740.00112 European War 1939/1551: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 25—12:33 a.m.]
1812. Department’s written instructions Nos. 1407 of May 23 and 1422 of June 3.7 The British authorities attach the greatest significance to that part of the legislation now being passed giving the President power to limit or prohibit the exportation of certain American products and in their minds it appears to have two aspects: (1) as a possible means of simplifying and augmenting their blockade and (2) as a factor of the highest importance in connection with the Far East.
As regards (1), they realize that blockade running will increase mainly via the Norwegian coast and the Bay of Biscay, the latter perhaps being even harder to patrol than the former, and that firms in South America at any rate will be found to facilitate this traffic. I have the feeling that they really do not know what they are going to do and probably do not even know how much the navy can do. But they see in our legislation something to grab at. Incidentally A. D. Marris, a war time official of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, has been assigned to the British Embassy at Washington and sails tomorrow.
Secondly and more importantly, as regards the Far East. No doubt you have received a copy of the Japanese demands as regards the Dutch East Indies.8 Leith-Ross9 stated informally that he had advised the Dutch to make them known to Washington and in any case I gather that Marris is taking them along with him. From what I hear, the Japanese have asked for substantial increased quantities of such products as tin, rubber, et cetera, a particularly large increase in oil and interior development concessions in the matter of wolfram, molybdenum, nickel, et cetera. I have the feeling that the British do not really know what to do in the matter of advising the Dutch [Page 582] until they know what we intend to do. Furthermore Leith-Ross stated today that he had been stalling with the Japanese but I gather that the Japanese here are not really being kept informed and empowered to act by the Tokyo Government. For instance, apparently the Japanese Embassy has asked for 7000 tons of nickel during the current year exclusive of the small amount shipped at the beginning of the year on last year’s contracts. Leith-Ross stated that to date he has been telling the Japanese that there would only be 2000 or 3000 tons available after the Allied Governments and the United States obtained their requirements. He was surprised that the Japanese Embassy merely took the line that Japan wanted its share of this remainder. However, Leith-Ross anticipates difficulty when the Japanese realize that the French allotment of 24000 tons will come up for disposal. Incidentally he implied that we could buy this for a reserve.
Leith-Ross also mentioned that they had been scared by the report that we might move our fleet (see next to last paragraph of my 1777, June 21, 11 p.m.10) because they believe that would be an immediate signal for the Japanese to take over the Dutch East Indies and he also indicated that the Dutch had decoded a message from the Japanese Consul General at Batavia urging action because a similar opportunity would not recur for a thousand years.
As always there are two schools of thought here about Japan but I do not think that either school intends to be tough in any way and both schools anticipate a request to close the Burma Road. One school believes that the situation can be worried along by concessions and fears drastic action such as an embargo by us on scrap iron or oil as a precipitating factor. The other school believes that the situation will inevitably go from bad to worse, concessions or no concessions, and that if we take drastic action under our legislation war will be precipitated in the Far East and then there will be just one big war.
- Neither printed; the latter enclosed documents for the information of the Embassy, including copies of the British Embassy’s memorandum of May 1, p. 569, and the Department’s reply of May 21, p. 570.↩
- Cf. telegram No. 439, June 12, noon, from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 24.↩
- Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, Chief Economic Adviser to the British Government.↩
- Not printed; it reported that the British Cabinet agreed that the best interests of all during the existing acute situation were served by the American Fleet keeping well out in the Pacific Ocean. The British Consul at Panama had advised that the American Fleet was coming back through the Canal. (740.00112 European war 1939/4040)↩