740.0011 European War 1939/14137: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 20—2:45 a.m.]
1051. Weygand’s confidential representative here who, with the Canadian Chargé d’Affaires, Dupuy, dined alone with me last evening says that there has been no renewal of German “pressure” for [Page 415] bases or port and transport facilities in French Africa. Whether such pressure will be renewed with real insistence in his opinion will depend in part upon developments in the East. He leans to the personal view that, if a major British offensive is scheduled to start in Libya in September, as the French believe and as Dupuy indicates, the Germans will be in no position to force French concessions in Africa at that time. As concerns Bizerte and the reported German need for the use of this Tunisian port and other territory of that colony to ship supplies and possible reinforcements to their army in Libya they would, he said, need at least a month’s preparation and, therefore, their efforts to obtain such concessions should be at their maximum now. “The Germans might, of course, occupy the whole of our country if we resist,” he said, “which would be the best thing for France, but obviously that is not to their interest or they would have done so before.” He went on to say that he thought the critical point as regards North Africa had been reached at the time of Weygand’s visit in the first days of June and that since the danger of German acquisition of bases was successfully averted at that time he is not overly worried that they will succeed “so long as Weygand is in Africa.” He confirmed reports from other sources that the German efforts to obtain transit facilities through Bizerte a fortnight ago had really been in the form of a “suggestion” as to how France could show a real desire to “collaborate” and thus obtain some more tangible German concessions than vague promises for the future which, except for a few thousand prisoners, is all the “generous” conqueror had yielded since Montoire.68a (I should add that his feeling that German pressure for bases in Africa will not be renewed with all the accompanying threats and intimidations so effective a part of the Nazi “war of nerves” technique is not generally shared in Vichy.)
We went over the importance of our present program of economic assistance in Africa and I believe convinced Dupuy of the desirability from the British point of view of strengthening that program in every possible way. We likewise emphasized the unfortunate effect which the clumsiness of Gaullist broadcasts from Britain are now having on French public opinion and the need for the utmost discretion in all references on the air to Africa, particularly the avoidance of any use of names. Weygand’s representative confirmed that the dismissal of General Bioyen [Doyen] (Embassy’s telegram 923, July 23, 7 p.m.69), whose effective resistance on the French Armistice Commission to many German demands was of considerable value, should [Page 416] be attributed solely to the B. B. C.’s references to his abilities in this respect.
They also talked of the regrettable lack of any effective direct contact between the Vichy Government and the British, a lack which gives rise to so much possibly avoidable friction and so many misunderstandings. A number of the latter Dupuy attributes to “self-seeking De Gaulle adherents in London whose primary personal interest is to prevent any better understanding with Vichy and whose false or exaggerated stories are too often believed.” Dupuy suggested that in spite of the great German suspicion of any direct Franco-British contact better use could be made of the French Legation at Dublin or the French Embassy at Washington. The General’s representative stated that “fortunately” the decision to change Henry-Haye has been practically taken and that the “failure to have in Washington an Ambassador who could properly interpret” both Vichy policies to our Government and to the British, and “American policies and opinion,” was one of the tragedies of the past year. He brought up the name of General Requin, speaking of the high regard which Weygand has for him. (Embassy’s telegram 1021, August 13, 1 p.m.70 An earlier plan to sound us out with respect to Gaston Bergery whose “collaborationist” and Anglophobe views are well known has, Rochat tells me, been definitely dropped.)
I was told incidentally by Weygand’s assistant that Hitler had made it known to the Marshal and his Government that he has a “personal interest and [in?] the maintenance [of De Brinon?] in his present office as Ambassador of France and general delegate to the occupying authorities; he is therefore for the moment “untouchable” in spite of Darlan’s reported personal desire to replace him by Benoist-Mechin or someone else.
Repeated to Algiers.