893.102S/2208: Telegram
The Consul at Shanghai (Butrick) to the Secretary of State
[Received 4:40 p.m.]
811. Continuing my 804, August 20, 4 p.m., regarding Shanghai Defense Sectors. Under date of August 20 Vice-Admiral Iwamura sent the following letter to Admiral Glassford:
“I am herewith sending you the documents concerning the reconsideration requested by you, regarding the Japanese opposition to the entrance of the United States Marines into the B Sector. I am enclosing also a memorandum No. 2 of the verbal statements I made at the subsequent meetings and my points of view.”
The first statement which is labelled “draft” reads as follows:
“You stated yesterday that there would be no objection whatever to the entrance of the Japanese forces into the Sector D, but that you could not agree to the Japanese proposal so long as you were not convinced by the reasons of the Japanese opposition to the entrance of the United States Marines into the Sector B, and asked for our reconsideration, submitting to me various questions.
I believe you have fully understood our points of view by the written statement (to be called hereafter memorandum No. 129) on the Japanese points of view showing [and] the verbal statements (submitted to you today as memorandum No. 2) I made at the subsequent meetings.
I have consulted with Vice Admiral Shimada and deliberately reconsidered, and I regret to state that we have found no reason to change our points of view which have been repeatedly stated. It is my earnest hope that a proper settlement will be reached speedily by the clear-cut compromise we have proposed and the tense situation now prevailing will be eased and stabilized.”
The item dated August 19, 1940 is “a memorandum (No. 2) of the gists of discussions between Vice Admiral Iwamura and Rear Admiral Glassford, together with a memorandum of my views in addition.[”]
[Page 783][“]1. I have definitely no belief that the abilities of the United States Marines are inferior to those of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps. The reason for our objection to the entrance of the United States Marines into Sector B is that it is unnatural and unreasonable to extend the sector of the United States Marines, as was explained in detail in our written statement submitted to you the other day.
2. It is alleged that the commander of the Japanese naval special landing party stated at the meeting on the revision of the defense agreement that the Shanghai Volunteer Corps was ‘incompetent’. If it is true, I believe what he meant was that in his view there had been cases where the Volunteer Corps had proved to be incompetent under particular circumstances.
I fear that the Volunteer Corps is less efficient than the defense forces of the powers, but do not consider that it is always incompetent under any circumstances. I think it can meet its tasks with due competence under existing circumstances in the International Settlement.
3. Sector B is an important area which may be called the heart of the International Settlement, and the center of the economic activities of whole China, having a close and extensive bearing upon the Chinese [China] incident. The people of Japan believe that the bloodshed on [of] their sons and brothers cannot be stopped on account of its very existence, while the Japanese forces stationed in and around Shanghai regard it as a loophole that prevents the settlement of the China incident, and they are paying close attention to the development of this question with serious concern. Thus, the utmost importance is laid upon this question by the Japanese authorities, as has been repeatedly stated in detail. Accordingly it was deemed absolutely necessary for Japan, facing as she is the serious situation, to send the Japanese forces into Sector B, and the first proposal was submitted. On the other hand, the American authorities also insisted that the United States Marines be sent into that sector, and the claims of both countries became irreconcilable. However, realizing that the situation did not warrant any loss of time and procrastination by further discussion, we have gone the greatest length in a conciliatory spirit and suggested that we refrain from sending the Japanese forces into Sector B, but instead the Volunteer Corps, which is generally neutral, to both sides, take over that sector. If there is objection to the Volunteer Corps’ taking over the sector, we will agree that neither the Volunteer Corps, the Japanese forces nor the American shall take over the sector.
Except in the case of emergency, the regular military forces are not to be engaged directly in police activities, but they are expected to exercise silent influence upon the populace by their existence, and give indirect support and assistance to the police forces by their strength. In necessary cases, therefore, the above effects of the military forces may be expected from the United States Marines as well as from the Japanese forces, stationed in the sector adjoining Sector B. Means to cope with a small matter [a situation] in which the existence of regular military forces is absolutely necessary can be worked out by further deliberate negotiation to be conducted after a decision is reached on the general scheme.
[Page 784]4. The American authorities cite [advocate] the maintenance of the international character of Sector B. From our point of view, however, it cannot be considered that the sector had the international character including Japan, although it may have had such a character excluding Japan.
The Japanese authorities hoped to attribute to Sector B a truly international character including Japan, and deemed it advisable in this regard to send the Japanese forces in that sector for the purpose of rectifying the unbalanced state of affairs which had prevailed. However, owing to the circumstances previously stated, we have adopted a conciliatory attitude and submitted a proposal to have the Volunteer Corps take over the sectors, which was in our judgment only a second best plan. The Volunteer Corps may be best suited for the purpose, so far as the question of the international character is concerned.
4a. The second and third clauses of our written statement submitted to you previously are the fundamental principles, while the substance of the Japanese contention is that it cannot be approved as it is unnatural and unreasonable to extend the defence sector in the International Settlement and its neighborhood of other forces than either the Japanese forces or the Chinese forces approved by the Japanese. Accordingly we have no intention to demand the withdrawal of the American forces on the basis of the said clauses, nor do we consider that we have the right to submit such a demand under existing circumstances.
5. It had to be [has been] alleged that the Settlement is an independent body free from outside influences. In an international community, so complicated and so organically composed as it is today, such a state of affairs can not exist in actuality, although it may be conceived as a mere idea or hope. Especially in such relationship as between Japan and Shanghai, which is not only so close to Japan but also given considerable effect to her vital problems, Japan can by no means consider any question apart from actualities.
6. One argument had it that Shanghai had been built up by the western people in western fashion after a long period of efforts. On the other hand, it may be argued that from the viewpoint of the eastern people Shanghai was established upon the soil inhabited by the eastern people by exploiting largely the materials which they produced with sweat and labor. We believe that such an argument and counter-argument can be continued indefinitely only to serve no useful purpose.”
In transmitting the above to Admiral Hart, Admiral Glassford makes the following comments that in Iwamura’s memorandum the second sentence of section 3 seems to be the Japanese answer to his question as to why a change in the existing status of the Settlement is desired while the last sentence of the first paragraph of numbered section 3 leads to the conclusion that the Japanese would agree to the present interim arrangement becoming a final one. Admiral Glassford comments that the last sentence of section 3 gives a clear indication of what the Japanese method of procedure will be in any [Page 785] future negotiations. Admiral Glassford considers that section 4 is the essence of the Japanese contention and that it is of interest to see it put in writing. Admiral Glassford has informed Admiral Hart that this contention seems from the American point of view untenable if the political and economic integrity and international character of the Settlement is to be preserved.
This telegram brings the Iwamura-Glassford conversations and exchanges of correspondence to a close and it is not considered likely that Iwamura will attempt to make any changes in the memoranda prepared by Admiral Glassford, preferring to consider it as the latter’s version of their conversations.
Please inform Navy.
Sent to the Department and Tokyo. Repeated to Chungking and Peiping.