740.0011 European War 1939/11135: Telegram

The Consul at Casablanca (Stanton) to the Secretary of State

198. From Murphy. On arrival at Lisbon I decided to proceed to Rabat by way of Madrid, Tangier and Spanish Morocco for the reason that I found at Lisbon belief on the part of many, especially members of the British Embassy, that there were active preparations in Spain for a military movement directed against French Morocco. I came away from Madrid with the conviction that there is imminent no such military operation. Sir Samuel Hoare76 said quite bluntly that he felt that some of his compatriots at Lisbon were unduly apprehensive. He said the situation in Spain offered many encouraging phases. The stories to the effect that there were upwards of 60,000 German effectives in northern Spain were he said without foundation and that furthermore the German effectives in the Hendaye–Biarritz area had actually been reduced rather than increased. The Ambassador said that he could find no evidence of the rather extensive preparation which such a military operation would entail.

A visit of 2 days to Spanish Morocco including Melilla and Tetuán leads me to believe that apart from the strengthening of the shore batteries at Ceuta which has been reported by Childs77 and some improvements in the landing fields the situation in Spanish Morocco is calm and does not suggest an imminent action against the French Zone. According to General Noguès and other reliable sources here this is confirmed by all the information which the French intelligence service in Spanish Morocco and Tangier is able to obtain and that service it should be remarked keeps in very close touch with the Spanish Zone.

I did find that the German propaganda service for French Morocco is now based in Tangier and Spanish Morocco. In this connection [Page 339] General Noguès and Monick both told me that the German Armistice delegates in French Morocco ceased all efforts at propaganda among the natives about 10 days ago. Thereafter the German effort seemed to redouble in the Spanish Zone from which printed matter in Arabic is smuggled into the French Zone and an incessant radio barrage is maintained. The French believe that the direct German effort in the French Zone ceased because of the urgent representations made to Vichy by both Weygand and Noguès and also because a considerable number of Arabs, including several Caids, who thought to draw a profit from contact with the Germans began to disappear, it is imagined, in the arid southern stretches of the Sahara.

The conclusion I draw from my short visit to the Spanish area is that German action in the western Mediterranean is dependent on the outcome of the action in the eastern Mediterranean and that there is a breathing space in French Morocco of possibly 2 months.

This opinion is confirmed by my conversations at Rabat. At the same time the discouragement here over the recent trend of events should not be minimized nor should the disappointment over American policy be ignored. I found General Noguès as cordial and friendly as ever but dismayed by events in Iraq77a and Syria.78 He said that the reaction in the Arab world resulting from the British attacks against the Iraqis is being fanned by the Germans who hope to arouse a flame of resentment among the Arabs in North Africa by picturing the Germans as the defenders of the oppressed Arabs against the British aggressors. Noguès and others said that the Arabs in Iraq, Syria and Palestine must be regarded as a unit in which opposition to the British has long existed strengthened by the British Jewish policy in Palestine. They said that obviously the developments in the eastern area would inevitably have repercussion in French North Africa but that thus far there is no effervescence here.

On the subject of our economic policy toward French North Africa, Noguès and other officials, of course, are alarmed that the Syrian development would result in American withdrawal from this field. I told them frankly that I thought much would depend on General Weygand and themselves and that I hoped French Africa could be treated as a separate problem (this was prior to the receipt of the Department’s 63, May 16, 2 p.m.).

I was also told quite frankly that there was German opposition to my return here, just as there was German displeasure over my last visit. I also note a distinction to my present visit: French officials now avoid meeting me in public.

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General Noguès again emphasized the firm stand General Weygand and he have taken against the arrival of German civilians in French Morocco. He decried the credence which the British and Americans had given to what he characterized as the cock and bull story about the arrival of eighteen or nineteen hundred German tourists. He said exactly one by the name of Mertz had arrived and that he had been sent back. Noguès said that the work of the German Armistice Delegation is at a standstill for the moment and that they are indulging in no important activity. General Bethouart, who is the liaison officer attached to the Armistice Commission, confirmed this. It is believed that the German inactivity may result from the necessity of awaiting the outcome of the Darlan conversations. For that reason also it is believed that the arrival of General Schult, he is now at Wiesbaden, who will be in charge of the German Delegation, has been postponed several times. He is now due here about May 21. After his arrival the French expect that an intensive verification of the air, naval and land forces will be undertaken by the Germans.

During the course of my several conversations with the French at Rabat, American policy toward French Africa has been the subject of some reproach and even sarcasm. I was told that so many months had elapsed between my first visit and the present and so little has happened that it seemed doubtful to them that we were at all serious or if we were that apparently our policy at the best was ineffectual. One official said “the Germans at least are able to make up their minds and having taken a decision act without months of delay and procrastination.” When I made reference in my conversations with Monick to our major policy of aid to England and our belief in a British victory, Monick advised vigorously that I not waste my time talking about a British victory. He said that I probably did not appreciate that since my last visit British prestige in this area has taken a nose dive. Nobody is interested any more, he said, in the British effort. There is only one question in the French mind,—“what is the United States going to do. If the United States does propose to act, what is the timetable.” He asked that I not mistake this as a personal reflection on the British for whom he has the greatest sympathy.

