740.00112 European War 1939/3584: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 5—12:18 a.m.]
1267. Department’s telegram 704, September 18, 7 p.m. and my telegram 1225, September 25, 4 p.m. The following telegram has been received from Murphy dated October 1, 5 p.m., in 13 sections:
“From Murphy. Your 1225, September 25, 4 p.m., and Department’s 704, September 22 [18], 11 a.m. [7 p.m.]. This telegram was delayed due to my absence in Morocco and my desire to discuss some phase of the matter with General Weygand prior to reporting to you.
1. I believe that it should be bluntly stated that whatever reports critics of the economic plan for North Africa may have before them regarding ‘large quantities of supplies proceeding to France and eventually Germany and Italy from North Africa,’ it is certain that such shipments have never been as low as they are now since the Armistice. Algerian and Tunisian ports are practically stagnant, and shipments out of Casablanca to Europe, I am informed, are far below what they were some months ago. According to the estimate of informed observers, including our Consul General, the port movement at Algiers is approximately but 3 percent to 4 percent of normal, taking 1938 as a normal year. This is likewise true of the ports of Oran, Nemours, Bône, Bougie, Philippeville, etc.
There is no doubt that recently the Germans have exerted increased pressure to obtain minerals from Morocco. French North African authorities deserve credit for maneuvering during a period of months and successfully blocking shipments of minerals which they knew were destined for Germany through French intermediaries. This at a distance may not appear a difficult matter but on closer inspection [Page 442] it is not trivial. General Weygand, I am reliably informed, flatly refused a recent proposal made by private Japanese interests to French Moroccan authorities for the delivery to Japan of 3,000 to 5,000 tons of cobalt ore by the Omnium Nord African on the ground that cooperation with Japan would alienate American public opinion. This was a difficult decision because the deal might have resulted in obtaining a substantial tonnage of Japanese cotton textiles sorely needed by the North African population.
2. I do not believe there is mystery nor bad faith connected with the delivery of war matériel to the Germans and Italians. It is remembered that France suffered an humiliating military defeat ending with the hardest kind of an Armistice Convention. Article 6 of that Convention requires France to preserve certain war matériel (over and above that allowed for the use of the French military establishment) in unoccupied French territory at the disposition of the Axis Powers. The latter’s Armistice Commissions made an immediate census in metropolitan France and in North Africa of the matériel available and had it set aside during the months after the Armistice before Weygand’s arrival here. In North Africa the matériel so set aside by the Armistice Commissions was kept in depots under their supervision. The Germans and Italians withdraw it when they wish. During the months that elapsed a portion of the matériel, I am informed, was sabotaged. The Department’s 325 of September 20, 7 p.m.83 states that the British complain that, according to their reports, of 1,000 trucks seized by the Axis Commissions in North Africa after the Armistice 450 actually arrived in Libya in working condition. The British regard this as aid extended by General Weygand to the Axis.
The following figures regarding deliveries of automotive matériel to the German and Italian Armistice Commissions in North Africa have been provided confidentially by a member of Weygand’s staff: total number of motor vehicles set aside after Armistice: trucks 1,100; passenger cars 275; busses 30. These were taken from French North African military stocks. In addition to the foregoing, 400 trucks were to be delivered from military stocks in metropolitan France to the Tunisian border. Under this application of the Armistice Convention the following deliveries were made up to August 31: motor vehicles from North African military stocks: 581 delivered; 343 ready for delivery; 267 under repair; 94 refused by the Germans; 920 not yet submitted to inspection. Trucks from France: delivered nil; arrived in North Africa 72; inspected and ready for despatch to North Africa 78; in France under inspection 250.
Part of the February 1941 accords entered into by Vichy with the Axis Powers contemplated the delivery to them in Libya of foodstuffs including 110,000 hectoliters of wine (about 10,000 metric tons) and from 40,005,000 [4,000 to 5,000?] tons of wheat monthly beginning with October 1941 or a total of from 40,000 to 50,000 tons of wheat.
Weygand’s arguments against such deliveries are bad crops, danger of famine on the part of the native population of French North Africa, no transport facilities. After long discussions the agreements were recently revised at Vichy (this is one of the reasons for Admiral Esteva’s recent visit to Vichy) and the French obligation reduced [Page 443] to deliver a total of 8,000 tons of wheat, 4,000 in October and 4,000 in November. Esteva, Resident General in Tunisia, urged that there are no means of transport overland; that if the Axis wanted the wheat and wine they would have to come by boat to Sfax to get it. The Italians indicate they are afraid of the risk involved.
Weygand said he promised me that if an arrangement is made to send an Italian ship to the port of Sfax to take this produce he will notify me in advance so that the Department may be appropriately informed.
In addition as previously reported 335 tons of olive oil was delivered under the February and March 1941 accords to the Italians in Libya from Tunisia.
The Germans also sent a commission to Algeria as previously reported for the purchase of other foodstuffs for the Afrika Korps but for reasons best known to the French the efforts of the commission failed.
I discussed this phase of the question with General Weygand today. He said the February accords were negotiated by Vichy without consultation with him. He has done his best to prove that they were wrong and oppose their execution. Last February, he said, Admiral Darlan believed in a German victory and felt that there was no alternative but to cooperate with the Axis. He said ‘Since then, June, July, August, and September have passed and on October 1 the war in Russia really is just beginning. The German front has broadened from the British Channel to Murmansk, the Caucasus and the Mediterranean basin. The battle of the Atlantic has begun to swing in favor of the British. Darlan has changed with the situation. Last June I had to oppose his readiness to make concessions to the Germans in North Africa. Today he gives me support.’
