740.00112 European War 1939/3519: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 26—6:50 a.m.]
1225. Department’s telegram 704, September 18, 7 p.m. Careful consideration has been given to the highly important question of policy presented in the Department’s telegram under reference. I may wish to supplement this telegram after receipt of Murphy’s views and after further conversations with high officials of the French Government. Meanwhile, since the problem presented appears to be of urgency the following is submitted:
As to the five specific points of criticism:
1. As the Department is aware from previous telegrams (for instance, Embassy’s telegram 251, February 28, 8 p.m.77) under specific agreement with Germany certain percentages of colonial products ranging from 12½ percent to 50 percent arriving at Marseille are to be delivered to Germany. The French Government has not concealed the general terms of this agreement from us. Actual deliveries of such products as palm oil, peanut oil, and phosphates, we understand, have fallen far under the original estimates owing to transport and other difficulties in getting the products to Marseille. (The Department will recall that in return Germany was to furnish France with certain quantities of potatoes and sugar which have likewise been far below the amounts promised.) In addition, however, there seems little doubt that in practice substantial percentages of foodstuffs arriving from overseas eventually find their way from Marseille to Germany. This seems particularly true of Algerian wine and mutton. The same applies to such raw materials as crude rubber (some 1,700 tons which arrived at Marseille, as the Embassy has previously reported) and probably Algerian wool. The Germans apparently operate largely through purchase made by private French intermediaries rather than through official direct requisitions so that reliable estimates are difficult to obtain.
I feel that there is probably some exaggeration as to the quantities of colonial products obtained by the Germans at Marseille, but there is no doubt that there is considerable leakage.
2. Of the reports of deliveries of trucks and other materials to German military authorities in North Africa, Murphy is in a better position to furnish the exact figures than I can ascertain in Vichy. His previous telegrams have indicated that trucks in quantity have been [Page 437] delivered from North Africa. Weygand seems to resist such deliveries to the best of his ability.
3. The stories which the Department states emanate “from Vichy sources” as to a wholesale shift of personnel in North Africa are, as far as I can learn, grossly exaggerated. (It would be helpful in my search for information to know just who these sources are if the Department is in a position to inform me.) Careful investigation leads me to believe that, while there have been and necessarily will be changes in personnel, they are not on the scale reported, nor are key posts being filled by “100 percent collaborationists”. For instance, General Koeltz, who was personally known to a member of my staff and who left Vichy recently to take command in Algiers, was not considered to be pro-German; in fact, his direct contact with Armistice Commission decisions could hardly have led him to have much faith in the possibilities of any real Franco-German collaboration under present conditions. Similarly, reports on General de Lattre de Tassigny, who took over yesterday as Commandant in Tunis, indicate that he is anything but a collaborationist. The reports, as the Department will recall, on General Juin are contradictory though since his arrival to take command in Morocco he does not appear to have shown any collaborationist tendencies and his earlier reported advocacy of views in that direction may have been merely with the object of obtaining his release from a German prison camp.
As against this of course there is the ousting of Monick for whom the Germans have long been gunning and which unquestionably represents a concession to their demands.
4. As the Department is aware, during the period last May and early June when German pressure was at its height, there was much insistence that the French undertake a military operation to retake dissident colonies in Africa. As the Department is also aware, Weygand (and in this he appears to have had Darlan’s support) effectively resisted the German demands, or at least succeeded in postponing action thereon, by showing conclusively that any such operation was unfeasible, owing to climatic conditions, prior to October. Investigation here leads me to believe that there is strong opposition, not only from Weygand but also from General Huntziger,78 to any such movement now. In fact there is considerable reluctance shown here to any plan, inevitably unpopular, which would involve taking the initiative in sending Frenchmen to fight Frenchmen, and it will be remembered that this fratricidal aspect was the principal source of Vichy bitterness over the British move against Syria. (This does not of course in any sense imply that the forces loyal to the Vichy Government will not resist to the full any further Gaullist attack against French West Africa.) In addition to private investigation showing the lack of any such plans for an attack on Africa, my Military Attaché has received an official denial of any such plans at the War Ministry and Rochat has given us a similar denial at the Foreign Office.
