740.00112 European War 1939/3297

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

Mr. Welles: I notice that in your telephone conversation with Mr. Hull on July 29 a reference was made to the plan of economic assistance for North Africa and for the necessity of watching carefully the movement of supplies to that area. Mr. Hull in this connection referred to the danger of a joint defense of North Africa by General Weygand and the Germans along the lines of the agreement on Indochina, and to a certain opposition on the part of some people to the granting of facilities for the North African trade.

In order to avoid any possible misconception in regard to our policy respecting North Africa, I feel it would be desirable to emphasize the fact that this Division has never been under any illusions as to the success of the plan. We are fully aware of the fact that the Germans have been putting as much pressure on the French Government as they can with respect to North Africa, such as increasing the size of the German Armistice Commission in Morocco, allowing German commercial penetration, endeavoring to obtain bases, et cetera. Their efforts may be crowned with success at any moment, and we are quite prepared for any unfavorable eventualities. On the other hand, the fact remains that General Weygand has so far stood out [Page 408] against German infiltration and has prevented any actual occupation or use of French North African territory by German forces. The firm attitude he has taken at Vichy has been largely due to his hope of obtaining supplies from the United States, and the officials under him, who are friendly to the United States, have maintained their positions very largely because of their reliance on American aid. Reports from our consular officers in North Africa show that this faith has to a great extent been justified and that new courage is being lent to General Weygand’s organization, with corresponding disgruntlement on the part of the Germans.

As long as this situation obtains and the door to North Africa remains closed to the Germans it would seem worth our while to continue to aid General Weygand. The supplies now reaching him are being very carefully watched by a specially selected staff of vice consuls, who are already rendering valuable service in obtaining information from strategic centers. The moment it should be ascertained that a single item in the list of supplies is going to the Germans, the plan will be automatically terminated in accordance with General Weygand’s own statement. While the British have faced some domestic criticism for giving consent to the plan, they are in agreement with us that the results so far have been satisfactory. Even if it should be necessary to abandon the scheme within the next few weeks or months, we shall have gained time in North Africa, and that is what counts today. There can be no question that we are watching the situation carefully and that we are prepared to stop the flow of supplies at any moment.

Wallace Murray