740.0011 European War 1939/8915: Telegram

The Ambassador in France ( Leahy ) to the Secretary of State

284. General Maxime Weygand, accompanied by his aides Count de Rose and Count de Leusse called on me today at my residence. I had been informed previously through Count de Rose that after reflection it was considered more prudent that Marshal Pétain should not invite me to lunch or dinner with General Weygand in order to avoid agitating [Page 235] the Germans who would undoubtedly place an exaggerated construction on such an affair.

I informed General Weygand that I had today received instructions from my Government to the effect that I should obtain written confirmation from the French Government of the conditions set forth in the memorandum regarding economic cooperation with French North Africa initialed by General Weygand at Algiers on February 26, 1941. When that had been obtained, my Government proposed to begin at once discussion in Washington with the duly qualified French representative regarding supplies for French North Africa, including the questions of shipping and payments.

General Weygand, in expressing his gratitude, said he was delighted with the progress which had been made in that direction and that such shipments could not be made too soon. He referred to the native Arab and Berber populations in North Africa, saying that after all those millions of people are not French and that their loyalty to France would diminish as their living conditions became less and less satisfactory. General Weygand said that this situation obviously favored German penetration.

I told General Weygand of the concern which my Government felt over the arrival of armed and uniformed German officers and soldiers at Casablanca. General Weygand, after stating that the 50-odd German personnel have with them very little in the way of arms, said he understood fully our concern because he felt the same way about it. He said that he had no illusions over the purity of German intentions in Morocco, that the Germans are certainly not there at his invitation, and that he is doing his best to control and circumscribe their activities. He said that they are undoubtedly in Morocco to spread propaganda among the native population. One of the best ways in which that propaganda can be defeated, he said, is to have the needs of the native population satisfied. He thought that American assistance in enabling France to satisfy the native’s essential needs would constitute the best bulwark against German propaganda. It is obvious, General Weygand said, that if the native is required to go without necessities, he will be much more susceptible of German propaganda and doubtful of French ability to administer the country than if his needs are satisfied.

I inquired about the situation in Syria48 and the General said that there is another example of the German method. There are in Syria, he said, only two German official representatives, but the Germans have released and helped repatriate a number of native soldiers. [Page 236] While these soldiers were prisoners in Germany they were coached and encouraged in every way to cooperate with the Germans on their return to Syria. Under the direction of the two official German representatives and their paid agents, these repatriates are undoubtedly responsible, said the General, for the recent disorders in Damascus.

I said to the General that another source of concern is the number of German effectives in Libya and that all these circumstances worked unfavorably against quick progress in the matter of American supplies for French Africa. In reply to my question, General Weygand said that he believes that there are at present between 1 and 2 divisions of Germans now in Libya. He said that their presence there constitutes a grave problem regarding what would happen should the German and/or Italian forces attempt to cross the Tunisian line. General Weygand said that he had his orders to defend French Africa and that should the Germans or Italians attempt to cross the Tunisian line that he would defend French territory to the best of his ability. I believe that he is quite sincere in this intention which has the full approval of Marshal Pétain.

I mentioned to General Weygand the unfortunate effect of the story regarding the order to deliver from Algeria 5000 tons of motor gasoline to Italy. General Weygand said he deplored this matter more than we did. It was an affair handled at Vichy with which he had nothing to do and it concerned apparently an old obligation. In any event, the memorandum of February 26 was the best sort of protection, both of our interests and his own, because he would be enabled, if in the future pressure would be put on him to release goods under similar circumstances, to refuse flatly on the ground that such delivery would endanger the entire French African economic structure.

I asked General Weygand regarding the commodities required urgently in French North Africa. He said that of course liquid fuels are the most important as well as automotive parts, binding twine for the crops, tea and sugar for the native population, et cetera, and referred to the list which is now under preparation by his services. I shall transmit this list by Murphy on his return to Washington.

General Weygand said that the written confirmation of the memorandum of February 26 is now being prepared by the Foreign Office and that I should undoubtedly receive it tomorrow. He said that the French Government approved it.

At departure, Count de Leusse said that he hoped, for obvious reasons, that no publicity would be given the General’s visit.

Leahy
  1. For correspondence on this subject, see vol. iii, pp. 686 ff.