893.00/14631
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 21.]
Sir: I have the honor to transmit for records of the Department a copy of a letter dated December 19, 1940,27 addressed by major Evans F. Carlson, U. S. M. C. (resigned), to Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Adviser on Political Relations of the Department, in which the former offers his observations and conclusions in relation to a three-months’ trip he has just completed through unoccupied portions of the provinces of Kwangtung, Kiangsi, Fukien, Chekiang, Anhwei, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kweichow and Szechuan. Major Carlson who, it will be recalled, made an extended journey through the guerrilla areas of North China in the summer of 1938, was accompanied on his present trip by Mr. Rewi Alley to the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives.
Major Carlson offers the conclusion that the present trend in China is toward “fascism” for the following reasons: (1) the desire of the Kuomintang leaders to perpetuate themselves in power; (2) alleviation of fears of rightist elements of the Kuomintang that Japan would obtain control of China and replacement thereof by fear of a “popular movement”; (3) German successes in Europe; (4) strengthening of the so-called Chen Brothers Group by increasing support from the “Political (Science) Group”, as well as the outward success of the Wang Ching-wei regime; and (5) lack of faith on the part of so-called “democratic groups” that the United States would lend more than nominal aid to China. Major Carlson also suggests that the administrators of the eastern provinces have increased their power as a result of the Sino-Japanese conflict; he makes note, moreover, of the infiltration of Japanese goods. In evaluating the trends as he observed them, Major Carlson considers that they have brought about “a serious disruption of the united front” and that the communist armies have been “isolated from the rest of China”. He offers the suggestion that the United States should, in granting more aid to China, exact definite assurances that there will be no compromise with Japan; and that the United States should lend support to organizations in China which are “laboring to acquaint the people with the fundamental principles of democratic processes”.
I should like to offer the following comment in regard to the various observations and conclusions of Major Carlson.
[Page 478]With regard to point 1) I share Major Carlson’s view that the leaders of the Kuomintang wish to ensure their own retention in power; that is only normal and natural, as he has indicated. But it is difficult to subscribe to the statement that the leaders of the Kuomintang have not initiated “any measures designed to promote representative government”. Prior to the beginning of the Sino-Japanese conflict the present Kuomintang-sponsored Government was generally credited with appreciable progress in the way of reforms. That Government has always professed to have before it the goal of a San Min Chu I28 democracy—a constitutional demo-racy—and, insofar as I have been able to ascertain, that is still the goal of the Government after three and one-half years of struggle against Japanese aggression. Following the outbreak of hostilities the Government established the People’s Political Council with limited advisory powers; recently the council has been enlarged and its powers enlarged. The communists and the various other Chinese political parties as distinguished from the Kuomintang are represented in the Council. Moreover, at the last plenary session of the Central Executive and Central Supervisory Committees of the Kuomintang a resolution was passed to convoke the People’s National Congress and enact a constitutional form of Government. Unfortunately, owing to many difficulties and dangers it has not yet been found practicable to convene the Congress; the latest reports are to the effect that the Congress is to be convened within a few months of the cessation of hostilities. In his latest official pronouncement,* made on December 31, 1940, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek said in part when dwelling on the subject of reconstruction: “Ultimately the goal is complete realization of the Three People’s Principles and the establishment of the Five Rights Constitution”. The Chinese communists have complained of restrictions against their activities, and it is believed that these complaints are partially based on fact; but it would appear that restrictions of a political character are no more stringent than was the case before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict. In some respects they are less stringent: for example, the communists are permitted to publish a daily newspaper and other periodicals in Chungking and to establish communist offices in various cities in the unoccupied provinces.
Rather than carry out the practices alluded to in the paragraph immediately preceding, the Central authorities might have been expected to seize upon the pretext of large-scale hostilities and a life-and-death [Page 479] struggle to add to their own powers, to extinguish so far as practicable all political opposition. But these have not occurred. On the contrary, the Chinese communists have been permitted to keep their own armies intact in specially designated areas. Attempts to regiment the people, to ration the necessities of life, to force the public to subscribe to bonds, to requisition their properties—all these and many other totalitarian methods of prosecuting warfare have experienced minimum utilization in China during the present struggle. The central authorities have apparently preferred to “muddle along” rather than endeavor to change the life currents of the people through the machinery of official control. It is my view that since the fall of the Manchu dynasty and the collapse of the traditional Chinese concept of government the Chinese people have been feeling their way along toward a new, evolving form of government. A definitive form of government has not yet been established and may not be established for decades; it may or may not be in the form of a democracy, but it will be a type of government that will be adapted to the needs of China and its people. It is doubtful whether in establishing a durable form of government the Chinese will be so much influenced by foreign concepts as by their own innate requirements.
With regard to point 2) of Major Carlson’s conclusions, I suggest that the “rightist” groups of the Kuomintang, in common with the so-called “leftist” and “moderate” elements of that organization and the communists and other political factions, all feel that China’s chances of ousting Japan from China are better now than at any time since the start of the conflict, largely owing to the change in the international groupings of the Powers and the increasing possibility of foreign aid to China. Of course, as Major Carlson hints, it seems scarcely deniable that the better the possibility of the present Government’s defeating Japan, the more freedom it will be the Government’s to dictate its desiderata to the Chinese communists whom they regard as possessed with the overweening ambition to govern and control China.
