740.0011 European War 1939/11217: Telegram
The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 23—9 a.m.]
171. There has been considerable private discussion in Morocco for some time past concerning the possibility both of the landing of American troops in this country as well as, more particularly, recently the possible display of American naval power by the visit of American war vessels at Dakar, Casablanca and Tangier. The President’s statement of May 15 concerning American-French relations and the statements of prominent personalities in American political life with reference to and interest in Northwest Africa have served to revive discussion in this country concerning the possibility that we may be contemplating some action involving at least the visit of American naval vessels to ports of French Northwest Africa.
The Department will appreciate of course that I am able to view such a possible contingency in the light of only a very few of the many factors involved. Notwithstanding this limitation it has [Page 347] seemed to me desirable to submit certain considerations which may perhaps desire to be taken into account in connection with this general question.
- 1.
- The Arab and Moor have the most wholesome respect for force. This psychology is being taken into account by the Germans who are distributing in Morocco an illustrated pamphlet in French and Arabic which has just come to my notice containing a most impressive series of photographs illustrative of the power of German arms. This is the most effective kind of propaganda especially when accompanied by action.
- 2.
- The French in Morocco are demoralized as previously reported and they have little stomach for anything but their personal security. The overwhelming majority are sympathetic to the United States and are devoted to the democratic way of life but they are no longer willing to pay a price for the maintenance of their convictions. I have found them in general including both officials and private citizens friendly disposed toward the British cause even when unsympathetic to the British nation and people. Their mental outlook is that of frightened and bewildered sheep. They have felt the power of German might and cringe morally and physically in apprehension of its exercise against them again. They are growing daily more bitter in spirit against the German but this bitterness is most unlikely to translate itself into action in the absence of the fullest assurances that they are not to be offered up again as a vain sacrifice through the mistaken errors and judgments of their military and political leaders.
- 3.
- A visit of American naval vessels to any French port would be received, there is every reason to believe, with the utmost enthusiasm by the French people of Morocco. On a number of occasions recently in French Morocco the flag on my automobile occasioned spontaneous shouts from passersby of “long live America.” The reaction of officials would probably be one of concern over possible German countermeasures.
- 4.
- The native population of Morocco for reasons already stated would be impressed if not necessarily rendered enthusiastic by the presence of American naval vessels in Moroccan ports.
- 5.
- However the visit of a few vessels from our fleet unless we were ready and willing in case of necessity to undertake decisive action would in all probability in my opinion result in consequences which we should rather seek to avoid than to provoke.
- 6.
- Such a visit if confined to a mere act of presence would tend in all probability to invite the Germans to strengthen their position in Morocco by the sending of additional members of the Armistice Commission if not by the taking of even more aggressive action.
- 7.
- Moreover it is reasonably safe to conclude that the Germans would capitalize on the visit of such vessels following their departure to inculcate among the Moors the lesson that while we make a display of force Germany makes use of force.
- 8.
- Accordingly the conclusion is submitted that unless and until we may be prepared to prevent the use of French Northwest Africa as a base for attack against the Western Hemisphere by the employment as well as by the display of our power it would be the most desirable part to avoid provoking countermeasures which we may not be prepared to contest. French feeling in Morocco needs no artificial stimulus at present. Its stiffening prematurely might lead to subsequent disillusionment. If it is to be encouraged in our favor this may best be accomplished it is suggested through the presence of American commercial shipping in Morocco rather than naval vessels.