intermediary in negotiations with the Foreign Office, and apparently has no authority to make decisions. It would be of vital assistance to the success of the plan if the whole machinery could be speeded up and emphasis laid on the broad general policy involved rather than the constant negotiations on small matters.
- Marginal note by Mr. Welles: “I quite agree—SW”.↩