With reference to the so-called cliques within the Kuomintang, it is my observation, though I have no supporting evidence, that the power and influence of the groups, perhaps exaggerated in the past, has been more or less in eclipse since the Sian Incident and especially since the start of the Japanese military attack on China. In the very beginning of the conflict, the so-called “pro-Japanese” elements either repudiated their Japanese leaning or lost their influence in China. And the so-called Wang Ching-wei group, usually regarded in the period preceding hostilities as being inclined toward compromise with Japan, was of course shattered with the flight from Chungking of Wang Ching-wei. It is true that the Chen brothers, Li-fu and Kuo-fu, [Page 480] remain in Chungking and that they are cordially hated by the Chinese communists; but is believed that their power and influence here are perhaps much less than formerly in Nanking, for they have been uprooted from Kiangsu, the province in which they wielded much power. Chen Li-fu, as Minister of Education, is in a position to influence the thoughts of the younger generation, but it may be suggested that this power is not all-inclusive or decisive. Of the various cliques said to exist in the Kuomintang, it would appear that the so-called “Wangpoo” or military faction is at present most influential in the councils of General Chiang Kai-shek. This group or faction is, of course, bitterly hostile to the Chinese communists; but like the communists it wishes to continue resistance to Japan until the latter is forced to withdraw from China. But it seems clear that the influence of any of the cliques or of their leaders pales in significance besides that of the Generalissimo. Today his influence is decisive in the deliberations of the Kuomintang, it is he who makes the final decisions. As he has grown in stature, as he has come to be recognized as the symbol of united resistance to Japanese encroachment, so has the influence of the various cliques seemingly waned.
In the absence of a definition it is difficult to discuss the question of a “strong popular movement” in China. If by that is meant the mass mobilization or regimentation of the people, as has been advocated by the Chinese communists, it would appear that the Kuomintang and the National Government are not overly enthusiastic. It is true that the Generalissimo has sponsored the “spiritual mobilization movement” and the San Min Chu I Youth Corps, but it would seem that these manifestations of a popular-movement character were designed to counteract communist activities in that field and have not been rewarded by any concrete success. The most marked accomplishment in the way of promoting a mass movement appears to have been achieved in fostering popular antipathy toward Japan, but that seems to have been more the result of actions on the part of the Japanese than of positive acts on the part of the Kuomintang and the National Government. It is difficult to ferret out the real reason why the central authorities have done little to foster a popular movement in China. It may be because of fear, as Major Carlson suggests, or it may be because of some other reason which is not so apparent. It may be because of apathy or of a conscious shrinking from such a tremendous and momentous task; or it may spring from a feeling that the mass mobilization is not desirable or not called for at this time. Perhaps I have left the impression that the national authorities and the Kuomintang are wholly opposed to any movement of a popular character. Such an impression would seem scarcely correct; for the National Government has fostered various types of cooperatives, [Page 481] has encouraged various hsien experiments, and has re-established the traditional “Pao Chia” system. It might be more correct to assert that the Kuomintang and the National Government are desirous of not encouraging popular movements of a political character that might menace its security or enable another political party to ascend to power.
With reference to conclusion 3), I believe that it would be correct to say that last June, July and August, at a time when Germany was sweeping all before it in Europe and when the attitude and policy of the so-called democracies toward China was unclear, there was a segment of influential opinion in China which wished to abandon China’s policy of pinning dependence on the United States and Great Britain for a policy of alignment with Germany and the Axis. However, demonstrated British ability to resist a German invasion of England, the signing of the Tripartite Pact, the re-opening of the Burma road, the continued non-change in the Soviet Russian attitude of cooperation with China, and the decision of the United States and Great Britain to afford China certain assistance,—all these factors served to commit China to a firm policy of continued resistance to one of the Axis Powers—Japan—and to a more certain policy of collaboration with those Powers which have indicated willingness to aid China. Accordingly, German influence in China has waned and at present is of little consequence. Chinese public opinion tends to classify German aims and objectives with those of Japan. It would seem at this time that German actions in Europe, far from fostering fascism in China, are tending to discourage it.
Point 4), as enumerated by Major Carlson, has been discussed in part above. Concerning the reference to the “outward signs of success which are being manifested by the Wang Ching-wei government at Nanking”, it would appear that, since the publication of the Abe-Wang “treaty” of November 30, 1940, revealing the Japanese determination not to disgorge gains acquired in China and the willingness of Wang to sign away China’s attributes of sovereignty without receiving anything in return, the antipathy and contempt of the average Chinese toward Wang and his regime is higher than ever. The few Chinese who apparently entertained the vestige of a hope that Wang Ching-wei was endeavoring in all sincerity to arrange an equitable and just peace seem finally to have been completely disillusioned. It is difficult to perceive how the signing by Wang Ching-wei of the iniquitous document at Nanking could in any way be regarded as strengthening any particular clique in the Kuomintang—unless it be the military group which is resolved on resistance to the end.
