740.0011 European War 1939/11545

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

The British Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at his request.

I gave Lord Halifax to read the report which Mr. Murphy had made of his recent conversation with General Weygand relative to the situation in North Africa.87 After Lord Halifax had read the message, I said that this Government believed that the expedient thing to do was to adopt the recommendations proffered by Mr. Murphy and to undertake to carry out, at least on a temporary and contingent basis, the agreements made with North Africa in which the British Government had concurred.

Lord Halifax argued the point for some time, presumably in view of the recent instructions he had received from his Government in that regard. After discussing the matter fully and elaborating the various points made in Mr. Murphy’s report, I said that the situation, in my mind, could be summarized as follows:

General Weygand said that the situation in so far as North Africa was concerned had not changed and that were any change to take place, he promised to inform this Government; he personally reiterated the assurances previously given that he would do his best to defend North Africa against any aggression; the supplies which we had agreed to make available under the terms of the North African agreement were more urgently needed than ever. Under these conditions, it seemed to me that this Government had nothing whatever to lose, nor did the British Government have anything to lose, by carrying out the terms of the North African agreement until and unless the situation changed in North Africa. I added that I had only today approved the immediate departure of additional American observers to North Africa and that all distribution and control of materials received in North Africa from the United States would be under ample American observation. If this assistance to General Weygand were now with-held, [Page 350] it would be obvious that General Weygand would consider that no kind of assistance could possibly be forthcoming from the United States, no matter what might happen, and it would be logical to suppose that in that event he would materially change his present attitude. On the other hand, I said, while we had nothing to lose by going ahead with the agreement under present conditions, it seemed to me that we had much to lose by refusing to go ahead with the agreement. If the native population in Morocco and North Africa were deprived of supplies they needed in order to live, there would undoubtedly be local disturbances which the French authorities would have difficulty in controlling and a critical situation of that kind would be exactly what the Germans would desire in order to insist upon increasing their own political and military control in that area, and our refusal to go on with the agreement would have a very serious effect upon the morale of that considerable portion of the French officers and soldiers in North Africa who still believed that their salvation lay in an ultimate British victory.

As a result of the discussion, Lord Halifax, who seemed to agree with my own point of view, said he would telegraph his Government in that sense. He asked if I would also cable Ambassador Winant in London to approach Mr. Churchill87a personally in the matter, and I said I would be glad to do so.

S[umner] W[elles]
  1. Presumably telegram No. 207, May 21, 9 a.m., from the Consul General at Algiers, p. 344.
  2. Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.