894.00/934
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
I call attention especially to paragraph four of Mr. Grew’s telegram,23 a copy of which is here attached.
[Page 589]The “opinion” of which an account is given in this paragraph seems to me to be based on sound considerations. Especially sound, in my view, is the reference to the potentially effective influence of “economic considerations”. In that connection, the fact that there exists and there hangs over the head of the Japanese leaders the possibility of substantial embargoes (both in the export field and in the import field) by the United States is of great importance. But the possibility of substantial embargoes by this country is linked closely with the question of the existing location and the possible alteration of the location of the U. S. Battle Fleet. So long as we have the Fleet in the Pacific, and especially while we have it at Hawaii, the Japanese have reason to fear what we may do in the field of embargoes. The Fleet stands as the defensive and shielding arm behind which and screened by which there is the potential striking power of the other arm, embargo. If and when our Fleet leaves the Pacific and moves into the Atlantic, Japan will have reason to be very little fearful that we will go in extensively for embargoes. Thus, our present setup—with authority for embargoes and with the Fleet in the Pacific—contributes greatly to the maintenance of the negative equilibrium in Japanese political thought which is described in the paragraph under reference and it should contribute toward making good the “best opinion today” to the effect “that there will be no abrupt and drastic change in [Japan’s] foreign policy in the immediate future.”