740.00112 European War 1939/2897
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)
| Participants: | Mr. Butler, of the British Embassy |
| Mr. Berle | |
| Mr. Murray |
Mr. Berle received Mr. Butler of the British Embassy this morning by appointment and handed him the attached memorandum dated February 13, 1941,77 in partial reply to the memorandum from the British Embassy of February 7, 1941, regarding this Government’s policy toward Morocco and other French territories in North Africa.
Mr. Berle prefaced his remarks to Mr. Butler by stating that we fully appreciated the strain under which the Embassy was working [Page 259] these days and had no disposition to make the burden any heavier. We felt, nevertheless, constrained to make certain observations in reply to statements contained in the Embassy’s memorandum of February 7, mentioned above.
Mr. Butler was reminded that on December 18th last we had called officials of the British Embassy to the Department to discuss their North African policy. We had stated our concern over the possible effects of depriving French Africa of the bare necessities of life, and indicated that we felt it to the best interest both of the United States and Great Britain to prevent a complete collapse in French Africa. Accordingly, we wished to know the British policy. We were answered that the Embassy was not informed as to the British policy but would endeavor to find out.
The Department renewed this request early in January, and was advised that no information had yet been received from London. Only on January 28th did we receive a preliminary report, which was amplified by the British memorandum of February 7th under discussion.
On this record, Mr. Berle observed that it was impossible to say that the British Government had not been given ample opportunity to consult regarding any North African economic policy.
Further, and during the period between December 18th and February 7th, we had learned indirectly of negotiations by the British Government looking toward supplying certain commodities to French Morocco. These appeared to be in the nature of a triangular barter agreement between Britain, Spain and Morocco. So far as the Department was aware, this Government had not been consulted in any way, but was being advised that the British policy with regard to Morocco was one of blockade. Mr. Berle pointed out the obvious inconsistency of a policy of limited supplies to North Africa by Britain at the same time that it was maintaining, so far as we were concerned, a policy of blockade.
Mr. Berle also noted that the British Government appeared to take exception to the fact that economic negotiations were now in progress between this Government and the authorities in Morocco. Mr. Berle ventured to point out that this was obviously a misapprehension of fact; that the Government had been informed of the fact that we proposed to enter such negotiations, but that the only work that had gone forward were exploratory conversations with General Weygand and his representatives.
Finally, Mr. Berle made two observations.
First, in principle this Government obviously could not and did not enter agreements with any foreign power limiting its right to undertake independent negotiations regarding economic and other matters [Page 260] anywhere in the world. Throughout its history, this Government had declined to commit itself in this regard. He noted that the implication of paragraph 6 of the British memorandum seemed to suggest that we should enter such a commitment, just as the entire note appeared to take exception to the fact that any independent negotiations at all were going on. This Government considered itself entirely free to enter such negotiations.
Second, despite the foregoing complete freedom, this Government was pursuing and proposed to continue to pursue a program of parallel action in aid of certain objectives which the British Government and our own considered of common advantage; that this had been of assistance to the British Government and had worked well; and that we proposed to continue the policy.
Mr. Berle observed that in view of the very great difficulties under which His Majesty’s Government was laboring, it was natural to expect occasional misunderstandings; but in view of the desire to cooperate in every respect, it probably would assist matters if all misunderstandings were removed. In covering the foregoing points there was no desire to complain, even though it would seem that some of the points made by the note could better be made by this Government against the British. Rather, Mr. Berle’s feeling was that by clearing the air of this sort of misunderstanding both in the minds of the British Embassy and in the minds of our own authorities, the way would be paved for more effective parallel action. He hoped Mr. Butler would agree that this was perhaps the best method of procedure.
Mr. Butler promptly said that it was true that the Embassy here had been laboring under very considerable difficulties. He felt that a considerable part of the delay in advising the Department of the British position had been due to the press of the work both here and in London. He agreed that his Government was suffering under a misapprehension as to the extent of the economic negotiations proceeding between Mr. Murphy77a and General Weygand’s representatives.77b This misapprehension, he thought, arose from a cable they had received from Tangier, intimating that Mr. Murphy had signed some sort of agreement with General Weygand’s representatives. This, bracketed with the advice which the British Embassy had received from Mr. Welles and from Mr. Berle, had caused the misapprehension. They had now learned that the cablegram from Tangier overstated the situation, and by consequence that part of the British note appeared to be ill-founded. He acknowledged the inconsistency of a policy of blockade vis-à-vis the United States at the same time that barter negotiations were going on as between Britain, Spain and Morocco. [Page 261] The Embassy had assumed that this Government had been kept informed, presumably by Sir Samuel Hoare,78 through Ambassador Weddell in Madrid. He conceded, however, that so far as they were aware, nothing in the nature of a “consultation” or a request for expression of the views of the Government regarding those negotiations had taken place. Generally speaking, he felt that there had been some failure in London to apprehend the situation, and he intimated that the Embassy had called this to the attention of the Foreign Office. He said he fully appreciated the friendly spirit in which we were endeavoring to clear the record.
Mr. Berle observed that it might be useful if the Embassy took steps which would clear the record both in the mind of Lord Halifax and in the minds of the Foreign Office, and Mr. Butler agreed that this would be useful.
Mr. Butler further observed that their people did not have as rosy a view of General Weygand and his probable policy as our people; and that they were somewhat skeptical as to the outcome. Mr. Berle agreed that the future course of the French authorities in Morocco was problematic; that the steps we were taking were experimental; that the policy had to be flexible and that its continuance had to turn on results. Mr. Butler said that according to Léger79 the acid test would be whether Weygand wished munitions, or merely food. If munitions, it could only mean for the purpose of resisting; if he wished primarily supplies, it might be assumed that they were for re-export to France. Mr. Butler’s information was that Weygand wished coal, oil, and also munitions. Mr. Berle said that in these matters we naturally would be guided by the apparent use to which the materials sought were to be put. He appeared to agree that a program of parallel action carried on flexibly and experimentally was the best line to take in the matter.
The conversation was cordial and friendly throughout.