3. I am of course entirely ignorant of the source of Vichy stories regarding a shift of personnel in North Africa with the elimination of ‘all French officials not 100 percent collaborationist’. I am not acquainted with any officials of importance in French North Africa who are ‘100 percent collaborationists’. There are, of course, different points of view as to how France could emerge from her present dilemma but these ideas generally converge around a basically nationalistic sentiment, not the thought of France as a province in a Nazified Europe.
A change such as that of Secretary General Monick at Rabat, though admittedly desired by the Germans, was largely due to disaffection which grew up between him and his superior, General Noguès. The latter, I am reliably informed, felt that Monick was not personally loyal.
General Weygand confirms entirely the statements made in your telegram under reference regarding the selection of General Koeltz, De Lattre de Tassigny and Juin for service in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, respectively, he says that he approves of them fully, he asked for their assignments to North Africa and knows that they are anti-Nazi and anti-collaborationist. He said ‘These men are excellent soldiers who do not love the Germans. They are not collaborationists. They can be depended upon to give a good account of themselves. General Juin will probably succeed General Noguès as Resident General of Morocco’.
[Page 444]4. No one of any reliability in French North Africa with whom I have talked seemed to believe that the French are planning a punitive expedition against French Equatorial Africa. A highly qualified French General, who has had many years of experience as a soldier in French Africa and who possesses an admirable grasp of the military problems involved, gave me the other day in Casablanca a graphic description of the obstacles to such an undertaking. He said he thought it might be a good idea if some of our military experts would study the map of that part of Africa, realize that Britain controls the seas, and understand that the shortest line of attack would require the establishment of an overland supply line of 1,000 miles across desert from Dakar to Bamako (rail end), Mniamery [Niamey?] and Zinder to the Tchad, a large portion of which would be flanked by British Nigeria. The General said that with the pitifully inadequate supplies now available such an enterprise would be folly and every French officer in Africa knows it. He, as do others, said that the strengthening of the military establishment at Dakar is purely a defensive move because many French do fear another British or an Anglo-Saxon attack against Dakar.
I put this question to General Weygand today. He replied that I could quote him as stating categorically that no attack against French Equatorial Africa is contemplated or will be made. He also pointed out on a map of Africa in his office the obstacles to such an enterprise. These obstacles under present conditions, he said, are insurmountable. He said ‘that is furthest from our minds. There is no German initiative in the movement of effectives, matériel and munitions to Dakar. As you know I have always opposed fratricidal action between Frenchmen and I blame the De Gaullists more than I do the English for such action in Syria and last year’s attack against Dakar. I would be the last to initiate such action and I know the Marshal shares my views. We have taken advantage of German fears regarding Dakar to obtain concessions in respect of effectives and military equipment.’ I have always imagined that a prime objective of our North African policy is a development of affairs which will lead the French to resume hostilities against the Axis and themselves to defend their African Empire. That policy fails if recourse to offensive military operations against the French in French West or North Africa is necessary. I believe that we are justified in hoping that if the Axis provokes the French by aggressive action against French Africa that the French will fight and that is particularly true if they are convinced that prompt and efficacious military support will be forthcoming from the United States.
On the other hand I believe that the French are [far?] from resumption of hostilities on their own initiative in the absence of Axis provocation. Therefore, our present policy of encouragement and support is at least partially responsible for the negative result that French Africa is not used as a base of Axis military operation. This may not be considered enough or satisfactory but I see no present opportunity to obtain more in the absence of German provocation.
First and foremost in the minds of the French in Africa is the question of Libya. Respect for British military ability has not been enhanced by the British showing thus far on the land in Libya and elsewhere. Many French here still hope that the British High Command will succeed in driving the Axis forces out of Libya. Should [Page 445] that happen we could hope that those forces might then supply the necessary provocation to the French by overrunning Tunisia. That hope would justify, it seems to me, our present inexpensive policy of encouragement and support.
I might add in conclusion that I have never seen General Weygand in a more confident mood than he is today. His bitterness over Syria has disappeared. He spoke at length of his admiration for General Wavell.84 He voiced his pleasure several times over the progress of the Russian campaign. He inquired eagerly for news of the production of war material in the United States. He also asked whether there was anything new on the subject of a negotiated peace and seemed satisfied when I said that I knew of nothing new other than what President Roosevelt, the Secretary and Mr. Churchill85 had said on recent occasions. Weygand referred to his continuing efforts to oppose German infiltration in French Africa and to the additional execution of natives who had been cooperating with German Armistice Commission representatives. He dwelt at considerable length on the incapacity which some French statesmen had demonstrated during the years before the war and expressed the opinion, to which I agreed, that the United States had no interest in seeing any particular set of individuals established in the French post-war Government.
At the end of our conversation he said with obvious sincerity ‘You may tell your Ambassador that I have not changed in my intention to defend French Africa against the Germans. You know that I do not love them. I very much appreciate the understanding support which Ambassador Leahy gives my Government’. [Murphy.] Cole.”
While I do not have complete confidence that Weygand, as he stated to Murphy in the last paragraph of the latter’s telegram, will resist German occupation of French Africa with force of arms, unless he should have either an order from the Marshal or satisfactory assurances of adequate American military assistance, I am in full agreement with Murphy’s expressed opinion that our present policy of encouragement and material support should be continued with the purpose of maintaining such obstacles to German penetration into French Africa as at the present time exist.