Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, Europe, Volume II

740.0011 European War 1939/9360

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)⁹⁰

[Washington,] March 20, 1941.

You will recall that several weeks ago a decision was taken to go forward with the plan for economic cooperation with French North Africa, and the British Ambassador^90a was so informed. On February 8 the British Ambassador here brought in a note⁹¹ stating that, although the British Government was not as sanguine as we were in regard to eventual cooperation by General Weygand,⁹² it was prepared to work with us on our plan. At the same time, the British expressed the hope that, in return for this economic cooperation, the French could be induced to release certain British shipping held in North African ports and permit the return to Morocco of British consular officers. These suggestions were passed along to Mr. Murphy,⁹³ who was then about to confer with General Weygand. Apparently the return of British shipping is out of the question, since such action would not be permitted by the Germans. Furthermore, since that time the British ships in North Africa have been seized by the French in retaliation for the action by the British in seizing certain French ships. The question of the return to Morocco of British consular officers is discussed below.

In a memorandum of March 13,⁹⁴ the British Embassy suggested further conditions to be imposed before proceeding with the plan of economic cooperation. These were as follows:

(1) That Marshal Pétain should prevent further Axis infiltration into French North Africa.

(2) That an adequate number of American observers be sent to French North Africa.

(3) That a British observer or British observers accompany the American observers or, alternatively, that British consular officers be readmitted to French North Africa.

So far as item (1) is concerned, Admiral Leahy has received assurance from Marshal Pétain that he will do his utmost to prevent further German infiltration into French Morocco. Despite numerous disturbing rumors and reports of infiltrations of large numbers of Germans into French Morocco, we have been able to establish definitely that there are only fifty-three Germans in that territory. It is true that Germans in small numbers have recently entered the Spanish Zone but, naturally, the French cannot be held responsible for that development, nor for the reestablishment of the German Consulate in Tangier. On the contrary, we know that these German activities in the Spanish Zone are resented by the French. Parenthetically I should mention that, in calling at the Department today, M. Paul Guérin, who is carrying on discussions here regarding economic cooperation with French North Africa, stated he felt it would be quite possible for the French Government to give us an assurance that no further German agents would be permitted to enter French North Africa.

As for the British proposal that an adequate number of American observers be sent to French North Africa, we have the definite assurance of the French that they will permit such observers. I should add here that, upon instructions from Mr. Berle,⁹⁵ we recently discussed with the War and Navy Departments whether it would be possible for them to send persons to North Africa to act as control officers. Both Departments are greatly in favor of such a move and I would anticipate no difficulty in working matters out along those lines. This would also meet the British suggestion that the control officers “be of sufficient standing to counteract German infiltration and to discuss with the French the possibility of armed resistance”.

As to British observers accompanying the proposed American observers, I believe that this would be a very difficult matter for the French to agree to in view of the terms of the armistice with Germany. Moreover, I do not see the necessity for such a move since our own control officers would presumably furnish us with adequate information which we could in turn pass on to the British if that course were thought desirable. I would see no harm in mentioning to the French that the British would like to return their consular officers to Morocco but here again I do not believe that this should be made a condition precedent to the extension of economic cooperation.

In connection with this whole problem, I have gained the impression that, during the past few weeks, some doubt seems to have arisen as to the desirability of going ahead with the program of economic cooperation. The North African program appears to have become confused with the problem of food supplies to unoccupied France⁹⁶ and there appears to be some disposition to make the realization of the North African problem contingent upon a satisfactory solution of the other question. I am inclined to believe that this confusion has come about largely as the result of the tendency of the British Embassy here to treat the two problems as if they were one. I am convinced that it is erroneous to treat them as one, and I believe that we should take steps as soon as possible to handle them separately, not only in our discussions with the British but for other purposes.

It seems to me that, even if it should be decided not to go ahead with the shipment of foodstuffs to unoccupied France, it does not follow that we should abandon the plan for economic cooperation with North Africa. Indeed I would say that it would be all the more imperative for us to proceed with the African plan so as to emphasize the distinct character of that region. In other words, whatever may happen with respect to France, all of the original arguments in favor of economic cooperation with North Africa hold good and daily grow stronger. If the French are to resist German efforts to penetrate further into Morocco, I believe that we should at once commence our program of economic collaboration. If General Weygand is not going to receive the assistance which we have led him to expect, he surely will not be strong enough to resist German demands. On the other hand, if he receives some concrete evidence of our intention to proceed with the program, he will be encouraged to maintain his position of defending his territory against the Germans and possibly at some later date to take an active role.

M. Guérin, the French representative from North Africa, has now given us a definite list of the products most urgently needed and has proposed a means of making payment. It would therefore be highly desirable to reach, in the immediate future, a definite decision whether we are going to proceed according to our plan or whether we shall abandon the program and let North Africa drift as best it may.

If it is decided that we should proceed according to plan, I believe that we should at once so inform the British Embassy here. I think it would also be desirable, in our discussions with representatives of the British Embassy, to endeavor to avoid treating the question of economic collaboration with North Africa and the question of food supplies for unoccupied France as if they were part of one and the same problem. It would perhaps assist toward this aim if the British representatives, when raising questions regarding North African matters, could be referred to this Division, which would of course maintain close contact with the Division of European Affairs. I believe that this separation of the two problems between the two Divisions would go far toward bringing the British to realize that the problems are not identical.

Wallace Murray

90. Addressed to the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn) and the Under Secretary of State (Welles).
91. Viscount Halifax.
91. Dated February 7, p. 253.
92. Gen. Maxime Weygand, Delegate General of the French Government in North Africa.
93. Robert D. Murphy, Counselor of Embassy in France, on special assignment in French North Africa.
94. Ante, p. 266.
95. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.
96. For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 89 ff.