5. There is no doubt that the French have for some time, as the Department points out, been strengthening their defenses in West Africa; but official sources, even friendly ones, are of course reluctant [Page 438] to talk. We are told by a reliable source that two battalions of the French Foreign Legion have recently arrived at Dakar and that plans are being made to send a Senegalese infantry regiment and a Madagascan engineering battalion by the end of this month. Two antitank corps are reported to be in process of formation and are slated to be sent to Dakar as soon as they are completely equipped. Apparently quantities of munitions, aviation bombs and gasoline, as well as bridging materials, have been sent from metropolitan France to Dakar, and the air army units there have also been reinforced. Similarly, work is reported to be progressing on a number of air fields in North Africa, although we have received no official confirmation of this. There is little doubt, in my opinion, that the primary purpose in this military reinforcement of Dakar is to defend that portion of the French Empire from any further De Gaulle or British attack, or if need be, against a similar move by the United States. This seems obvious since a German move would not come from the sea, in view of the distance of Senegal from any present German-occupied base, and would probably not take place until North Africa had been occupied by Axis forces.
It is assumed that America’s present attitude toward the African colonies was taken with a thought that when he is faced with a decision, Weygand either with or without the Marshal’s orders might determine to resist by force of arms a German move to North Africa; whether this premise proves to be right or wrong—and only time and future events can tell—presumably the quantities of supplies which we are now furnishing French Africa or may furnish in the future are not sufficient to make any appreciable difference in the success or failure of a German attack on that area. To halt or to reverse our North African policy at the present time might have the effect of throwing France completely into German hands.
This moment would, in my opinion, be singularly ill-chosen for such a change which, insofar as we can see from here, promises no advantage to America. Since early June, as I have reported, Vichy has shown some resistance to German demands with respect to North Africa and this resistance seems to be as firm today as it ever was—as German interruption of collaboration negotiations would seem to show. It is due almost entirely to two facts: The strength of Russian resistance and a growing realization not only of the magnitude of our defense effort but of our determination to see a Nazi defeat. For these reasons there has been a considerable evolution of opinion here. As I have reported, the eagerness of the “collaborationists” to hedge has at times been very apparent.
I do not wish in any sense to imply that this change is necessarily permanent. German successes in the Ukraine in the past few days have already given signs of reversing this trend, and Vichy, which began by having no faith in Russian resistance then changed to believing [Page 439] that country invulnerable, is once more beginning to visualize complete German occupation of the vital Caucasus oil area and all its implications. It is the growing feeling here that within the next month, possibly the next fortnight, German demands for facilities in Africa will be renewed to the accompaniment of dire threats, if not an ultimatum, with probably some proposals for modifying the “severity” of the Armistice Convention terms. What the attitude of the Vichy Government will be at that time depends, to some extent, on the military situation. If there then should be sufficient evidence that Vichy is prepared to grant facilities to Germany in Africa, that Weygand will not resist such a grant with force, a change in our policy would seem necessary, including an immediate stoppage of all shipments and a recall of the Ambassador “for consultation;” and the reasons therefor should be publicly and widely stated. In the meantime, however, pending some evidence or indication that either Marshal Pétain or General Weygand is not prepared at least to refuse to agree to German infiltration into Africa or the passage of supplies to the German forces in Libya through Tunis, I feel that we should continue our present program, including Red Cross supplies for children in Free France and hold out hope for its extension.
With reference to the specific question of Bizerta or Tunis, the Department will recall (Embassy’s telegram 1170, September 12, 2 p.m.) the intimations of Admiral Darlan, in the Marshal’s presence, that the French Government may be compelled to agree to the passage of German “foodstuffs” to Libya. Weygand, we are told by Monick who has just arrived at Vichy, will oppose any such concession, recognizing it for the entering wedge. I feel that it might be well for the Department to instruct me to make it clear beyond the shadow of a doubt that agreement to the extension such facilities will definitely mean the end of all cooperation with French Africa, even if more serious steps are not under consideration. It has been unfortunately, but understandably, in the past the policy of the Vichy Government to yield when the pressure is greatest and in the face of the greatest immediate dangers. In the long run, only through the exercise of strong counter-pressure on our part will the Marshal and his Government be persuaded to resist. As indicated in telegram No. 1150, September 8, 1 p.m., they may even welcome a strong statement of what we can and will do, and use such a statement in the renewal negotiations with the Germans which, according to current reports, will not now be long delayed.
Repeated to Algiers.