With reference to conclusion 5), as presented by Major Carlson, it is my view that the so-called “pro-American and democratic groups” [Page 482] were of the opinion all along that the United States would finally decide to grant China concrete assistance if China continued resolutely to oppose Japanese aspirations to dominate East Asia and drive the Western Powers from its shores; otherwise they would never have adopted such a policy. The above-described policy has time and again been solemnly pronounced and consistently followed by General Chiang Kai-shek since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict; and it has been concurred in by the majority of the Chinese leaders. It is apparent, however, that in July and August of 1940 there was a period of uncertainty: it was then that Great Britain, fighting for existence in Europe, closed the Burma road on Japanese insistence, it was then that the position and attitude of the United States and Soviet Russia, in the face of the German assault on western Europe, was not wholly revealed in terms of future Far Eastern policy. But since the signing of the Tripartite Pact, and the reaction thereto in the United States, the Chinese attitude has been firm in opposition to the Axis. Chinese leaders wish to cooperate with the United States and Great Britain and Soviet Russia; in return for assistance from those Powers, they are unquestionably desirous of carrying on the struggle with Japan, not so much to keep Japan occupied vis-à-vis the United States and Great Britain as to drive the Japanese from the territorial confines of China. The Chinese feeling and attitude toward the United States were never better than at present. The Chinese now consider that they are joined with the United States and Great Britain in an integral struggle against the aggressor Powers; they feel assured that they will be supplied with the wherewithal to repulse the Japanese; and they now feel that victory is virtually theirs.
It is doubtful if the helpful attitude of the United States and Great Britain will have any marked effect on political trends in China as viewed from the long swing; it seems probable, as I have stated above, that it will take decades to work out a definitive form of government. In all probability the youth of China, who view conditions through different eyes than their elders, and as yet unknown leaders, will play a large part in shaping up the ultimate form of government adopted in this country. But looking at the situation from the short swing, it would seem that American and British support of the Central Government will place the latter in a position where it can exert increasing pressure on the Chinese communists whose continued growth and expansion has become a matter of serious concern to the leaders of the Government from Chiang Kai-shek on down. Indeed, that pressure is already in process of being exerted to the end that communist military units now based in central China shall be removed to the north of the Yellow River to join other communist forces in forming a barrier between the forces of the National Government and those of [Page 483] the Japanese. Whether the communists will bow to this unwelcome pressure is not altogether clear. It appears that they are prepared, perhaps as a gesture, to start the northward trek from Central China of their military forces. With conditions as they are at present, I am of the opinion that the communists will find it desirable to remove slowly northward. In the end a compromise is not unlikely; the Kuomintang and the communists have been able to cooperate fairly well on the large issues since the Sian Incident because they must do so if they wish to stand up to their common enemy—Japan. I believe they will be able to continue this loose form of cooperation, at least until Japan is removed as a major threat. Thereafter Kuomintang-communist developments cannot be predicted with any surety.
I believe that Major Carlson is correct in his statement that there is more autonomy in the governing of the eastern provinces than was the case before the start of hostilities, for the very good reason that General Chiang and the authorities of the Government at Chungking do not have the requisite time to devote to the problems of these far-off provinces; they are more concerned with the general prosecution of hostilities, with the international situation, with the development of west China as a secure base. But I believe that the records of General Ku Chu-tung, Chen Yi, Hsiung Shih-hui and Huang Shao-hsiung belie reports of a sympathetic attitude toward Wang Ching-wei or of a desire to capitulate to the Japanese.
With regard to the importation of Japanese goods into the unoccupied areas, I am informed that this is a common occurrence not only in south and central China but also in north China, even in the areas garrisoned by the communist forces. Why? Because substitute goods are unobtainable and because of the cheapness of Japanese goods. There is a very real shortage of cheap manufactured goods throughout all the unoccupied areas and, unfortunately, the Japanese can and do supply that demand. The people prefer Japanese goods to no goods at all.
I cannot share Major Carlson’s recommendation that we should condition our assistance to China on assurance of a political nature. With reference to the question of a compromise with Japan, I feel certain that if we supply China with the implements of war that she requires—especially airplanes and artillery—and afford her financial support, there will be absolutely no question of General Chiang Kai-shek and his Government’s coming to a compromise with Japan. General Chiang has said all along that he would require the withdrawal of all Japanese forces from China as a condition precedent to negotiation of peace terms, and so far as I know he is still of that frame of mind. I am of the opinion that we should be very chary in the matter of lending official support to various specified organizations in China [Page 484] merely because they are “laboring to acquaint the people with the fundamental principles of democratic processes”, even though they are regarded in all respects as worthy organizations. As Major Carlson phrases it “we can take no action which can be regarded as attempting to interfere with the internal affairs of the nation”. For, after all, we recognize and carry on relations with the National Government and there would seem to be no reason, as far as I can see, why we should not continue to do so. If we feel that certain organizations in China, such as the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives—which has made a worthy contribution—merit our help, then it seems to me that that assistance should be furnished in cooperation with the National Government, and not in a manner tending to embarrass or cast reflection upon that Government.
Respectfully yours,