740.00112 European War 1939/3756
Mr. David Eccles of the British Embassy to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)
Dear Murray: London have sent us their comments on the draft letter I was to write to Marchal,90a covering our side of the United States-French North Africa trade arrangements, and have also made a number of changes in the schedule of quarterly quotas. Before I give you these in detail I think we ought to examine the general position in the light of the increasing evidence of Vichy’s intention to collaborate with the Germans and the Germans’ desire to press Vichy to attempt re-capture of the Free French Colonies. Both developments are beyond dispute. They must influence our treatment of Weygand, making us more cold-blooded and open-eyed, and at the same time more careful to safeguard the position in Equatorial Africa.
Lord Halifax was assured by Mr. Welles that Murphy would tell the General that your help to him was contingent on no attempt being made from French North and West Africa to attack the Free French Colonies. Should we go further, and cut the quarterly quotas in half, as a sign not to be mistaken that we are alive to the menace of a German-inspired campaign against Equatorial Africa? The Takoradi air-route is of paramount importance. It is something definite in the conduct of the Middle-Eastern campaign that we cannot afford to sacrifice for the sake of a remote hope that Weygand will resist the German drive to occupy the territories. We might abandon the quarterly quotas altogether, and proceed from hand to mouth as ships are available, but I understand from the French that this would greatly embarrass their purchasing programme and it would certainly lessen our chance of obtaining those guarantees expressed in the draft letter from the French Ambassador to Mr. Hull, and in my letter to Marchal.
[Page 360]It was clear that once the German army had arrived in Tripoli we could not expect Weygand to act as we should wish, unless he were promised definite military support. Unless such an offer is forthcoming now the odds in favour of the absorption and use against us by the Germans of the resources of French North Africa are too great to be ignored. Our situation is now so difficult and dangerous that I cannot see the value of a few shiploads of supplies except as a curtain-raiser to a military drama.
I enclose a memorandum91 covering the changes which London would like to see embodied in the documents we drafted to cover the proposed United States–North Africa trade. I am not clear where we stand on sending supplies to French West Africa. Would you kindly inform me?
Yours very sincerely,