893.24/837
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Affairs (Hornbeck) of a Conversation With the Chinese Ambassador (Hu Shih)
The Chinese Ambassador called on me at his request, this noon. He handed me a paper on which there was what he described as a “rough translation” of a telegram81 which he had received this morning from the Chinese Ambassador in London82—in which the Chinese Ambassador stated that he had had a conversation with the British Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister had stated that the British Government was making to the Japanese Government a promise to suspend temporarily arms traffic on the Burma road; the Minister had said that they did this with regret, that, having been unable to obtain assurances of support from the United States and being unable by themselves to make resistance, they had no alternative.
The Ambassador said that he had another telegram from the Chinese Ambassador in London in which that Ambassador inquired whether there was not something which the United States might do—either [Page 48] by way of stiffening up the British Government or of restraining the Japanese Government.
There followed some discussion of the world situation and of the problems to which the American Government is compelled to give consideration.
The Ambassador then said that he wished to speak with all the seriousness of which he was capable: he said that he feels that he has kept well abreast of and reasonably well understands the situations both in China and in the United States, and the currents and trends in both countries; he adverted to the fact that he has never pled with the American Government with over-emphasis and he has for the last two years maintained a constantly optimistic attitude regarding the potentialities of Chinese resistance and he has constantly encouraged his Government to maintain that resistance and to expect a favorable outcome; he said that now, with the closing of the railway to Indochina and the impending closing of the highway from Burma, China’s situation becomes gravely difficult and the problem of maintaining Chinese morale and China’s will to resist becomes critically difficult. He hoped that the American Government would discover some way by which it could make a contribution of influence in this situation toward preventing a breakdown of Chinese morale and toward restraining and holding back Japan. He said that the situation called for something more positive than mere words of encouragement, something more positive than mere promises of financial assistance to China. He hoped that we would think of something and that we would find ourselves able to take some action.
My comments will be offered in a separate memorandum.83