Monick tells me that he now enjoys Weygand’s full confidence and is certain that the General is impatient that he has not heard from us details of exactly what military cooperation the United States would be able to afford when the General gives the signal. Monick asserts that the General adheres to his policy of not talking to anyone on this subject outside his immediate entourage but that he understands that certain individuals on his staff have given us at the end of April the necessary basis on which we could if we wished establish a program. Have we done so and why is there so much delay, inquired Monick.

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In my conversations with Monick as well as in his last conversation with Childs [I] detect a certain amount of bluff. I believe he hopes that if General Weygand is presented with a detailed program, including details of large-scale American aid, both of matériel and effectives, Weygand might be inspired to act. Monick emphasized several times that Weygand is not interested in British aid, that only American military aid would be acceptable. He and other officials said, “Let there be no mistake, the British are not welcome here. We have only confidence in the Americans. And don’t believe also,” Monick said, “that shipments of American matériel will be sufficient. The United States will have to send an expeditionary force.” In fact, that seems to be the general keynote in French Morocco—a conviction that Britain cannot possibly win the war without direct American participation. Until the French know definitely that we will participate they will take no risks.

I hope to see General Weygand Tuesday or Wednesday.79 There has been no available plane service to enable me to proceed to Algiers before Tuesday and Weygand plans to visit Morocco this week. Therefore, I may meet him here.

Our friend just returned from Algiers tells me that according to a letter received Friday from Darlan to Weygand the recent conversations with the Germans contemplated no change in French North Africa. Our friend learned from an unofficial but presumably reliable source that the conversations are supposed to have related to the use of Syrian air bases by the Germans in return for the repatriation of 500,000 French prisoners of war from Germany, a reduction of the daily payment of occupational costs from 400 to 200 millions, and a change of the line of demarcation to the line Angers–Emreux and area in the Free Zone. There is, of course, no official confirmation of this story.

I have talked with the appropriate French officials regarding the establishment of the American control organization under the plan of economic cooperation and they state that all facilities will be granted. Admiral d’Harcourt, Naval Commander of Casablanca, said he would grant the necessary authorization for our consular officer to visit the port, which is not accessible to the public. Admiral d’Harcourt said that he thought that the German apprehensions regarding seizure of the port by the British had subsided and that on the other hand the French were reassured on the same score. He characterized as ridiculous the several rumors regarding the use of any French Moroccan ports including Casablanca by the Germans for naval operations. He denied that they had ever been so used or that any suggestions had been made by the Germans looking to such use. [Page 342] Admiral d’Harcourt, who is proud of his friendship with General Pershing,80 said that regardless of the folly of Mers-el-Kebir and Dakar81 there is no thought in the French Navy of war with England. At the same time it was obvious from our conversation that there is no thought in the Admiral’s mind of a resumption of hostilities against the Germans. I expected from the Admiral, who is jealous of French maritime rights, a violent reaction regarding the placing of guards on French merchant shipping in American ports. Much to my surprise he limited himself to a mild inquiry whether this actually meant seizure and expressed no resentment.

Our friend just returned from Algiers also reports that according to a junior French officer, who attended a staff meeting in honor of General Bergeret, Under Secretary for Air, who has now completed a tour of French Africa, Bergeret informed all French air officers that Britain could not possibly win, that American aid would be far too late and that there could be no hope of resumption of hostilities by the French in Africa.

My preliminary opinion is that we should go forward boldly with the plan of economic cooperation establishing our control organization and using it to the best advantage. I should prefer, however, to make more definite recommendations after conversations with General Weygand and additional French officials. I have been careful in my several conversations to emphasize to the French that in this plan we are working in harmony with the British and that the latter deserve full credit for relaxation of the blockade policy in favor of French Africa.

Repeated to Vichy. Also repeated by mail to Tangier, Lisbon and Madrid. [Murphy.]

Stanton
  1. British Ambassador in Spain.
  2. J. Rives Childs, Chargé at Tangier.
  3. For correspondence regarding the attitude of the United States toward anti-British military coup in Iraq, see vol. iii, pp. 486 ff.
  4. For correspondence regarding efforts of the United States to prevent French authorities from succumbing to German pressures in Syria and Lebanon and regarding use of Syrian airfields by German planes, see vol. iii, pp. 686 ff.
  5. May 20 or 21.
  6. Gen. John J. Pershing, Commander in Chief, American Expeditionary Force, 1917–19.
  7. French warships were attacked and sunk by British warships at Oran and Mers-el-Kebir, Algeria, July 3, 1940. Dakar, French West Africa, was unsuccessfully attacked by British and Free French forces September 23–25, 1940.