Office of the Historian

740.00112 European War 1939/2223

The British Embassy to the Department of State 58

Memorandum

1.
His Majesty’s late Ambassador59 and Mr. Butler60 duly reported to London their conversations with Mr. Sumner Welles on various dates in November and December, notably on November 27th,61 December 23rd62 and December 27th,61 regarding the policy to be adopted towards dependencies of the Vichy Government, especially in blockade matters. Mr. Butler has now been instructed to explain to Mr. Sumner Welles the general policy of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom in this matter, and at the same time certain difficulties in the way of giving it full implementation.
2.
On November 27th Mr. Sumner Welles informed Lord Lothian that it was the aim of the United States Government to increase the probability that, in the event of Germany trying to coerce the Vichy Government into adopting Monsieur Laval’s63 policy, an independent government, perhaps under General Weygand,64 would be set up in [Page 246] Algeria and would attract to it the French fleet from across the Mediterranean. His Majesty’s Government appreciate the force of this argument. At the same time they feel that, if anything should happen either to Marshal Pétain65 or to General Weygand no one can foretell the course of subsequent events. Even if nothing should happen to either of these leaders, were Germany to occupy the rest of France, it cannot be certain that the French forces in North Africa would actively resume the struggle unless they were themselves directly attacked either by Germany or by Italy. His Majesty’s Government feel it necessary to have such possibilities in mind in framing their policy.
3.
In this the following are the main guiding considerations:—
(a)
They naturally are most desirous of avoiding any conflict of policy with the Government of the United States. Their object is, however, also to encourage the French authorities, wherever they exercise control, to feel that the future of France and of the French Empire depends on a British victory, that expediency and indeed honour demand that the French should contribute to that victory, and that therefore they should in the meantime do nothing directly or indirectly to delay or impede its achievement.
(b)
The French capacity to resist Germany and Italy is everywhere greatly reduced. In those areas most vulnerable to German and Italian attack or exploitation, care must be taken not to allow the opening of a wide channel for dangerous supplies which might tempt the enemy or which might encourage German pressure on the Vichy Government. Moreover, there is a danger that if the blockade were to be relaxed, the French authorities would be enabled to obtain the best of both worlds by prolonging the status quo, and refraining from all further effort. This is particularly true in the case of the French dependencies in North and West Africa and of Syria.
(c)
The reconciliation of (a) and (b) is a problem of great complexity, and may seem to involve inconsistencies between principle and practice. His Majesty’s Government feel that they must maintain the principle of the blockade, but in practice they are prepared to admit elasticity, varying according to geographical conditions and to the strategical and political exigencies of the moment. For example, the distance of Indo-China from metropolitan France gives it a degree of independence which justifies exceptional treatment. In Morocco, however, the political and strategical situation is entirely different. The policy of His Majesty’s Government is to blockade Morocco like any other territory owning allegiance to Vichy, but subject to such relaxations as may be desirable for specific reasons, and always of course subject to the existing limitations of their powers to enforce the blockade with all its rigour. A copy is attached of a separate memorandum dealing specifically with Morocco66 which is being handed to Mr. Berle who discussed this aspect of the question with His Majesty’s Embassy.
(d)
It is no doubt well known to United States naval experts that British naval limitations encourage the use of the French West Indies, Dakar, and Casablanca, as entrepôts from which dangerous commodities find their way to North Africa, metropolitan France and thence to Germany. For this reason it is important to stop dangerous commodities at their source in the American continent before they reach any of the entrepôts. His Majesty’s Government feel that, if trade must pass, barter arrangements in approved commodities would be preferable, as no question of free exchange would then become involved.
4.
His Majesty’s Government are bound to admit that, as regards the relaxations referred to in (c) above, the gravity of the present crisis has compelled them primarily to consult their own needs. Within the above framework they would, however, be happy to consider any genuine and specific trade requirements of the United States. Nevertheless they feel it necessary to emphasise that their whole policy would be jeopardized by any flow, particularly of dangerous commodities. This, though not at present very large in quantity, shows every evidence of rapid development and would have a greater moral, political and economic effect than its value would seem to warrant, or than is perhaps fully realised by the United States Government.
5.
In placing these considerations before Mr. Welles, Mr. Butler is instructed to invite Mr. Welles’s comments in general, and more particularly as regards United States collaboration in stoppage at source of dangerous commodities referred to in paragraph 3 (d) above.
Washington , 24 January, 1941.
  1. Handed to the Under Secretary of State on January 28.↩
  2. Lord Lothian.↩
  3. Nevile M. Butler, Minister-Counselor of the British Embassy.↩
  4. No record of this conversation found in Department files.↩
  5. For memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. iv, p. 245.↩
  6. No record of this conversation found in Department files.↩
  7. Pierre Laval, former Vice President of the French Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs.↩
  8. Gen. Maxime Weygand, Delegate General of the French Government in North Africa.↩
  9. Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.↩
  10. Supra. ↩