740.0011 European War 1939/14875
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles W. Lewis, Jr., of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
| Participants: | Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Solborg, MID, War Department. |
| Mr. Murray | |
| Mr. Villard | |
| Mr. Lewis |
Colonel Solborg stated that when he arrived in French North Africa in February the feeling of the officials and others toward the United States was very friendly but that toward the end of about three months the attitude of the French toward us began to cool. This, he said, was due to disappointment resulting from the failure of economic assistance from the United States to arrive and afterwards to reach the expected proportions and also because this Government had shown no active interest in extending military assistance, in the form of matériel or otherwise, to French North Africa.
He commented that the fighting spirit in that area had fallen to a very low level and that it had now become clearly apparent, in view of the prevailing weariness and the lack of heart for further struggle, combined with relatively satisfactory economic conditions and the absence of the pinch of war in an acute form, that there can be little hope of a resurrection of a will to light. The general attitude, he said, is that, for the French, the war is over and that nothing can be done to alter the fact of their defeat. He stated that this attitude had been, in fact, encouraged by the authorities, who likewise had also taken severe measures to suppress those who ardently wished to continue to keep alive a combat organization. He said that while General Weygand had repeatedly stated that he would defend North Africa against all comers he was convinced that this was an empty boast. General Weygand knows the weakness of the North African forces and realizes that a defense against the Germans could last but a few days. The Army, at first puzzled by the confusion of events, has now settled down to a peaceful routine and is therefore no longer in an expectant mood. The soldiers were told by high ranking officers that the “jig was up” and that since no help from the United States, [Page 421] the only possible source of help, could be expected revenge must be dismissed from their minds. General Weygand, disappointed, has done much, the Colonel stated, to further this forlorn view.
He said that while General Weygand undoubtedly knew of the plans and the statement of needs of the military forces in North Africa which had been transmitted to this Government he had taken no active part in their formulation. When the United States failed to react he was keenly disappointed. The General will not commit himself to a course of independent action without an absolute assurance of adequate help from the United States. If given orders to fight an American invasion he would resign, and he would resign also, Colonel Solborg said, if instructed by Vichy to surrender African bases to the Axis. If called upon to resist the Germans he would say that he has not the forces or material to do so. He is not anti-British, but at the same time he expects nothing good from the British.
There is, however, Colonel Solborg said, a general anti-British feeling in French North Africa. This is particularly so among the officer personnel of the Navy. The Navy, however, has little regard for Darlan. The feeling of the naval officers toward Americans is one of mixed emotions. Generally, they are not particularly cordial, this being due to the knowledge that the United States is supporting Great Britain, the defeat of which country seems to be ardently desired notwithstanding the knowledge that Britain’s defeat would end all hope of a free and independent France. Colonel Solborg attributed this paradoxical attitude toward the British to such emotions, a humiliation over the defeat of the French and jealousy of the French toward the British for having continued the struggle.
Basically, Colonel Solborg said, the French are anti-German, but they know what the German war and peace aims are. These aims may be bad in many respects, but at least the French know that if Germany is victorious they will not return to the corrupt political system of pre-war days and will not be subjected to the machinations of “international Jewry”. As they see matters now, they have only a choice of “Jewry” if the British win and of the Boches if the Germans win, and as between the two they prefer the latter. The Colonel thought that the recent eight-point declaration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill74 might have served a useful purpose in outlining the war and peace aims of the Democracies but he doubted if the declaration was sufficiently detailed or concrete to clarify French minds and dispel all of their doubts.
Colonel Solborg said that while Marshal Petain is still sacrosanct to most French people it is noticeable that his personality is now [Page 422] beginning to be questioned. One reason for this is the growing realization, or belief, that the Armistice was a mistake. Both Petain and Weygand shared the responsibility of the Armistice and so are now beginning to reap the results of an erroneous decision.
Colonel Solborg said that there was little sentiment in French North Africa in favor of General de Gaulle. While generally regarded as an able tactical officer he lacks the sympathetic personality required, under French standards, for a great leader. Moreover, he is held responsible for many of the British blunders because of bad advice which he is believed to have given the British. It is thought that he would never be accepted generally by the French as a leader. On the other hand, there is some respect for such of his subordinates as Catroux, de Larminat and Gentilhomme.
Questioned as to his reactions to the plan for extending economic assistance to French North Africa, Colonel Solborg said that the plan had one considerable advantage in that it keeps the door open in that area for American observers but that, on the other hand, the plan would not suffice to revive the fighting spirit of the French in North Africa or to induce the authorities to resist the Germans. The assistance should, he said, have been started earlier and should have been ampler to prevent the discouragement which has taken possession of the French in that region. He said that Vichy and the French Navy are not receptive to our economic assistance and are disposed to defeat it, or at any rate Vichy wishes to give it no publicity and thereby prevent, as far as possible, the natives knowing from whence the assistance comes. So far as the plan’s effect on building up resistance in North Africa to German propaganda is concerned, such effect is limited because of the factor just noted, but in any case, he added, when the Germans are ready to move they will invade North Africa and the economic assistance now being given will in no way affect the situation.
Colonel Solborg said that he estimates that there are perhaps one hundred and fifty Germans in French Morocco in addition to the members of the Armistice Commission. These Germans, he explained, are mostly ex-soldiers of the French Foreign Legion. There are no Germans or Italians in Dakar and the French Sudan. The police in French Morocco are efficient and are implacable in their determination to destroy all contacts between natives and German agents. The loyalty of El Glaoui, Pasha of Marrakesh, to the French depends entirely upon what he can gain by the attachment, and likewise his present pro-British feelings will continue only so long as it is advantageous to him or there is a prospect of his being able to gain something [Page 423] from the British. He is equally mercenary, the Colonel stated, with respect to the United States.
Colonel Solborg stated that when he arrived at Dakar the sentiment at that place toward Great Britain and the United States was bitter. Fearful of another attack, the authorities were on the alert and were resolved to defend the city against all comers. However, after the arrival of the tanker Schéhérazade carrying oil supplies for that area the feeling toward the United States improved considerably. He expressed the opinion that Casablanca is of far greater strategic importance to the United States than Dakar and would be much easier to take. Dakar could, he said, be largely neutralized by the capture of Casablanca. He felt that no serious French resistance would be encountered in taking the city but admitted that such a move on the part of the British or Americans would probably precipitate a German move into North Africa, the Russian campaign notwithstanding.
- Atlantic Charter, August 14, 1941, vol. i, p. 367.↩